This appeal was  originally  addressed  to the Court of Appeals.   For the  reason, however,  that this case "is one in which  the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue and the evidence involved is  largely  the  same as the evidence submitted in   an  appealed civil  case  within the exclusive   jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,  within the meaning of Section  17, paragraphs  (3)  and  (5) of Republic Act No. 296,  the Judiciary  Act of 1948,"  We allowed  the endorsement of the same to Us  by the appellate court  above-mentioned.

The relevant circumstances which  precipitated the filing of  this suit, borne by the  records and established  by the trial court, are as follows:

1. On September 27, 1951, Federico Suntay the registered owner of  the fishponds  in question  situated  in  the  municipality  of Hagonoy, Bulacan, leased said fishponds to Virgilio I. Ramos, Maximo Santiago  and Graciano  Queyquep   for a  period of four  years beginning October 1,  1951  up to October 1,   1955.

2. On September 29,  1951, Federico  Suntay signed a promissory

note in favor  of the aforesaid  lessees, as follows:

"Value Eeceived  :.................................................. P30,000.00

For value received I hereby promise to pay Virgilio I. Ramos, Maximo Santiago and Graciano  Queyquep,  or order payable in  Quezon City within 3  years from the herein stated date at   10%   a  year.  In  case of  my  failure  to  pay  within the said  period  of  3 years, the  said  amount of   P30,000.00 shall be  consolidated  and   considered  as  additional  sura   to the consideration with corresponding  extension  of  period   of the contract  of lease entered into  between Virgilio  I.  Ramos, Maximo Santiago and Graciano Queyquep and  Federieo  Suntay, Docket No. 217, Book X, Page 4, Series of 1951 acknowledged  before  the  Notary, Apolonio  Amancio on the 27th day of  September 1951  at  the  City of Manila.

September 29, 1951.

(Sgd.)  Federico  Suntay

3. On October 1,  1951, Ramos, Santiago and Queyquep executed an "Assignment of Lease," whereby  for and  in consideration of the sum of P32,00O.0O Philippine Currency paid to them by the assignee, Fortunato  F. Halili, they sold,  conveyed, assigned and transferred unto the said Fortunato  F. Halili, all their rights  and  interest to the contract of lease   executed  by Federico  Suntay in their favor for the term  of  four  years,  beginning  October  1,  1951.  This assignment  of  lease,   according to Suntay, was   made by  Ramos, Santiago and  Queyquep  without  his  knowledge and consent;

4. On September  28, 1955, Suntay leased the  fishponds in question to  the  herein plaintiffs for  a period  of two  years  beginning October 2,  1955  and ending October  2,  1957   for  the  sum  of P32,000.;

5. On October 4, 1955, as   defendant  was  then in possession  of the fishponds  in  question,   and  as  he refused  to relinquish the possession thereof, plaintiffs instituted  an  action  for  unlawful detainer  against  said  defendant in  the  Justice  of  the  Peace Court of Hagonoy, Bulacan, which  was docketed as Civil Case  No.  96 of the   said  court;

6. On   October 5,  1955,  Suntay filed a  complaint in the  Court of  First   Instance  of Quezon  City  against  the herein  defendant Halili   together  with Virgilio I. Ramos, Maximo  G. Santiago and Graciano  Queyquep   (which  was  docketed as  Civil Case Q-1564) wherein  he prayed for judgment:

"I

(A)	Declaring the  lease evidenced by Annex  A and the assignment  thereof as  evidenced  by Annex  B, and plaintiff's promissory note,  to be null and void for lack  of, or for  failure, of  consideration, or
(B)	Declaring the  said lease  and the said  promissory note to be   null  and void  under Art. 1409 of the  Civil Code, in  relation  to   the   provisions  of the  Revised  Election Code;  and

"II

In either  event, sentencing defendant Halili  to pay plaintiff the  sum  of P64,000.00  for the use and  occupation  of  plaintiff's fishpond which he has  held from  Octoiber  1,  1951  to October 1, 1955.

Plaintiff  further  prays for his costs  of suit and  for  such other  relief as  in  the premises he may be entitled  to. 7. On January 1, 1956,  the Justice of the Peace of  Hagonoy, Bulacan rendered a  decision in Civil   Case No. 96, ordering:

"1. The  defendant  and all  persons  claiming  under  him,  to vacate the fishponds in question  and  to surrender possession thereof, to plaintiffs;

"2. The defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of   P2,200.00 a month as reasonable compensation for  the  use  and occupation of the  fishponds from  October 2,  1955  until defendant finally vacates the   same,  and

"3. To pay the costs of  the  suit.  The  counterclaim of the defendant is  hereby dismissed."

8. On May 23, 1957,  the  Court of First Instance of  Rizal, Quezon City  Branch,  rendered a  decision in Civil Case  Q-1564, the dispositive  portion of which declared:

"Premises  Considered, the court  hereby renders  judgment in favor of plaintiff Federico  Suntay,  by declaring the promissory notes as well as the contract of  lease, null  and void, as they were executed in violation of  Art.  1409  of  the new Civil  Code and Section 48 of the  Revised Election  Code, and insofar as the claim of damages of both  plaintiff and  defendant  in their respective pleadings  are concerned,   the  court dismisses the same for both are in part delicto, without special pronouncement as  to  costs.

9. The  parties  in  Civil  Case  Q-1564,  not  satisfied  with the decision above rendered, filed  their  respective  notices  of intention to appeal  and eventually elevated the ruling  to the Supreme Court.1 10. On  Appeal of the decision of the Justice of the  Peace Court to the  Court of  First  Instance of Hagonoy,  Bulacan,  the  same was reversed and the complaint dismissed.   The CFI ruled that the Justice  of the Peace could not have acquired  jurisdiction over the case and  that, consequently, it, the   CFI, could likewise acquire no appellate  jurisdiction to review the same.  In support of the ruling, the CFI said:

"After  a careful study  of the evidence  of record, it is our sense that plaintiffs'  right  to  the possession  of the fishponds in dispute depends upon the declaration of nullity of the  various documents under  which defendant bases  his right  of possession.  The basic  issue  involves not  merely the question of possession which 'naturally  flows  as   a   consequence  of the leasehold  right' but also 'the validity of  the source of the  right of  possession.'  In  order to  determine the  validity  of the leasehold  rights  of  the defendant, this  court perforce  has to make  a judicial  pronouncement or  finding as to  the  validity or nullity of the deed  of assignment executed in his (defendent) favor as  well as the  promissory note the issue involved and/ or  squarely  presented in  Civil Case No. Q-1564 of  the  Court of  First Instance of Quezon  City above-adverted  to.   It  is our considered opinion  that the Quezon City Court (now the Supreme Court   where the  case is on  appeal)  is the proper court that could  legally pass  upon and determine the  validity of  the documents  upon which  the defendant bases his  right to  possess  the  fishpond  in  dispute  and not  this  court or the court of  origin for that matter.  Until said case is finally decided in favor of  Suntay,  the  defendant  cannot  be dispossessed  of the property in litigation  by means of this action.Unless the contract of lease, assignment of  lease and  promisory note have been finally declared void by the  Supreme Court decided that it  did  not have appellate jurisdiction  over the case  and remanded the appeal to the Court of Appeals.

Court said documents are presumed  valid.  Undoubtedly, the justice of the peace court of  Hagonoy had no power to declare said documents upon which defendant bases his right void. ***." Plaintiffs-appellants  take  exception  to the  aforequoted ruling of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, assigning thereto the following errors:

First:	That the  trial court erred in finding that the  issue  involved in this case is not merely the question of possession but also the  validity of  the contract of  lease, the promissory note and the assignment of  lease:
Second:	That the trial court  finally erred  in refusing to take cognizance  of  this case in exercise of  its  appellate jurisdiction.
Third:	That the  trial  court  finally  erred in not  declaring the plaintiffs entitled to the possession  of the property in question,  together with the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the same.

We cannot subscribe to  the stand taken by the herein plaintiffs-appellants.

When the decision of the Justice of  the  Peace Court dated January 5,  1956 was elevated  for review  to the Court of First  Instance, the  latter court   could have acted on  the same only in the  exercise of its  appellate jurisdiction.   The exercise  of  appellate jurisdiction,  however, calls  for and demands a previous, legitimate  jurisdiction by  the court of origin.  Unfortunately, this requirement for  the proper dispensation of the Court  of  First Instance's appellate  jurisdiction was wanting in the case at bar.  It is the  Court's considered view that  the Justice of  the Peace of  Hagonoy,  Bulacan had no   jurisdiction over  Civil Case No. 96.

The disagreement of the parties in  Civil Case No.  96 of the Justice of the Peace of Hagonoy, Bulacan extended far beyond the issues  generally involved  in unlawful detainer suits.   The litigants  therein  did not raise  merely the question of who among them was entitled to the possession of  the fishpond  of  Federico  Suntay.   For all judicial  purposes, they likewise  prayed  of the court  to rule on their respective rights under  the  various contractual documents their respective  deeds  of lease, the deed of  assignment and  the  promissory  note upon   which they predicated their claims to the possession of the  said fishpond.   In other words,  they gave the court no alternative but to rule on the validity or  nullity of the above documents.   Clearly,  the  case was   converted  into the determination  of the  nature of  the  proceedings from a mere detainer suit to one that is "incapable of  pecuniary estimation"  and thus beyond the  legitimate authority  of the Justice  of the Peace  Court  to rule  on.  Under the Judiciary Act  of 1948, as  amended, civil actions  "incapable of pecuniary estimation"  can only  be addressed  to the original jurisdiction  of the Court  of First Instance (Section  44, par.  A).

Considering that, as  the  Court of  First Instance  of Bulacan expressed   it,  "plaintiffs'  right to  the  possession of the fishpond  in dispute depends upon the  declaration of nullity of the various  documents under which   defendant bases his right of possession," then  truly, only the Court  of First Instance of Quezon City  (now  the Court of Appeals)  could have legally decided that question for two reason:  First of all, the Court of First Instance  of Bulacan could not try the case, even  if it wanted to, because then  it would have done violence to Section 11  of Rule  40 of  the Rules of  Court which  says

"SEC. 11. Lack of Jurisdiction. A case tried by an inferior court without jurisdiction  over the subject matter shall be dismissed  on appeal by the Court  of First Instance.  But  instead of dismissing the  case, the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may try the case on the merits if  the parties therein file  their pleadings and go to  the trial without any objection  to such jurisdiction."

Pursuant  to  the above   rule,   therefore,  the   Court  of First Instance of  Bulacan  could   have  tried the case on the merits only had the parties therein filed their pleadings and gone "to the trial without any objection to such jurisdiction."  That  was,  however,  a  condition which could  have  not  been  met  for the reason  that a party thereto  has  precisely  "objected  to such   jurisdiction." Secondly,  the nullity of the various instruments under which the defendant (herein  appellant)  bases his  right of possession  was the  sole and  very bone  of contention in Civil  Case No.  Q-1564 of the Quezon City   Court of First  Instance (now Court of Appeals).  If the Court of First  Instance of Bulacan were to make its  own findings on that  issue, and, thereafter the  Supreme  Court  laid down  a contrary  ruling,  then  the  proceedings in  the Court of First Instance of Bulacan would only have  been rendered naught  since, naturally, the Court of Appeals's decision  must prevail.

One other observation may be pertinent.  There is no privity  of contract between the appellants and  the defendant-appellee.  The unlawful detainer case was  filed by the herein appellants ostensibly as an assertion of their right under the  contract  of lease with Federico Suntay dated September  28,  1955.   If,  indeed,   appellants  trace  their right to the possession of the fishpond to that lease   contract, then  We hold that the course of  action taken by them was  inadequate   and  essentially  erroneous. Under the premises, We believe that they should  have claimed their right  under the said  contract  against the lessor, Federico Suntay, and  not against the incumbent possessors who themselves had some colorable  right to the disputed realty.

Under Article  1654  of  the  Civil Code,  the  lessor is obliged:

In  view  of all  the foregoing,  the judgment  appealed from is hereby affirmed in full, with   costs against the appellants  in all instances.

Bengzon, C. J. Padilla, Bautista Angela, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and Makalintal,  JJ., concur.