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https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c3756?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09
[CELESTINO CO v. COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE](https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c3756?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
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99 Phil. 841

[ G.R. No. L-8506, August 31, 1956 ]

CELESTINO CO & COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

BENGZON, J.:

Appeal from a decision of the Court of  Tax Appeals. Celestino Co & Company is a  duly registered general copartnership  doing  business  under the  trade  name of Oriental Sash  Factory".  From'  1946  to  1951  it paid percentage taxes of  7 per  cent on the  gross receipts  of its sash,  door and  window factory,  in accordance with section one hundred eighty-six  of the  National Revenue Code imposing taxes on  sales of  manufactured  articles. However  in  1952 it  began to claim liability  only to the contractor's 3  per cent tax  (instead of 7 per cent)  under section 191 of the same Code; and having  failed to  convince  the  Bureau of  Internal  Revenue,  it  brought the matter to the  Court  of Tax Appeals, where it also failed. Said the  Court:
 "To support his  contention that his  client  is an  ordinary contractor * * * counsel presented * * *  duplicate  copies of  letters, sketches of doors and windows and price quotations supposedly sent by  the manager.of  the Oriental  Sash  Factory  to four customers who allegedly made special orders for doors and windows  from the said factory.  The  conclusion that counsel  would like  us  to deduce from these few  exhibits is that the Oriental Sash Factory does not  manufacture  ready made  doors, sash  and windows  for the public but  only upon special order of  its  select customers. * * * I  cannot  believe' that petitioner company  would  take,  as in fact  it has taken, all the trouble and expense  of registering a special  trade name  for its sash business  and  then orders  company stationery carrying the  bold print 'Oriental  Sash Factory (Celestino  Co & Company,  Prop.)  926 Raon  St.  Quiapo,  Manila, Tel. No.  33076, Manufacturers of all kinds of  doors,  windows, sashes, furnitures,  etc. used season-dried and kiln-dried lumber, of the best quality workmanship' solely for the  purpose of  supplying the needs for doors, windows and sash of its special  and limited customers.  One will note that  petitioner has chosen for  its trade name and  has  offered  itself to the public as a  'Factory', which means it is out to do business, in its  chosen  lines on  a  bigscale. As a general rule, sash factories receive orders  for doors  and windows of special  design only in particular cases but the bulk of  their  sales  is  derived from  ready made  doors  and  windows of standard sizes for the average home.  Moreover, as  shown from the  investigation  of petitioner's books of accounts,  during  the period from January 1, 1952 to  September 30,  1952, it sold sash, doors and  windows worth W88,754.69.   I find  it difficult  to believe that this amount which runs to  six figures was derived by petitioner entirely from  its   few  customers who made  special orders  for these items. 

"Even if. we were to believe petitioner's claim that it does  not manufacture  ready-made  sash, doors, and windows for the public and  that it  makes  these  articles only upon special order of its customers, that  does not  make it a contractor  within  the  purview of section  191 of the National Internal Revenue  Code.  There  are: no less than fifty occupations enumerated in the aforesaid section' of the National Internal Revenue  Code  subject to percentage  tax and  after reading  carefully  each  and  every  one of  them, we cannot find one under  which the business enterprise  of petitioner could  appropriately  fall.  It would  require a  stretch of  the  law and much effort to make the business of  manufacturing sash, doors: and  windows  upon special  order   of  customers  fall  under  the category of road,  building, navigation, artesian  well,  water works and  other construction  work  contractors;  filling contractors'  as enumerated  in  the section  being  invoked by  petitioner's  counsel. Construction  work  contractors  are  those  who  alter  or  repair buildings, structures,  streets, highways, sewers,  street railways, railroads,  logging  roads, electric, steam  or  water  plants telegraph. and telephone plants and lines, electric  lines  or power lines,  and includes any other work for  the construction altering or repairing for which machinery driven by mechanical power is used.   (Payton. vs. City of Anadardo 64 P. 2d 878, 880,  17& Okl. 68).

"Having thus  eliminated the feasibility of taxing  petitioner  as a contractor under section 191 of  the National Internal  Revenue Code,  this leaves us to decide the remaining issue whether or not petitioner could be  taxed  with lesser strain and more accuracy  as seller  of its manufactured articles  trader section 186  of the  same code, as the respondent Collector of  Internal Revenue has in  fact been doing since the Oriental Sash Factory was established in 1946. "The percentage tax imposed in section 191  of our  Tax  Code  is generally a tax on the sales of services, in contradiction with the tax  imposed  in section  186 of the same Code which is  a tax on the original sales of articles by the manufacturer, producer or importer. (Formilleza's Commentaries  and  Jurisprudence on  the  National Internal Revenue Code, Vol II, p. 744).  The fact that the articles sold are manufactured  by the seller does not exchange the contract from the purview  of section 186 of the  National Internal Revenue Code as  a sale  of articles."

There was a strong dissent;  but upon  careful consideration of the whole matter we  are  inclined  to  accept  the above  statement  of  the facts  and  the  law.  The  important thing to  remember is that Celestino Go, & Company habitually makes sash, windows and doors, as it has represented  in its  stationery  and  advertisements to the public.   That  it  "manufactures" the "same  is  practically admitted by appellant itself.   The fact that windows and doors  are made  by it only when  customers  place   their orders, does not alter the nature of the establishment, for it is obvious that it only accepted such  orders as called for the  employment of such materials-moulding,  frames, panels-as it  ordinarily manufactured or was in a position habitually to manufacture.

Perhaps  the following  paragraph  represents  in  brief "the appellant's position in this Court:

"Since the petitioner, by clear proof of facts not disputed by the respondent, manufactures sash, windows and doors  only for special customers  and upon their special  orders and in accordance  with the desired specifications of the persons ordering the same and not for the  general market: since the doors ordered by  Don Toribio Teodoro & Sons, Inc., for instance, are not in existence and  which never would  have existed but for  the order of the party desiring it;  and  since petitioner's contractual relation with his  customers is that of a  contract for a piece of work or since  petitioner  is engaged in the sale of services, it follows that the petitioner should ie taxed under section 191 of the Tax Code and NOT under section 185 of the same Code."  (Appellant's brief,  p. 11-12).

But the  argument rests on  a  false  foundation.   Any builder or  homeowner, with  sufficient money,  may  order windows or doors of the kind manufactured  by this appellant.  Therefore  it is  not true  that  it  serves special customers  only  or  confines its  services  to them alone. And anyone who sees,  and  likes,  the doors  ordered by Don  Toribio  Teodoro &  Sons  Inc. may purchase   from appellant doors  of the same kind, provided he pays the price.  Surely, the appellant  will not  refuse,  for it can easily duplicate  or even mass-produce the same doors it is mechanically  equipped  to do so.

That the  doors and windows must  meet  desired  specifications  is neither here nor there.   If these specifications do not happen to be of the kind habitually manufactured by appellant special forms of sash, mouldings or panels it would  not accept  the order and no sale is  made.  If they do,  the transaction would  be  no different  from a purchasers of manufactured goods held is stock for sale; they are  bought  because  they  meet  the  specifications desired by the  purchaser.

Nobody will  say that when a sawmill cuts lumber in accordance with the peculiar specifications of a customer sizes not  previously held in stock for sale to the publicity thereby becomes an employee or servant of the customer,[1] not the seller of lumber.  The same consideration applies to this sash manufacturer.

The Oriental  Sash Factory does nothing more than sell the goods that it mass-produces or habitually makes; sash, panels, mouldings,  frames,  cutting them;  to  such  sizes, and  combining them in such forms as its customers may desire.

On the  other hand, petitioner's  idea  of being a contractor doing construction  jobs  is  untenable.  Nobody would regard the doing of two window panels as construction work in common parlance.[2]

Appellant invokes  Article 1467 of the New  Civil Code to bolster its contention that in filing orders for windows and  doors according to specifications, it did not sell, but merely contracted for particular pieces of work or "merely sold its services".

Said article reads as follows:

"A  contract for the  delivery at a  certain price of an  article which the vendor  in the ordinary course of his business manufactures or procures  for the general market, whether the same is on hand at the time or not, is a  contract of sale, but if the goods are to be manufactured specially for  the customer and upon  his special order,  and not for the  general market, it is  contract  16c a piece of work."

It is at once apparent that the Oriental Sash Factory did not merely sell its services to Don Toribio Teddoro & Co.  (To take  one  instance)  because it also sold  the materials.  The truth of the matter is that it sold materials ordinarily manufactured by it sash, panels, mouldings to Teodoro & Co., although in such form  or  combination as suited the fancy of the purchaser.  Such new form does not divest the Oriental Sash Factory  of its character as manufacturer.  Neither does it take the transaction out of the category of sales under Article 1467 above quoted, because  although the Factory  does not, in the  ordinary course  of its business, manufacture and  keep on stock doors  of the  hind sold  to Teodoro, it could stock  and/or probably had in stock the sash,  mouldings and panels it iised therefor (some of them at least).

In our opinion when this Factory  accepts  a  job that requires the use of extraordinary or additional equipment, or involves services not  generally performed by it it thereby contracts for a piece of work filling special orders within the meaning of Article 1467.  The orders herein exhibited were not shown to be special.  They were merely orders for work nothing is  shown to call them  special .requiring extraordinary service of the factory.

The  thought occurs to  us that if,  as  alleged all the work  of appellant is only to  fill orders previously made, such orders should not be called special work,  but regular work.  Would  a factory  do  business  performing only special,  extraordinary or  preculiar merchandise?

Anyway, supposing for the moment that the transactions were  not sales,  they were neither  lease of services nor contract  jobs by  a  contractor.  But as  the doors  and windows had been  admittedly  "manufactured"  by the Oriental  Sash Factory, such transactions could be,  and should be taxed as "transfers" thereof under section 186 of the National  Revenue Code.

The appealed decision  is  consequently affirmed.  So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B.  L., and Felix,  JJ., concur.
 


[1] [2]With  all the  consequences in Article 1729  New Civil Codte and Act No.  3959 (bond of contractor).
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