[ G.R. No. L-13663, March 25, 1960 ]
ESPERIDION ADORABLE, ET AL., CLAIMANTS AND APPELLEES, VS. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, MOVANT AND APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The claim of the appellant Director of Forestry that he is entitled to a personal notice of the hearing in this case seems to have been based on the provisions of section 32, Act No. 496 (as amended by section 2, Republic Act 96), that:
"* * * If the land borders on a river, navigable stream, or shore, or an arm of the sea where a river or harbor line has been established, or on a lake, or if it otherwise appears from the application or the proceedings that the National Government may have a claim adverse to that of the applicant, notice shall be given in the same manner to the Solicitor General, the Director of Public Works, the Director of Lands, and the Director of Forestry. * * *"
Since the description of the land here in question does not show that it borders, on a river, stream,, sea, or lake, and considering the fact mentioned by the court that an employee of the Bureau of Forestry was present all throughout the hearing with a map of the cadastre but did not make any claim in behalf of said Bureau, the omission to send personal notice of the hearing to appellant can not be considered a violation of section 32 of Act 496.
But while the lower court was not legally bound to send personal notice of the hearing to appellant, it does not mean, however, that it acted correctly and within legal bounds in summarily dismissing appellant's motion for reconsideration and new trial without any inquiry as to the truth of the facts alleged therein. Appellant based his motion on the claim that a portion of the land in question either is needed for river bank protection or forms-part of permanent timberland. If this claim that any portion of the land in question still forms part of the public forests is true, then possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it, into private property (Vaño vs. Government of the Philippines, 41 Phil., 161), and such portion would fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the torrens system (Nicolas vs. Jose, 5 Phil., 589; Vaño vs. Government of the Philippines, supra). Hence, the lower court should have set appellant's motion for hearing to receive evidence on his allegations, in order that any portion or portions of the land in question that should form part of the forest or timber zone may be excluded and segregated from the decree of registration in favor of appellees.
The order appealed from is, therefore, set aside, and the records are remanded to the court of origin for a hearing on the motion for reconsideration and new trial of the appellant Director of Forestry, after which a new judgment shall be rendered with respect to Lot No. 3249. No costs.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.