An appeal  from two Orders  of the Court  of First Instance of Manila, dated January 23, 1961, dismissing  plaintiff's complaint  on the ground of  prescription of action, and March 4, 1961, denying motion for reconsideration of the first order.

On  December  21,  1949, the  CFI  of Manila rendered judgment  in  Civil  Case No. 9694, in favor of herein  plaintiff-appellant and against defendants- appellees, for the payment of various  sums of  money representing  loans.  As the five (5) year period within which to enforce judgment by  mere  motion,  had already elapsed, plaintiff,  on October 8, I960, filed a complaint  for revival of the aforesaid judgment.  Defendants, instead of answering the complaint, presented on  January 10,1961, a Petition to Dismiss,  claiming that the  action is now barred by the statute of limitations.  Plaintiff  opposed said motion, arguing  that although  ten  (10)  years and  nine  (9) months had elapsed since the aforesaid judgment was rendered, when the instant complaint for revival  was presented, its  action had not as then prescribed, because the prescriptive period had been legally interrupted when plaintiff sent two (2) extrajudicial   written demands to the defendants on March 29, 1954 and September  5, 1954, for the payment or satisfaction of the judgment.  A reply to the above opposition was filed by  defendants.  On  January 23, 1961, the trial court issued an  Order, to wit

"After  considering the  'Petition to Dismiss' filed by counsel for the  defendants, the opposition  thereto by counsel for the plaintiff dated  January  19, 1961 and the reply to the plaintiff's opposition filed with this Court  on January 21, 1961, for reasons stated in said  petition to dismiss and the reply to the plaintiff's opposition, the  Court  orders  the dismissal of  this complaint, with costs against the plaintiff, because the action has already prescribed."

Plaintiff moved to  reconsider the above order, in a motion dated February 21, 1961, wherein it elaborated on the grounds contained in its opposition to the Petition to Dismiss.  It supported its  motion  for reconsideration with the cases  of  Marella, et al. vs. Agoncillo, 44  Phil.  844; Compana General de Tabacos vs. Martinez, et al., 29 Phil. 515; and Aldeguer vs. Gemerio, et al., 68 Phil., 421.  The opposition to  the  motion pointed out that the doctrines enunciated  in the cited  cases,  are not  applicable to  the one  under  consideration.  On March 4,  1961, the trial court denied  the motion for reconsideration. It would seem that the only issue involved in the present appeal  is  whether  or not  the sending  of extra-judicial written demands, asking the satisfaction of the judgment, suspended  the  period within  which to bring  an  action upon said judgment.

It fs alleged that the  pertinent provisions  of the law that governs  the case are the following

"Article 1144.  The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of actions accrues:

*                *                *                *                *                *                *                *»

(3) Upon a judgment."

"Article 1152.  The period of prescription of actions to demand fulfillment  of obligations declared by a judgment  commences from the time the judgment  become final."

"ARTICLE 1155.  The prescription of actions. The  prescription of actions are interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a written extra-judicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written  acknowledgment of the debt  by  the debtor." (Civil Code).

The trial court held that the ten  (10)  year period was not  suspended: with  the sending of the written  extrajudicial demands;  that the provision  which  states that prescription of actions  are  interrupted when there is a written extra-judicial demand, refers to an action  which has not been passed upon in a Judgment, but not an  action to enforce  a judgment; that Article 1144  provides that action upon a judgment must be brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues, which is "from the time the judgment becomes final" (Art. 1152); that if written extra-judicial demands interrupts an   action upon the  prescriptive period on a final judgment,  the case will never be terminated; that the provisions  of the civil code, did not contemplate  such a predicament; and considering further that a judgment is ordinarily enforced by a writ  of execution,  as provided for in Sec.  6, Rule  39, and not by  an extra-judicial demand as contemplated  in Art. 1159, supra, it stands to reason that the said   extrajudicial demands,  refer to  those made  by the creditors before  an   action  is  filed  and not  in cases where final judgments  have already been  secured, as in the present case, and that for one thing, appellant  Bank is guilty  of laches,  in not  executing the  judgment in  its favor  for number of years.

We are of the opinion, however, that article 1155,  N.C.C heretofore  quoted, is not applicable to the instant case.
The judgment  in question became final on  December 21, 1949,  from which date prescription began to run.,  The new Civil Code took effect   August  30,  1950,  and  article 1116 thereof  states

"Art. 1116.  Prescription already running before the  effectivity of this Code shall be governed  by laws  previously in force; but if since the time this Code took  effect  the entire period  herein required for prescription should  elapse, the present Code shall be applicable even though by the former laws a  longer period might be required."

The law  applicable,  therefore,  in  determining  whether prescription has been  interrupted in the case at bar, is Act No. 190,  which provides as follows

"Sec.  50.  What shall  renew  right of  action When  payment has been made upon any demand  founded upon contract,  or  a written acknowledgment thereof or a promise to pay  the same has been made and  signed by the party sought to be charged, an action may be brought thereon within the time herein limited, after such payment, acknowledgment, or promise."

As will be seen, Section 50, gives as  grounds for suspending the running of the period of prescription when  payment has been made upon any demand founded upon contract or a written acknowledgment  thereof or a promise to pay the same has been made and signed by the party sought to  be  charged.   It did not include  written  extrajudicial demand made by the creditor, mentioned in Article 1155,  New Civil  Code,  above quoted.  This being true, the extra-judicial demands effected in the instant case, did not suspend the running of the period and the present action has already prescribed.

On  the  ground  herein set forth,  the  orders appealed from,  are hereby affirmed,  with costs  against  appellant Bank, in both instances.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,  Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.