This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of  Rizal,  Pasay City Branch, Hon. Jesus Perez, presiding, appointing Chung Kiat Hua as administrator of the estate of the deceased Chung Liu in Special Proceeding No. 1552-P of said court.

On December 7,  1957, Ngo The Hua, claiming to be the surviving spouse of the deceased Chung Liu, filed a petition to be  appointed administratrix of the estate of the afore-mentioned deceased. Her petition  was opposed by Chung Kiat Hua, Lily Chung Cho, Bonifacio Chung Siong Pek and Chung Ka Bio, all claiming to be children of  the deceased Chung Liu by his first wife, Tan  Hua.  They  claim that Ngo The Hua is  morally and physically unfit  to execute the duties of the trust as administratrix,  and  that she and the deceased have  secured an absolute  divorce in Taiwan, both being Chinese citizens, confirmed and legalized by the Taipei District Court, Taipei, Taiwan on  August 25, 1955. In this same opposition they prayed that  Chung Kiat Hua, allegedly the eldest child of the deceased, be appointed administrator  instead. These oppositors' prayer was in turn opposed by Ngo The Hua who claimed that the oppositors are not children of Chung Liu.

On January 13, 1957,  Chung Kiat Kang, claiming to be a nephew of the deceased, filed his opposition to the appointment of either Ngo The Hua or Chung Kiat Hua, on the ground that to be appointed, they must first prove their respective relationship  to  the deceased  Chung Liu, and prayed that he be appointed administrator.

The petition was heard and evidence presented by both petitioner Ngo The Hua and the oppositors Chung Kiat Hua,  et al When Chung Kiat Kang's turn to present his evidence came, he manifested, through his counsel, that he was waiving his right to present evidence in so far as the appointment of administrator of the estate is concerned. (t.s.n. pp. 3-6, hearing  of July 3, 1958).

On  December 2, 1959,  after a lengthy hearing, the lower court found that Ngo The Hua and the deceased were validly divorced by the afore-mentioned Taipei District Court, and that Chung Kiat Hua, Lily Chung Cho, Bonifacio Chung Siong Pek and Chung Kiat Bio are children of the deceased. So it issued the order appointing Chung Kiat Hua as administrator of  the estate of Chung Liu.

From this order, both the petitioner and Chung Kiat Kang appealed.   On May 30, 1961, however, petitioner Ngo The Hua filed  a petition to withdraw her appeal stating that she had entered into an amicable settlement with the oppositors-appellees.   Her petition was granted  by this Court in a resolution dated June 26, 1961.

Hence only the appeal  of oppositor Chung Kiat Kang remains for the consideration of this Court. Appellant  now contends that the  lower court erred  in passing upon the validity of the divorce obtained by the petitioner and the deceased  and upon the filiation  of the oppositors-appellees, such being a prejudgment "since it is well-settled  that the declaration of heirs shall only  take place after all debts, expenses and taxes have been paid" in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 91 of the Rules of  Court.

The pertinent portion of the section cited by  appellant is as follows:

"Section 1. When order for distribution of  residue made.  * * * When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowances to the widow, and  inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court * * * shall assign the residue of  the estate  of the persons entitled to the same * * *.

"No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations  above-mentioned  has been made or  provided for *  * *." (Italics  supplied)

A cursory reading of the above-quoted section   discloses that what the court is enjoined from doing is the assignment or distribution of the residue of the deceased's estate before the above-mentioned obligations chargeable to the estate are first paid.  Nowhere from said section may it be inferred that the court cannot make  a declaration of heirs prior to the satisfaction  of  these obligations.  It is to be noted, however, that the court in making the appointment of the administrator did not purport to make a declaration of heirs.

On the other hand, it is clear from the facts of this case that it was deemed  necessary by the lower court to determine the relationship of the parties, as advanced by the petitioner and the oppositors-appellees, to be able to appoint 2,n administrator in accordance with the order of preference established in Section 5,  Rule  79 of the Rules of Court. Said   section  provides that letters  of administration shall be granted to the surviving spouse,  the next of kin,  or to any  principal creditor, in  this order.  Oppositors-appellees denied petitioner Ngo The Hua's claim that she is the surviving  spouse of Chung Liu, and the petitioner likewise denied the oppositors-appellees' claim that they are children of the  deceased.  Since these applicants  were  asking for the letter of administration on the theory that they are preferred according to Section 5 of Rule 79 because of their relationship to the deceased Chung Liu, the lower court necessarily had to pass first on the truth of their respective claims of relationship to be able to appoint an administrator in accordance with the afore-mentioned order of preference.

Let it be made clear that what  the lower court actually decided and what we also  decide is the  relationship between the deceased  and the parties claiming the right to be appointed his administrator, to determine who among them is entitled to the administration, not who are his heirs who are entitled to share in his estate. This issue of heirship is one to be  determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court in the case at bar on the relation- ship of the parties is not a final determination of such relationships as a basis of distribution.

Having resolved the issue raised, it is unnecessary to rule on the other questions raised by the appellant Chung Kiat Kang.   It is well-settled that for a person to be able to intervene in an administration proceeding concerning  the estate of a deceased, it is necessary for him to have interest in such estate (Sec.  4, Rule 80, Rules of Court; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, 1957 ed. p.  382). An interested party has  been defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by the  estate, such as an heir, or one who has a certain claim against the estate, such as a  creditor (Saguinsin vs. Lindayag,  et al., G. R. No. L-17759, Dec. 17, 1962; Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa, 40 Off. Gaz., 1171; Williams vs. Williams, 113 Ga.  1006, cited in  Francisco,  Rules of Court, Vol.  1955  ed., p. 411).   Appellant Chung Kiat Kang does not claim to be a creditor of Chung Liu's estate.  Neither is he an heir in accordance with the Civil Code of the Republic of China (Exh. 28 of Chung Kiat Hua), the law that applies in this case, Chung Liu being a Chinese citizen (Art. 16, New Civil Code).  The appellant not having any interest in Chung Liu's estate, either as heir or creditor, he cannot be appointed as co-administrator of the estate, as he now prays.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.  So ordered.

Bengzon, C. J. Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Barrera Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and   Makalintal, JJ., concur.