This  is  an  appeal from the order of the Court  of First Instance of Negros  Oriental dated October 29, 1958, dismissing plaintiffs'  complaint  for lack of jurisdiction. The  complaint was filed September 17, 1958,  alleging that plaintiffs were permanent, year-round employees of defendants by virtue of agreements entered into between them and that, in violation of said agreements defendants dismissed  the plaintiffs from their employment.  It was prayed  that a writ of preliminary mandatory  injunction be  issued   for immediate reinstatement; and  after trial that the  dismissals be declared illegal and  plaintiffs awarded moral damages and attorney's fees.

'In their answer defendants  alleged that they had no agreement with plaintiffs with respect to the duration of employment and justified the  dismissals on  the ground that defendants  had entered with the United  Central and Cellulose Labor  Association  (UCCLA- PLUM),  the  exclusive bargaining representative designated by the C.I.R., into a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed-shop clause,  with  which  defendants, at   the instance of the UCCLA,  asked plaintiffs to comply,  but that plaintiffs failed to do  so,  whereupon defendants considered  them separated from employment as of   September 15, 1958.

In the order  appealed  from  the court declared  itself without jurisdiction because plaintiffs' claim for reinstatement was closely interwoven with a question  of unfair Labor practice.

Plaintiffs  now maintain  that the  lower  court erred (1)  in holding that it had  no jurisdiction over  the case; (2)  in taking into consideration   defendants' answer in determining jurisdiction; and (3) in dismissing the  case without defendants' having filed  a motion to  dismiss.

Appellants  designate their action  as one for "specific performance  with   damages  and  preliminary mandatory injunction."  This  description, however, is not necessarily conclusive as  to  the nature of  the action.  In  the complaint, after  alleging the conditions of their employment, appellants state the  manner of  their dismissal, thus:

"That, predicating their action on the notices to  the plaintiffs, copies of  which are hereto attached as  Annexes A to A-8, which notices are not based on any   of the causes specifically provided by law for dismissal of employees and violate their contractual obligations with the plaintiffs,  the defendants have  dismissed the herein   plaintiffs from employment  with them  as shown  in  the letters, copies of which are hereto attached as  annexes B  to B-8 and made integral  parts hereof." (par. 4,  complaint)

The above-mentioned  annexes   to  the  complaint  are deemed part  thereof and should  be  considered together with the formal allegations therein^[1] in order  to  arrive at correct conclusion  as to the nature  of  the  action. Annexes  A  to  A-8  are individual letters  dated August 11, 1958, sent by appellee Compañia Celulosa de Filipinas to appellants, informing them that on April 12, 1958 said company and the UCCLA entered  into  a collective bargaining agreement, one of the terms of which was that those employees who  were not yet members of the union should  be required to become members  15 days from the signing of the agreement, and should continue  to be so as  a condition of their continued employment;  that the UCCLA  had formally demanded from the company that appellants, who were not members  of said union, comply with said provision within 30  days  from notice; and that if appellants failed to register within said period, without the UCCLA  having  withdrawn its  demands with respect to   them, the company would  be constrained to  consider them separated from the service.  Annexes B  to  B-8 are individual letters to  appellants, informing them that since they failed  to  affiliate  themselves with  the  UCCLA, and the latter  had  demanded  prompt implementation of  the closed-shop  agreement, they were considered dismissed as of that date.

In  effect, therefore, the complaint avers that appellants were employees of appellees,   and that upon  their failure to become members of the UCCLA as required by appellees, the latter dismissed them.   This  is a clear statement of an unfair labor practice committed by the employers,^[2] cognizance of which, there being in the petition  a prayer for reinstatement, as in this case,  is given  to the Court of Industrial  Relations.^[3]

Appellants insist that what they  seek is not  the prosecution  of an  unfair  labor practice  but the  specific  performance of  their  contracts of employment  which had been violated by the unwarranted dismissals.  Be that as it may, the  alleged  manner  in which  the  employment contracts were breached, as described by appellants themselves, placed the case outside the  jurisdiction of  the lower court.

A  contract of  employment   may   be  violated  by   the employer  by unjustifiably dismissing  the  employee,  in which case  the general law of contracts applies, and the action to compel the employer to reinstate the employee is  cognizable  by  the court  of first instance.  However, if  the dismissal is discriminatory though also a breach of  a private contract ordinarily remediable by rescission or  reinstatement by way  of  specific performance it constitutes a violation of a public right which the  law specifically protects, and  for the  redress of which a specific procedure  in a designated court, i.e.,  the   Industrial  Court must  be  followed.^[4]

Upon finding that it has no jurisdiction  over the case, the lower court correctly   dismissed it, even though  appellees had  not moved  for  dismissal.^[5]

Wherefore, the  order appealed  from is  affirmed, with costs  against   appellants.

Bengzon, C.  J., Padilla, Bautista  Angelo,  Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes,   Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.

 

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^[1] The  copy  of  the  lease  attached  to  the  pleadings  under  the modern  rules  of practice, became  a part of the declaration  of the  petition, and both are construed together in  determining  the sufficiency of the statement or averments of  the cause  of action; (Cox  vs. Sinclair Gulf  Oil  Co.,  265 SW 196;   Warren  vs.  La Jomales, et al. vs.  Central Azucarera  de Bais,  et al.  

The petition and the document annexed are construed together, and error in the petition as to interest was amended by reference to the contract of lease annexed.  Vincent vs. Frelich, 23 S 373.

It has been  repeatedly held by  this and other courts that the mere reference to  a  contract in a  pleading  does not make that contract a part of the pleading, unless a copy of it is annexed. Du Pont Automobile  Distributors vs. Du  Pont  Motors Inc.  210 NYS 577.

The petition is  loosely drawn.  Had a  motion to make  more definite and certain been filed by  defendants,  it should have been sustained.  Aided,   however,  by the  bond  upon which the  action was  based, and a copy of  which was  attached, marked  as  an exhibit anl made a part of the petition, the  petition is sufficient as against a  general demurrer.  Davis  vs. Board of Com'rs  of Choctaw County,  158  p. 294.

^[2] It shall be unfair labor practice for an  employer to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to  encourage or discourage membership  in any labor organization, provided, that nothing   in this  Act  or in any other  Act  or  statute  of  the   Republic  of the  Philippines shall preclude  an employer  from  making an agreement with a  labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein,  if  such labor  organization  is  the representative of the employees as provided in section  12.  (Sec. 4 (a)  (4),  R.A. 875).

Nonetheless,  those already in  the  employ of  the company when the   collective  bargaining agreement was entered into, are not under obligation  to join the  Union to  keep  their  jobs,  Sumcad vs. CIR, L-18716, Apriil   29, 1963;  United States Lines  Co.  vs. Associated  Watchmen and Security  Union et al., L-15508, June 29, 1963.

^[3] The Court  (of Industrial Relations) shall have jurisdiction over the  prevention of  unfair labor  practices and  is empowered to prevent  any  person from  engaging  in  any unfair labor practice. (Sec. 5  (a), R.A. 875); Barranta vs. Internationa] Harvester Co., L-18198, April 22, 1963; Araullo   vs.  Monte de  Fiedad  Savings Bank, et al., L-17840,  April 23,  1963.

^[4] The reason  for the distinction between an unfair labor practice case  and a  mere  violation of  an  employer  of   its  contractual obligations towards an employee, is, as we have stated above, thus:

That  unfair  labor  practice  cases  involve violations  of a public right  or policy,  to  be  prosecuted like criminal offenses;  whereas a breach of an obligation of the  employer to his employee is only a contractual breach to  be redressed  like an ordinary contract  or obligation.  National  Labor  Union vs.  Insular Yebana  Tobacco Corporation, L-15363,  July  31,  1961;  Bagnio Gold Mining vs. Tabisola, L-15265,  April 27, 1962.

^[5] It  has been frequently held  that  a  lack of jurisdiction  over the subject matter  is fatal, and subject to objection  at  any stage of the proceedings, either in the  court below or on appeal (Ency. of PI. & Pr., Vol 12. p.  189,  and  large array of cases there cited), and indeed, where the subject matter is not within  the jurisdiction, the court may dismiss  the proceeding ex mero motu.  (Wakefield vs. Goudy, 4 111., 133;  190 Ind., 79;  Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496)  U.S. vs. Jayme, 24 Phil. 90.

Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it shall   dismiss  the  action.  Sec. 10, Rule 9, Rules of Court.