[ G. R. No. L-16307, April 30, 1963 ]
FEDERICA ABALLE, IN HER BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR SONS, RODOLFO SANTIAGO AND JUNE JOSE SANTIAGO, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. FORTUNATO SANTIAGO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
PAREDES, J.:
After due trial, a decision was rendered, the dispositive portion of which states-
"Wherefore the court finds that the plaintiff has not established any evidence to justify the claim for support and successional right under Art. 287 of the Civil Code, as well as the claim for moral damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and the complaint is hereby dismissed, without costs.
As paupers, the plaintiffs appealed directly to this Court, and allege that the trial court erred (1) in not holding that "because the material evidence of the plaintiffs-appellants, not being denied by tho defendant-appellee, is deemed impliedly admitted by him"; (2) in not
awarding moral damages to her, support for the minors and attorney's fees. Defendant-appellee did not file any brief.
Plaintiffs-appellants' theme may be gathered from the arguments, in support of the first assignment of error;
"We contend that the material evidence presented by the plaintiffs-appellants regarding the fact that the plaintiff-appellant Federica Aballe became the common-law wife of the defendant-appellee in 1947 up to an including 1952 (s. n. of Arroyo, pp. 3 & 4); the paternity of the minors Rodolfo Santiago and June Jose Santiago (s. n. of Arroyo, pp. 4, 5 & 6); Exhibits A thru K; and of the fact that the said minors were supported by the defendant-appellee since their birth until March, 1957 (s. n. of Arroyo, p. 11, Exhs. C to K), not being denied by the defendant-appellee are deeded impliedly admitted by him.* *".
In the first place, in his answer, regarding each and everyone of the 3 causes of action, defendant stated that he had no knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the averments contained therein and specifically denied the said three causes of action.
Secondly, at the trial, as stated in the decision, the defendant denied all the statements made by plaintiff Federica Aballe, as well as the documentary evidence presented (supra). This being the fact, there is no way of applying the provisions of the rule and the jurisprudence,
regarding admission by silence, cited by appellant.
The precariousness of the appellants' position is due to the fact that they appealed directly to this Court, and are deemed to have waived all factual issues, thus submitting the case on questions of law only. The factual findings and conclusions of the lower court perforce will
have to be admitted. And his Honor, the trial Judge, dismissed the complaint because the canonical baptismal certificates Exhs. A B, could not help appellants' cause at all, for they do not constitute the authentic document to prove the legitimate filiation of the children
(Adriano vs. de Jesus, 23 Phil. 350); Exhs. F 1 and H 1, appears to be envelopes addressed to the defendant, crumpled, soiled and empty, which could have been secured by plaintiff Federica. Aballe from anywhere, without the knowledge and consent of the defendant;
Exhibit C thru K, are fragmentary pencil notes on different papers and are without any signature on them, except some illegible initials; Exhibit F contains a writing which reads "darls" meaning "darling" and Exhibit K has a complimentary ending "darling", but no signature
appears below them. As found by the trial judge, none of these papers mentions the two minor plaintiffs to be the illegitimate children of the defendant, and no amorous manifestations, pretensions or references between the parties are shown in them; the plaintiff failed to prove
that the handwriting on them belonged to the defendant; that the testimony of the plaintiff, uncorroborated as it was, had been denied by the defendant; and notwithstanding her allegation that in 1952, she learned that the defendant was a married man, she did not take immediate
action against him; it was only on June 18, 1959 (almost seven years) that she filed her present complaint, after having been given, according to her, a house by the defendant in 1957 all of which had compelled the trial judge to dismiss the complaint, which dismissal, We find
to be well-taken. And in view of the fact that the trial court has not committed the first assigned error, further determination of the second alleged error is deemed unnecessary and irrelevant.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.
Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes J. B. L., Barrera, Dizon Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.