Respondent Jose Hidalgo was a candidate for the  office of city councilor of  Tacloban  in the elections of  November  10,  1959.  The city treasurer sent notice to  the city board  of  canvassers to  convene on November 20,  1959, "for the purpose  of canvassing the returns of votes cast in the city  for Senators, Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Members of the  Municipal  Board, as well  as the proclamation of the city elect."  On the  same date Hidalgo filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of  Leyte, presided by respondent Judge Segundo  Moscoso, praying that a writ  of preliminary injunction be  issued to  restrain  the  board of canvassers from canvassing the votes cast in the city and from proclaiming the elected city officials, and that, after hearing, the injunction be made permanent.  The petition alleged several  grounds, to writ: that the city  treasurer was not authorized to convene the board of  canvassers, being neither the chairman nor a  member thereof; that the members of the board were not duly qualified to  act as such;  and that  the  board could not canvass  the votes in part, that is, without also including the  votes cast  for the offices of Govenor, Vice-Governor and members of the Provincial Board.  It was further alleged that proper petitions for the recanvass of the votes for Governor, Vice Governor, etc., had been filed with the Commission on Elections  on  the ground that  tho elections in Tacloban City had been characterized by terrorism and vote-buying.

Immediately  upon the filing of the  petition respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. On November 24, 1959, the City Attorney, in behalf of the city board of canvassers, filed his answer with an urgent motion to dissolve  the  injunction  and dismiss  the case. The  hearing was scheduled for November  28,  1959,  but on November 27 herein respondent Hidalgo filed an amended petition reproducing the allegations in   the first petition but stating the particular instances of terrorism, vote-buying and  other irregularities  allegedly committed  in  the elections in Tacloban City and praying,  by way of additional relief, that said elections be  declared  null and void. In its answer to the amended petition the city board of canvassers challenged  the sufficiency thereof to  support the writ of  preliminary injunction  as well as the jurisdiction of the court over the subject-matter.  These questions were heard, after which respondent Judge, on   Decembor 3, 1959, sustained his jurisdiction and issued an amended writ of preliminary injunction.  The next day, December 4, the other respondents herein, except the Judge, filed a motion for leave to intervene, alleging that they were candidates for mayor,  vice-mayor and   councilors, respectively, and making common  cause  with the petitioner below, herein respondent Jose Hidalgo.  The  intervention was allowed. The city board of canvassers, petitioner here,  moved to reconsider the order of December 3, 1959, and  after the motion was denied,  commenced the instant proceeding in certiorari and  prohibition to review and annul the actuations of respondent Judge and to restrain him from further taking cognizance of the action.   As  prayed for in the same petition,  we issued a writ of preliminary injunction on December 11,  1959, ordering respondent Judge to desist and refrain from proceeding in the action before him and from enforcing his order of preliminary injunction dated December 3, 1959.

On the first ground relied upon  by respondent Jose Hidalgo in his petition below, namely, that the city treasurer was not authorized to convene the city board of canvassers because he was neither the chairman nor a member thereof, it  is  enough to point  out that such authority was contained in the resolution of the Commission on Elections promulgated on August 18, 1959, deputizing the city treasurers, among  others, as election  officials and instructing them specifically to convene the corresponding  boards  of canvassers for their respective localities. The said resolution of the Commission  on Elections is reproduced textually in the answer to the petition below.

On  the second ground, namely, that the members  of the  city board of canvassers were not duly qualified  to act  as such,  it should be noted  that  the said  members, consisting of the city  superintendent of schools, the city engineer, the city health officer, the city register of deeds, the clerk of the municipal court, the judge of the municipal court  and the city auditor, were designated as substitutes for the city mayor and  six  city councilors, respectively, who  were all  disqualified  because they were candidates in the same election.  Such  designation is  in accordance with   Section 159  of  the Election Code.

The third ground relied  upon in the petition is equally unmeritorious, because the canvassing of  the votes for the candidates for provincial offices was  not the duty of the city board of canvassers but rather of the provincial board of canvassers.

The question of whether or not there had been terrorism, vote-buying and other irregularities in the 1959 elections in Tacloban City should be ventilated in a regular election protest, pursuant to section 174  of  the Election Code, and not in a petition to enjoin the city board of canvassers from canvassing  the election returns and proclaiming the winning candidates for municipal offices.  The duty of the board in this  regard is  more or  less   ministerial:  it does not pass upon the validity or invalidity of the ballots cast, and its action is necessarily without prejudice to the determination of such question in a proper court proceeding later.  This proceeding, under section 174, should  be filed within two weeks after the  proclamation of the result  of the election and  hence necessarily implies a previous canvass of the votes by  the  board of canvassers.  Both the logic of the situation and the interests of the public at large demand that the board be allowed to perform this duty.  If it should  turn out from the returns  submitted to it that the petitioner and  intervenors below (herein respondents)  had won the elections, the much unnecessary delay, expense  and labor would  have been  avoided.  If otherwise, then  the proper  election  protests  would be in order, wherein the  matters  raised by them could be duly heard and decided.   In  either case the prima facie will of the electorate would be expeditiously implemented, without prejudice  of course to the results of such protests as might  be filed.   On  the other hand, to  enjoin  the city board of canvassers from assessing the returns would result in a lack of incumbents in the offices concerned after the  termination of the current term and while the case remains pending in court.  This is not within the contemplation of the Election Code, which  provides for election contests only after proclamation of the winning candidates.

Furthermore, an injunction such as that issued by respondent court would prevent the city board of  canvassers from certifying the results of the election  even with respect to Senators as to which the Senate Electoral Tribunal has national  offices in the instant case, the offices of eight Senators  as  to  which  the  Senate  Electoral   Tribunal exclusive jurisdiction to pass upon any irregularities committed (Art. VI, section 11 of the Constitution; Nacionalista Party et al., vs. Commission on Elections 85 Phil., 149; Off.   Gaz., No. 6, 2851).

In view of the foregoing considerations, the writ prayed for  is granted, and the preliminary  injunction  we have heretofore issued is made permanent,  with costs against respondents  except respondent Judge.

Bengzon C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and Regala, JJ., concur.