Plaintiffs  as  the  Heirs  of Mariano Blanco,  who in 1941 sola  a part  of  his homo stead to Molecia B.  Corpuz,   sued defendant s,   an   the   heirs  of Melecia,   to enforce" the  statutory right   of  repurchase   granted by section  119 of Commonwealth Act No.  141, and to recover damages.

Filed in the Isabela   court   of  first instance,   the complaint   is   dated June 10, 1952.

It   appears  that   the   conveyance  in  1941 was not   registered in the office  of  the register of deeds.    However,   on June 15,   1949  the lie its in plaintiffs  in  an "extra judicial  partition and  transfer", .made   after the death  of Mariano Blanco in 1946.   acknowledged  the previous  sale to Molecia Corpuz by making   it   appear that  they themselves  had sold the  land   to her.    This  deed, was filed with  the   register of deeds   on Juno   23,   1949.

The   principal   defense  rooted  on the   plea of proscription, the  five-year period   allowed by law having expired,   inasmuch as  the   sale  by Mariano had taken  place  in 1941. In  reply, plaintiffs  contended,   and the trial   jingo  so declared,   that the   five-year period  began  iron 1949 when   the   transfer had been officially recorded upon presentation of the aforesaid "extrajudicial partition".

The main  question in  this  appeal   is whether  the five-year period of  redemption began from the  date  of  the  execution of  the  contract   (1941)   or iron the  date  of  its registration in the  office   of   the register of   deeds   (1949). There   is no doubt  that the   conveyance   to Melecia 3.  Corpuz  was fully executed in  1941,   the  deed of   sale  having been   approved by the  Department .of Agriculture   on April  22,   1941.

The lower court,   and the   plaintiffs,   point   out   that,   because  the homestead was registered under the Torrens system, that  section of Act 496 providing;   that  the  "registration   (in the  registry  of deeds)   shall be  the   operative  act  to convey and  affect the   land governs the   situation;   aid that o on consequently,   the homo stead  should be deemed to have  been  conveyed on June 23,   1949, from which date  the five-year period  should be  computed.

This   Court has resolved  this   very in sac   in Galasinao  v. Austria,   L-7918,  May  25,   1955.    Mr.   Justice  Labrador for this Court said:

"Does   'conveyance' as  used above   (sec  119 C.  Act 141) mean   the   actual  sale or transfer,   or  does it mean   the   registration of  the deed evidencing it?    The trial court   held  that   'conveyance'  implies registration,  because Section 50  of  the  Land  Registration Act provider that the act   of   registration shall be the operative  act   to   convey and affect   the   land.    And plaintiffs-appellees  argue   in support   of   this  ruling  that an unregistered deed  does not  convey  title or ownership bat   operates   only as  an executory  contract  to convey.    Such a  construction is belied by the language   of the  law  (Section  50,   Land Registration Act)   it self,  which is   as  follows:

'x x x.    But no deed x x   x shall take effect   as  a  convoyance   or bind the land,  but   shall  operate   only as a contract  between   the   parties  and   as evidence   of authority to the cleric or registry of   deeds  to make   registration.x x x.',

In a long  line   of   decisions we have  held,   following the language of the law, that as between the parties of a contract of sale registration is not necessary to make it valid and effective, for actual notice is equivalent to registration x x x.

It  can  be  seen,   therefore,   that in so far   as   the  owner  of  the  homestead,   Jose  Lagon,   is   concerned, the conveyance mentioned in Section 119 of the Public land Law is the actual date thereof, and not the date of the registration of the deed of sale. x x x

As  respects  tic   children  of  Jose  Lagon,  the other   plaintiffs-appellees,   they may not be   considered  third  parties because  there is a privity  of Interest between  them and  their  father.    They only succeed to whatever rights their father had and what is valid and binding against him is also valid binding as against him is also valid and binding as against him is also valid binding as against them." (Underscoring ours )

Hence,   it must  be  hold  tint  plaintiffs  have   lost  their right   to   repurchase   and their  demand  for consequential damages must    necessarily fail.

On the   other hand  the   defendants'   claim   attorney's  fees  and  other   expenses  under Art.   2208 par. 4, New Civil Code Civil  Code should not be granted, considering that our direct pronouncement on the issue was promulgated only on May 21, 1955, after the   submission by plaintiffs   of   their  printed brief.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment will be reversed, and the defendants absolved from all liability. No costs. So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.