The Embassy Motors  Workers Union  (PAFLU) filed this petition before this Court seeking to compel the Court of Industrial Relations to  execute  its resolution of February   14,  1959  which set aside the order of the court a quo authorizing the layoff  of  the  15 laborers  sought by the Embassay  Motors,  Inc.  Incidentally, it  is prayed that since  said  employees were laid off prematurely they should  be  reinstated with back  wages.

Sometime in  1957, the Embassy Motors Workers  Union (PAFLU)   filed a   complaint for  unfair labor  practice before the Court of Industrial Relations against the Embassy Motors, Inc. for having dismissed 15 of its employees due to alleged union  activities.  Judge  Emiliano C.  Tabigne, who was assigned to try the case, found the company guilty as charged and as a consequence ordered the reinstatement of the dismissed employees with payment of their back wages.  The decision was  affirmed by the court en banc, and the case having been taken to this Court on a  petition for review, the appeal was dismissed for lack of merit.

On  April 1,  1958, or barely three weeks after the re-instatement of the  15 employees,  the  company filed  a petition before the same court as an incident of the original case seeking authority to lay off the same employees on the alleged ground that they   had no work to perform due to the fact that the company was  suffering losses as a result of general business recession, lack of materials, and reduced dollar  allocation.   The case was again as signed to  Judge Tabigne for hearing.

The union moved to dismiss the petition on the  ground of lack of jurisdiction since it cannot be considered as an incident of the original case,  but without apparently act ing thereon, the trial judge set the petition for hearing on the merits.   And after the reception of the evidence, the trial court issued an order on November 20, 1958 holding that the court has jurisdiction to take  cognizance of the petition pursuant to Section  17, Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, while it ruled that the  company could lay off the  15 employees  who  had been  previously re instated  on condition that if the company should return to its normal business situation in view of the restoration of  its original dollar  allocation, the  laid off employees would be given priority of employment.  Without waiting for this decision to become final, the company proceeded to immediately lay  off the employees  above-referred to.

On  November 28, 1958, the  union  filed a motion for reconsideration of the   decision of Judge Tabigne,  which, on February 14,  1959, was reversed by the court en  banc by a split vote as follows: Presiding Judge Jose S.  Bautista, concurred  in  by Judge Baltazar Villanueva,  voted to reverse the decision on the merits, while Judge Arsenio I. Martinez concurred in the result on the ground of lack of  jurisdiction.  Trial  judge   Tabigne  dissented  in  a separate opinion.  The company moved to have the resolution clarified  considering that the same apparently appears to be merely supported by the vote of two members since the third vote  is based  on different ground, contrary  to Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as  amended, but the industrial court denied the  motion stating  that  it is clear  from its  disputed   resolution that  the  same  is sup ported by the votes of three judges.  "The  fact that the concurring opinion of one of the Associate Judge is based from  (upon)   different reason  is  of no consequence to the present issue."  Whereupon, the   company took the case to this Court on a petition for certiorari raising the same issue  raised by it in its motion  for clarification.   Again, this Court dismissed  the petition for lack of merit.

The resolution of February 14, 1959 having become final and  executory,  the union   asked  the  trial  court for its execution with  a view to the reinstatement of its laidoff employees with payment of back wages.  On  April 28, 1960, Judge Tabigne, to whom  the  motion was assigned, denied the motion reasoning that the  resolution which is sought to be executed is ineffective because  it  only finds support on the votes of two judges contrary to the requirement  of Section 1  of Commonwealth Act  No.  103,  as amended.  And on motion  for reconsideration filed by the union, the industrial court en  banc sustained  the order also  in a split resolution.   As  a consequence,  the union interposed the  present  petition  for review.

The main  issue to be determined hinges  on the legal effect of the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations dated February 14, 1959 which  set aside the order of the trial judge of November 20, 1958 authorizing the layoff of the 15 reinstated employees  as requested  by the company  considering that the same  appears supported only by the affirmative vote of two judges while the third judge merely concurred in the result, contrary to the requirement of Section 1, Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended.

The section above-referred to provides:

"Should any party aggrieved by a ruling or decision of any of the Judges, request a reconsideration thereof,  or at the request of any of them, the Judges shall sit together, and the  concurrence of at least three  of  the five Judges shall he  necessary for the pronouncement of  a decision, order, or award. * * *"

 It would appear that in order that there may be a  decision, order, or  award it is enough that the  judges com posing, the court sit together and that the concurrence of at least  three of the five judges be obtained.  It  is not necessary that the requisite number of judges  should agree on the  issues raised or on the reasons  that  each may advance  in support of their findings or conclusions, it being sufficient that they  concur or  agree on the  result. The issues may vary, the reasons may differ, but  if the judges arrive at the same conclusion, or agree on the same result, there  is decision.  This may happen when in addition to the majority opinion, some judges write concurring opinions expressing their views on some matters discussed or on issues raised, or when each writes separate or   individual opinions, but  if they agree on  the result, the  law is satisfied.   This   is  what happened  in this case.  Judges Bautisia and Villanueva found the order under consideration  erroneous  considering the nature of  the evidence presented  and the merits of the questions involved, while Judge Martinez found it untenable on the issue of jurisdiction.  In substance,  therefore, the three  agreed that the trial judge  acted erroneously  in  issuing  the order appealed from and so they decided to have  it set aside. We therefore hold that the resolution of February  14, 1959  is valid and effective because it finds support  on the affirmative votes of three judges as  required  by  law.

As a corollary to our ruling, it should be stated that the voiding of the order of the trial judge which authorizes the layoff of the 15  reinstated employees  has the con-comittant   effect of  a directive to  reinstate them since they  were laid  off   prematurely.  It appears that, even before said order had become final, because the period to appeal had not yet expired, the  company proceeded  to decree their  layoff.  Since the layoff was  unauthorized it is imperative that the employees  be reinstated with payment of back wages.

Wherefore,  petition is granted.  The Court of  Indus trial  Relations is hereby ordered to immediately  issue  an order of execution  of its resolution of February  14,  1959 with the directive that  the laid off employees be immediately reinstated with  back wages.  No costs.

Bengzon,  C.J.,  Padilla,  Labrador,  Conception,  Reyes, J.B.L.,  Barrera,  Paredes,  Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.