These are  twenty-four of 89  cases decided  by the  Court of Appeals in a single consolidated decision, promulgated on  July 27,  1961, the dispositive  part  of which provides as follows:

"Upon the  foregoing considerations, the  writs of certiorari  and prohibition are granted  in the  cases of the petitioners who are buyers of lots   within the  Tatalon Estate,  whose  names are included in the list of buyers in annex B  of the compromise  agreement, and who made known their intention to buy the lots occupied by them, and  have filed the appropriate  actions  in court,  for, as  already stated hereinabove, said petitioners, as defendants in the ejectment suits, can not  be  ejected  from the premises occupied by them, notwithstanding the final decisions in the ejectment suits filed  against them, until after  their rights to the land have been finally determined in the pending actions.  As  to the  petitioners who  do not come within the scope  of the foregoing ruling,  their petitions are dismissed. On equitable considerations no pronouncement as  to costs is hereby made."

and against which  petitioner J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., interposed a petition for certiorari on the ground of grave errors of law.

The cases were initiated by  petition  for certiorari and prohibition, filed  by the occupants of lots in the Tatalon Estate in the Court of Appeals, seeking to prohibit Judge Hermogenes Caluag of  the  Court  of  First Instance  of Quezon City  from  enforcing execution of  his final and executory  decisions and  orders of  execution  previously rendered against them in the numerous litigations involving possession  of lots in  the Tatalon  Estate  in  Quezon City.  The Court of Appeals  in its decisions, declared that these   individual  respondents  (petitioners below)

"were defendants in separate  complaints  filed by J. M. Tuason  & Co., Inc.,  in the   Court of  First Instance of Rizal,  Quezon City branch.  The nature of the actions  was to  recover  possession of portions of a parcel of land included in a bigger tract of SO "quiñones", covered by transfer certificate of  title  No.  1267   (37686-Rizal), in  the name of J. M. Tuazon & Co., Inc., and occupied by the defendants.  Service of summons  and complaint  upon  each defendant was  fully   made by  the  process server.  The regularity  and validity of the service of process upon each defendant  has  not been assailed.   The court, therefore, acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendants.

In respect of the proceedings   had in  connection with  the trial of the above-entitled cases in the  lower court, it  appears that there were defendants who have filed answers to the complaint, and were present at  the trial during which  the parties adduced  evidence. There were defendants   who have also filed answers to the complaint, but failed to appear at the trial,  and the plaintiff adduced evidence in their absence.  And other  defendants  were declared  in default, upon  petition of the  plaintiff, for  failure to file  answers  to the complaint.   In those cases, too, the plaintiff presented evidence.  The petitioners come within either  of  the three categories of defendant. Separate decisions were rendered in each case, wherein the defendant was ordered  to vacate  the premises occupied by him,  to  remove his house erected on the land, and to pay to the plaintiff damages  in concept of rental for the use and  occupation of the  property.  Some of  the defendants who were declared in  default, or who  failed  to appear at the trial, presented  motions to be relieved from the effect of the judgment or  order.  After due  hearing the motions  were denied.  No appeal from the aforesaid  orders  was  ever  taken by the defendants concerned.  The decisions rendered in the cases have become  final and executory  as  no appeal  has   been interposed by the defendants from  said decisions."  (Italics supplied)

The  grounds relied upon by the  petitioners below  (now respondents)  are  common to all petitions, and are  thus described  in  the decisions under review:

"All the  above-named petitioners are represented in this  Court by Attorney Cornelio S. Ruperto.  The petitions have  shown  a set and  unvarying pattern  in the narration of the facts which,  as already stated, are fundamentally identical in all the petitions. Typical of the allegations in the petitions  are the following:  (a)  That Aniana Deudor was and  is  one of the original owners and contracting   parties collectively  designated as  DEUDORS, as well as of the co-owners of  the undivided parcel of land  known  as the TATALON' ESTATE, ;  (b) That the defendants  in the  lower court, petitioners herein, are purchasers for value and in good faith of the portions of land occupied by them  which they have already paid almost the full price  of the land,  and  that they are  in possession  thereto;  (c)   That Tuason &  Co., has  absolutely no  right whatsoever  to  take any positive  action nor to file and bring  ejectment suits for recovery of possession against the herein petitioners, until and unless the  said respondent  has  completely paid the sum of  Pl,201,063.00  to  the contracting  parties  collectively  designated as DEUDORS as provided  for under the  COMPROMISE AGREEMENT  dated  March 16,  1953,  * *.';(d)  That the actions  for recovery of possession 'were  filed and brought  by J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., upon the strength of  the order  of  the respondent Judge, dated March 31,  1938  *  *  granting said  respondent corporation authority to file ejectment  suits and forcible  entry and  detainer cases not  only against the  DEUDORS,  but likewise against the lot holders  and purchasers in good  faith and  for  value  from the DEUDORS', and that  'the  said authority to  file  ejectment  suits is in direct violation  of the provisions of the COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, * * obtained by the said respondent J.  M. Tuason & Co., Inc., through  collusive  schemes  and  processes  and grave influence peddling with the trial  court.  * *.  Petitioners' contention is   founded  on the decision, marked  Annex E, and  the  orders respectively marked  as Annexes  E-l  and E-2 of the trial court.';(e)  That on October 31, 1960, an action was filed  in  the Court of First  Instance of  Rizal,  Quezon City Branch, docketed as civil case No. Q-5492, in the name  of the Republic  of  the Philippines, by the BARRIO TATALON  GOVERNMENT;  and (f) That on February 24, 1961, a complaint for the expropriation of the TATALON  ESTATE  in the name  of  the   Republic of the  Philippines, represented by the Land Tenure Administration, was filed  in the Court of First  Instance of  Rizal, Quezon City branch."

Petitioners J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., (respondent below in  all  the cases)  resisted the  petition  for prerogative writs, mainly because, as admitted by the Court of Appeals in its decision,

"The  petitions under consideration are bereft  of any allegation that the petitioners are included in the list of buyers in Annex B of the compromise agreement"

between  Tuason &  Co.,  Inc., and the  Deudors,  in   case Nos.  Q-135, 139,  174, 177, and 186.  However,  the Court of Appeals held that

"the lack of such allegation in the petitions is  not a fatal defect nor substantial enough as  to  defeat  a right which has been  preserved or safeguarded for them."

As a result, the Court of Appeals  decreed, as  stated in the beginning of this opinion, the  suspension of the  execution as to those petitioners whose  names, as  buyers of lots in the Tatalon Estate,  appears  in the lists (Annex B), attached  to the compromise agreement between Tuason & Co. and the Deudors, and  who  have filed appropriate action in courts to purchase the lots they occupy.

Considering that  it has been  repeatedly ruled by  this Court that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari,  injunction,  and  prohibition,  in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, only in those cases where the parties have  a  right to appeal to that Court,^[1]  it is  clear that said court could  not  validly entertain the petitions filed in  these cases unless the judgments  and  orders of execution complained of could have been appealed to the  Court of Appeals.  But this is not the case, because the judgments  in ejectment against the individual respondents (petitioners below) were already final and executory, as expressly recognized in  the  consolidated judgment under review; and as to the orders and writs of execution of said final judgments, the same are, likewise, not appealable  (Molina vs. De la Riva(  8 Phil. 571), there being no allegation that the writs of execution have varied the tenor of  the respective  judgments (Castro vs. Surtida, 87 Phil., 166;  47 Off. (Supp.)  351, 354).  Having no jurisdiction over the cases,  the  Court of Appeals' consolidated decision now  before Us is without authority in law; hence, it is null and void.

The lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is also apparent from the fact that  the petitioners below  (now respondents) contended in their petition that the Court of First  Instance   "had no  power right  or  jurisdiction to enforce his controversial order dated February 28, 1957" (Petition in CA-G. R.  No. 28632, par. XVI), and that the execution of the final judgments rendered by the Court of First Instance in the  various ejectment  cases  should be suspended in view of the terms of the compromise between Tuason & Co.  and the Deudors, the pendency  of actions to fix  the price that should be paid by the persons whose rights as purchasers had been recognized by  Tuasons  & Co  and the Land Tenure  Administration's endeavors to expropriate the land.  Whether the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to  order that  its  ejectment decisions be executed, and whether the facts  alleged  were sufficient causes for suspending the execution of the judgments of ejectment, even if already final, and whether the Court of First Instance abused its discretion in refusing  to suspend execution, are pure questions of law that lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals  (Judiciary Act , sec. 17, Nos. 3 and  6).

It is well to note, in this connection, that this Supreme Court has previously ruled  (at least twice)  against interference  by the Court  of Appeals  with the execution  of final  judgments  under  similar circumstances  (Tuason & Co.  vs. Sanvictores,  L-16836, January 30,  1962, Tuason vs. Court  of Appeals  & Rosete, L-18128,  December  26, 1961).

Turning now  to the grounds urged for the  suspension of writs of  execution,   we find that the respondent  occupants of lots in  the  Tatalon Estate rely first on the compromise entered  into in 1953 between the registered owner, Tuason & Co., Inc., and the original claimants to the property,  the Florencio Deudors, et al., in Case No. Q-135 of Quezon City, and approved  by that court, wherein it  was stipulated as follows:

"SEVENTH. That the  sales of the possessory rights claimed by the DEUDORS, are  described  in the lists submitted by  them to the OWNERS which are attached hereto marked Annexes 'B' and 'C  and  made  part hereof.  Whatever amounts  may have  been collected  by the DEUDORS on account thereof,  shall be deducted from  the total sum of Pl,201,063.00 to be paid to them.  It  shall be the joint  and  solidary obligation  of the  DEUDORS to  make the buyer  of the  lots purportedly sold by them  to  recognize the title of the  OWNERS over the property purportedly bought by them, and to make them sign, whenever  possible,  new contracts of  purchase  for  said property as the current  prices and  terms specified by the OWNERS in their sales of lots in their subdivision known  as  "Sta.   Mesa   Heights Subdivision."   The DEUDORS HEREBY  advise  of the OWNERS that the buyer listed in Annex 'B' herein with the annotation  'continue'  shall  buy the lots respectively occupied by them and shall  sign contracts, but the sums already paid by them to the DEUDORS amounting to P134,922.84 (subject to verification by the Court) shall be credited to the buyers and shall be deducted from the sums to be paid  to the DEUDORS by the OWNERS. The DEUDORS also advise the OWNERS that 'the buyers listed  in Annex "C" herein with the annotation 'Refund' Dave decided not to continue with their former contracts or purchases with  the  DEUDORS and the  sums already  paid by them cto the DEUDORS TOTALLING  P101,182.42 (subject to verification by the  Court)  shall  be refunded to them by the OWNERS  and deducted from the  sums that may  be due to the DEUDORS from the OWNERS;"

They also invoke the case of Lucina Evangelista vs. Deudor et al.,  106 Phil., 170; decided by this Court on September 10, 1959, wherein this Court stated the following:

"It is clear that there  now exists a  sort of contractual relation between the  plaintiff  and Tuason  & Co.  as regards the sale of Lot No. 126; and that as regards said lot, plaintiff is the  purchaser  and has made payments  on  account of the purchase price, and Tuason & Co. acknowledges the partial payments already made, the same to  be deducted  from the  sum payable to  Deudor. That Deudor has an obligation and responsibility to the plaintiff there is no question; and the case  is still pending against him, thereby giving  the trial court an  opportunity to determine the nature and extent  of, said obligation  and responsibility."

However, there is a substantial difference  between the situation of Lucina Evangelista, in the case cited, and the individual  respondents herein, in that (as found by  this Court in its decision   in  106   Phil.,  170!) Lucina Evangelista was an immediate vendee of Pedro Deudor,  had made payments on account  of her purchase of lot  126, and, as a  matter of fact, her name  was included  in the list of purchasers Annex B,  appended to the compromise agreement between Tuason &  Co., and the Deudors, heretofore mentioned.  Moreover, Evangelista had filed action to  have her rights  recognized by the parties to  the  compromise.

On the other hand, it nowhere appears in the present case that respondent occupants had their   names included in the Annex  B to the compromise,  or that they had made  payments,  or  that  they had  filed suits  to compel recognition of their alleged rights as buyers  before the eviction  judgments against them became final.  The   Court of Appeals expressly  found as a fact  that

"the  petitions under consideration  are bereft of any allegation that the petitioners are included  in the list of buyers in  Annex B of the compromise agreement",

and that

"While copies of the aforesaid compromise agreement have been attached to the petition under consideration, the Annexes B and C of the compromise agreement are not included."

As the case now  stands, therefore, there is nothing on record  to establish  that the respondent occupants  (who are the ones that sought suspension of their  eviction by petition for certiorari  and prohibition in the Court  of Appeals against the Court of First Instance,  the Sheriff, and the petitioners Tuason & Co., Inc.,) were recognized by Tuason & Co., Inc., to be purchasers from the  Deudora, or that they  filed  in  due time actions to  enforce their supposed rights.  Neither is there evidence, beyond mere allegations,  that they were purchasers in good faith and for value, or had made payments on account of their purchases.  It  was no doubt due to absence of any such proof that the Court of Appeals was  unable to pinpoint  the individual parties whose  eviction  should be halted, and had to content itself with a hypothetical pronouncement in  its decision ordering the suspension of the eviction of those

"whose  names are included in the list annex B of the compromise, and who have made known their intention to  buy the lots  occupied by them, and have filed appropriate actions in court."

The  failure of respondents lot occupants to even allege, much less prove, that they are  covered by the list Annex B of the Tuason-Deudor compromise is strongly indicative that they were not included therein; therefore,  they are not entitled to have the ruling in Lucina Evangelista  vs. Deudor,  ante, applied in   their  favor.  Otherwise, they would  not only have averred the fact in their   petitions for certiorari,  but  they  would have also invoked their pretended preferential claims to purchase the lots they occupy in  the various  evictions proceedings  instituted  against them.,  before  the judgments therein had  (as they admit tedly have)  become  final and  executory.

In  Tuason & Co. vs.  Sanvictores,  L-16836,  January 30, 1962, this Court said:

"Assuming,  without deciding, that the Tuasons had really hound themselves to  recognize the alleged preferential rights of the vendees of  Deudors, it is more than remarkable that  appellee Sanvictores, one of the vendees, did  not  take steps to enforce his supposed  preference until after the adverse  decision  of the Court of First  Instanc3 in the possession  action had become final and executory in 1959. six  years after the Deudor-Tuason compromise was made.  This inaction of Sanvictores is all the more strange when We consider that  he could have set up  such preferential   rights as a defense  against the  suit filed  by appellant  Tuason  & Company against  him. If he really was entitled to  purchase the contested lot, the claim was  in  the nature  of a compulsory  counterclaim under Section 6 of  Rule 10, since it was necessarily connected with the right of possession asserted by the Tuasons, and did not require the presence  of third  parties  for its   adjudication.  Both under Section 6 of Rule 10, as well as Section  10  of Rule 9, the failure to set up such rights resulted in  a  waiver thereof, and they become barred after the judgment in the possessory action  became final. It was,  therefore, error  on the  part of  the  Court of Appeals to consider  that  the  determination of  appellee's alleged preferential right  constituted a prejudicial question  to  the execution  of  the final judgment of ouster against appellee.

The  argument that Tuason & Co., Inc., had no right to eject respondents  lot occupants until  and unless  it had completely paid to the  Deudors the amounts stipulated in the compromise agreement, has  no merit.  These respondents  were not parties to the compromise itself, nor were they  entitled  to  receive  such  payments.  Besides, this Court has already ruled in Deudor  vs. Tuason & Co.,  L-13768, May 30, 1961, that the obligation of Tuason & Co., Inc., to complete such payments became unenforceable by the Deudors' failure to comply with their own  obligations under the compromise.

As to the  supposed expropriation  of the Tatalon Estate, it  is enough to remark that the Court of  Appeals  has found  that  no such expropriation proceedings have been filed; and this Court has ruled  that until proceedings for condemnation are  fully instituted, and  possession of the property is taken over by the condemnor, the enforcement of  final decrees of eviction may not be constitutionally suspended (Teresa Realty, Inc. vs. Sison, L-14716,  April 23, 1962; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., vs.  Cabildo, L-17163, Oct. 31, 1962; Cuatico vs. Court of Appeals, L-20141, Oct. 31, 1962; Tuason & Co.  vs. Court of Appeals and Land Tenure  Administration,  L-18128, December 16,  1961).

"Hence, the mere filing  of  the condemnation proceedings for the benefit of tenants  can not,  by itself alone,  lawfully suspend the condemnee's dominical rights, whether  of possession, enjoyment or disposition. And this is especially the case where final and executory judgments of ejectment have been obtained against the occupants of the property."  (Tuason & Co. vs. Court of Appeals and Land  Tenure Administration, L-18128, December 16, 1961).

We conclude that the actions brought  by respondents  lot occupants in the Court  of Appeals for the suspension of the executions against them is untenable for lack of jurisdiction  in the Appeals Court  and lack of merit in their individual petitions.

Wherefore, the writs of certiorari prayed for by Tuason &  Co., Inc., are hereby   granted,  and the consolidated decision of the Court of Appeals in the cases above-entitled is hereby annulled  and  set  aside, without prejudice  to the appropriate action on the part of the lot occupants to  enforce  whatever  other rights  they  might  have, if any, against J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.  No costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Paredez and Dizon, JJ., concur.

 

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^[1]  Judiciary Act,  Sec. 30; Roldan vs. Villaroman, 69 Phil.  12; Ereslin vs. Luzon Stevedoring Co., 84 Phil., 618;  47 Off. Gaz. 3 1170; Tuason vs. Sanvictores, L-16836, 30 Jan.  1962; Tuason vs.  Court of Appeals, L-18128, December 26, 1961.