(1) in not holding that, by their inadequate  allegations  in the complaint as  well  as their   immaterial  evidence  adduced  during the trial, the respondents failed to establish liability  on the part of the petitioner to pay them P1 ,500.00;

(2) in admitting in evidence check for PI,500 (Exhibit G)  which was not  alleged  in  the complaint;

(3) in leaving unsolved the petitioner's motion for new trial;

(4) in not holding that the respondent's claim for Pl,086.0O was already   paid;

(5) in not holding that plaintiff's claim for P14,500  was neither adequately  alleged in the complaint nor  proved during  the  trial;

(6) in admitting in evidence the power of attorney (Exh. F)  with which respondents  intend  to   prove their above claim of PI4,500;

(7) in holding that  Exh.  F  (power of attorney) alone constitutes  sufficient  evidence  that Mrs.  Raquiza owed the  Ofiladas P14,500; and

(8)  in admitting  Exhs.  G,  G-l, G-2 and G-3 against the objection of the defendant for not being  alleged in the complaint.

The  findings of  the Court of  Appeals  are the following:

"It appears that  sometime  in July 1950, plaintiff Raymunda G. Ofilada purchased from a certain Rufina Vinoya a pair  of diamond earrings for Pl,500.  But to accommodate defendant Natividad Castellvi Raquiza, the  earring had previously been pledged  by  Mrs. Vinoya to one Mrs.  Maria de Guzman.  In   order to   redeem the jewelry,  the buyer  thereof  issued  a  check   (Exh. "C")  in the amount of Pl,500.00 in favor of Mrs. Raquiza for the  redemption of the articles pledged.   The  check  was cashed at  the Philippine National  Bank  by Mrs.  Raquiza who  did not utilize  the money for the purchase intended. Thus,  no  earrings  were delivered to Mrs. Ofilada.

The  paying teller  of the Philippine National Bank by the name of Pedro  Melendrez positively declared that the check was cashed by Mrs.  Raquiza.   He testified thus

Q.	Would you  tell the  Court the  procedure  when  a  check is presented to you?
A.	When a check is presented to  me for payment I verify the signature of the drawer; after  verifying the  signature of the drawer  I send the check to the  bookkeeper for  further verification of   the  drawer's signature and the balance'; then  the check  is given to me for   payment.  Before I pay the check, of  course I will have to let the payee,  the one who is cashing the  check, to sign in my  presence.
Q.	I am showing to you now a PNB check bearing No. 2094321-K which has been marked as Exhibit C, do you know this check?
A.	Yes.
Q.	Do you know the  person who  cashed this check?
A.	Of  course the signature  on  the  back will  show  that  she was  the one  who cashed the check.
Q.	Who cashed  the check?
A.	Mrs. Natividad Raquiza.
Q.	Do I get  you right that before you paid this check to Mrs. Natividad C. Raquiza you  required  her to sign?
A.	In  my  presence,  yes.
Court:
Q.	Where is  she now, do you know?
A.	She is there.  * * *."  (t.s.n.  pp.  38-39,  Samson)

It  also appears  that  on  September  21,  1950,  one transaction about jewelry was entered into by  and between Mrs. Ofilada  and Mrs. Raquiza,  who executed the  corresponding promissory  note

"I promise to pay Mrs.  R. C.  Ofilada the amount  of  Pl,086.50 before December  31, 1950.

(Sgd.)  Natividad Raquiza
Horse Shoe Drive"

(Exhibit "A")

On  July  23, 1956,  Mrs. Raquiza  executed a  special power of attorney  in favor of Mrs. 'Carmen  Vda.  de Castellvi authorizing her to pay  the total  amount of P14.500.00 to  Mrs. Raymunda C. Ofilada  and  Mrs.  Andrea  Ofilada  Veneracion.

Defendant, however,   insists that the amount of  PI,086.50  which she had  promised to  pay   before  December  31,  1950,  to plaintiff Raymunda C.  Ofilada  had  already been paid  in  behalf  of  the former by a certain Mrs. Castellvi who was said to have paid the sum of  P2,000.00  (t.s.n., p.  55,  April   10,   1955).  But, the promissory note evidencing the indebtedness  (Exh. "A")  has not been retrieved  from  the creditor,  plaintiff  Mrs.  Ofilada,  and there is is nothing on its bare  face to  show  that  it  was ever paid  by the promissor defendant Natividad  Raquiza, who admitted  having executed  the  same  (t.s.n., p. 18, January 23, 1958)  Under this circumstance, we could  not  believe that  plaintiff Ofilada would have the temerity of going to the extent of suing herein  defendant if the latter  had already  satisfied  her indebtedness  as  embodied in  Exhibit  "A".  If the creditor required  the debtor  to sign  the corresponding promissory  note  (Exh.  "A"),  like, in  the  instant case,  then the  latter  should  have reasonably asked the  former to hand  in the note and to indicate thereon that the same has already been  paid.  That is the normal  and ordinary way  of dealing  on this kind of  transaction.   And  since this has not  been  done,  we are not  inclined, much less satisfied,  to  believe defendant's pretension that she had already paid her obligation under Exhibit "A".

The complaint as well  as  the evidence satisfactorily establishes the fact  that  herein  defendant is   under  obligation  to  plaintiff Ofilada in the sum  of Pl,500.00 which was advanced to the former by the latter in the form  of a check for the purpose of   redeeming the pair  of  diamond  earrings  from  a  certain  Mrs.  Maria de Guzman. Defendant, however, did not redeem  the  precious articles and so nothing was delivered to   Mrs.  Ofilada who lost  money and earrings.  This is  what  they  say  in ordinary parlance "por nada". Of course defendant in trying  to shake off liability  under the check denied having   cashed  the same,  for, according to her, the signature appearing at  the  back thereof  is not  her  genuine signature.  In other words, she  wants us to believe that somebody had forged her signature  and thereafter  the  forger or somebody else  cashed  the check.  But, the  paying  teller, who  does  not appear to have any ill-motive towards  herein  defendant, positively declared  that she  was the  very one  who signed  the  check   on the back as payee.  While  there  is   an  apparent  dissimilarity between   the  admittedly genuine signature  of the defendant  and the signature appearing on the  back of  the check, yet  we cannot rule out  or  do away with  the  testimony  of the teller who, from all indications,   simply testified on what  he knew.  It  may be  stated in this  connection  that  the  signature appearing  at the  bottom of Exhibit "A" end those appearing  on  Exhibits  "F" and "G" are not  quite similar an   indication that defendant at times sign her name  in different ways.  For this reason, it  would not  be reasonable to say that she may have signed her name in a different way she cashed the  check  (Exh. "C".)  For all these  considerations, we hold and   declare that  plaintiff never  put up a theory different from  what she alleged in the complaint about  Exhibit  "B".

The check  (Exh.  "C") is an evidence  in support of what has been alleged in the  complaint regarding  the transaction relating to  the pair of earrings that were  previously  pledged  to Mrs. Maria de Guzman and later on sold by Mrs. Vinoya to herein plaintiff.  It was  established that  the  pledge was constituted  for  the benefit of the defendant. It  is not  true  that  plaintiffs failed  to adequately  alleged in the complaint  the  claim of  P14,500.00.  It  is  enough to  reproduce in this connection the  pertinent  paragraph

"6. That on July 23, 1956,   defendant herein executed  a power of attorney in  favor  of Carmen  Vda. de Castellvi for the  purpose of  paying the sum of P14,500.00  to  the plaintiffs herein as shown in  said special power of attorney  a copy of which is hereto attached and marked as Annex  "D"  which forms  a part of this complaint."

It should also be  stated that defendant  admitted the genuiness of her signature appearing on the special power  of attorney  (Exh. "F",  authorizing her  attorney-in-fact,  Mrs. Carmen Vda.  de  Castellvi, to pay  Mrs.  R. C.  Ofilada and Mrs. Andrea Ofilada  Veneracion the total sum of P14,500.00.

The special power of  attorney  (Exh. "F") is written in  English, a  language which, we  can reasonably say,  is understood by the executor thereof, Mrs. Castellvi  Raquiza,  considering that she testified in said language (Pis. see  t.s.n., p. 17,  hearing, Jan.  21, 1958). For this reason,  we  cannot  reasonably say  that she was duped  to sign the same.  We  are, therefore, satisfied  that  Exhibit "F" was  duly   executed  for  some lawful  obligation,  and  not  for any undesirable purpose.

Exhibits  "G", "G-l" and G-3" were  correctly admitted, for they may be considered for whatever they are worth in connection with the allegations in the complaint and   other  evidence  duly presented. It may be  stated that  defendant's counsel interposed  his objection as to the admission of Exhibit "G-2"  only.  All  of these Exhibits ("G", "G-l" &  "G-2") reflect the sale of  defendants  share in the expropriated  estate of her late father,  Alfonso Catellvi.  Plaintiff Raymunda   G. Ofilada declared that  "everytime  she sold to me a portion of  her  land  she  executed a document, and these  are the documents that  she executed   (t.s.n.,  pp.  21-24, Jan. 10, 1958).   A cursory reading of  Exhibits "G",  "G-l", "G-2" and "G-3" readily confirms the sale to Mrs. Ofilada and  Mrs. Veneracion of defendants participation in  the estate of her late father."

Ultimate  and not evidentiary  facts  are  to be  pleaded in a  complaint.  The  test of  sufficiency of a  complaint is, could a competent court render a valid judgment upon the facts alleged in it if admitted or proved?  If it could, then  the  allegations are sufficient.  The indebtedness of the petitioner has been established as found by the Court of Appeals.  This Court does  not find any error of  law claimed by  the petitioner to have been committed by the Court of Appeals, except an error of fact upon which this Court is not allowed to pass.   The error is to have taken into account Exhibit G  executed by the  petitioner on 17 February 1958 and Exhibit  G-2  executed on 16  May 1957  to support  in part the items  of P12,000.00  and P900.00 appearing in the special power of  attorney  (Exhibit  F, Annex D to the complaint) executed on  23  July 1956.  If, as testified to by respondent Ofilada, the special power of attorney executed  by the petitioner on  23  July 1956  in favor of Carmen Vda.  de Castellvi, was a  consolidation of all the receipts signed by the petitioner for money  paid by the former and received  by  the latter, then   Exhibits G and G-2, receipts signed by the petitioner on  17  February  1958  and  16  May  1957, respectively, long  after the execution of the special power of attorney (Exhibit  F)  on  23 July  1956,  could not  have been included in the amounts appearing in Exhibit F.  But the Court of Appeals found that   counsel for the  petitioner, contrary  to his claim, objected  to the  admission of Exhibit  G-2 only.  Be that  as it may, the fact  is  that in Exhibit F  the petitioner acknowledged to be indebted to  the  respondents  in the sums therein stated and authorized Carmen Vda. de Castellvi to pay the sums to the respondents.

The third error assigned is untenable, because by finally deciding the case without even   mention  of the new  trial prayed for, the  Court in effect denied the motion. The  judgment under review  is  affirmed, without  pronouncement as to costs in this instance.

Bengzon, C.J.,  Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera,  Paredes,  Dizon,  Regala,  and  Makalintal,  JJ., concur