Certiorari against various orders or  proceedings in the Court of First Instance  of Rizal, Hon. Nicasio Yatco, presiding.

On  December  28,  1954, petitioner  was  charged  before the  court with a violation of Commonwealth Act No.  104 for allowing more than 400 laborers to  work in a room of 3,427.20  cubic meters space, during the period from May 3, 1954 to October 11, 1954. On February  17,  1955, after the  accused had  pleaded  not guilty, he filed a motion to quash on the ground that at the time of the alleged violation the regulations implementing the law had not yet been published in the Official Gazette as required by law.  The Department  of Labor, through its legal  assistant, joined petitioner in asking for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the violation was merely technical, and petitioner's factory was complying substantially with Department regulations.   The motion was  supported by a letter attached thereto,  written  by the  Secretary  of  Labor, showing that the engineer of the Department of. Labor had found compliance after a subsequent inspection.  But respondent judge held that the legal assistant of the Department of Labor had no authority to appear before his court and ordered the motion and the letter of the Secretary of Labor detached from the record and returned.

When the case  was called for hearing  on March 17, 1955,  the  first  assistant city attorney  of  Quezon  City appeared and made a verbal motion for the dismissal of the charge on the same grounds mentioned in the motion for dismissal filed by the legal assistant of the Department of Labor.  Instead of approving this motion, the court made a surprise visit to the place where the  alleged violation was taking place,  conducting an ocular  inspection of the premises.  During the inspection the presiding judge questioned the  petitioner, who answered that there were 397 laborers working in the factory on the  day in question. After the inspection the court entered an order finding that petitioner was still  violating the provisions  of Commonwealth Act No. 104 and denied the verbal  motion of the fiscal to dismiss, and ordered him to file an  amended information within a period of five days.   Pursuant to this order the fiscal filed an amended information on March 18, 1955.  As this amended information alleged that the  commission of the violation took place on January 2, 1954 to October 11, 1954, petitioner reiterated his original  motion to quash.  The judge had ordered the fiscal to file an opposition to the motion to quash, but the  fiscal instead  of doing so filed an amended information on March 31, 1955, changing  the period of  the  supposed violation  to that from January 2, 1955  to March 17, 1955.  On June 28, 1955 the  judge denied  the motion to quash.

On July 23, 1955, petitioner filed another motion to quash the amended information, on  the ground that no  preliminary investigation had been conducted on the first  and second amended informations.   But the  judge  denied  this motion alleging that he had seen a continuous violation of the rules and regulations.  So he set the case for trial.  It was at this stage of the proceedings that petitioner  presented his petition in this case.

The orders and proceedings  of the lower court are alleged to have been committed with grave abuse of discretion for the following reasons, namely, that the testimony of petitioner was not taken by the judge in the ocular inspection under oath; that  no opportunity was  given  petitioner to give an explanation or  to his  counsel to cross-examine the witness on whose testimony the judge based his  order to elicit exculpatory facts; that petitioner's case was prejudged and he was, therefore, denied a fair trial; that the judge constituted himself as  a raiding party, performing police function, refusing  to  hear  explanations; and  that the amended informations  were filed without a previous preliminary  investigation, etc.

There  is a feeling among some of the members of the court that judges should be admonished to act with impartiality, devoid of prejudice in  favor of the accused  or of the State, abstaining from acts indicative  of undue or unjustified interest for one  side or the other,  in order that the public may have confidence in the administration of justice. The discretion lodged in the judge in granting or refusing a motion for dismissal, as in  this case, does not authorize, much less justify, the personal interest demonstrated by the respondent judge in making an ocular inspection, in directing the continuance of the action  against the petitioner, against findings and recommendations of executive officials entrusted with the implementation and enforcement of laws, if confidence in the judicial department is to be conserved. This, notwithstanding, we have decided to consider the legal issues on their real merit and worth.

Except for the impression that it produced that the judge was personally interested in maintaining the action against the petitioner, the action of the respondent judge in making the ocular inspection and in questioning the. petitioner in his factory, is valid and legal, as  it was a proceeding that he adopted in order to be able to pass on the motion for dismissal.  The proceeding was not a preliminary investigation ; it was a proceeding adopted by the judge himself, the form and manner of which he is at liberty to choose, in  order  to  enable  him to  exercise his judgment and discretion in passing upon the motion  for  dismissal.  It was not a preliminary investigation;  hence the rights of the accused at  such  a proceeding could not  have been invoked.  There was, therefore, no abuse  of discretion in the adoption of the proceeding or in the manner thereof.

The other  legal issue  is;  Was the presentation of the amended information changing the date of the commission of the offense to between January 2, 1955 and March 17, 1955, justified, when  the original information filed .on December 28, 1954 charged violation from May 3, 1954 to October 11, 1954?  May the State be allowed to amend the information by  stating that the  offense  was  committed between January  2,  1955 and March 17, 1955, on  an original information dated December 28,  1954?

There are argument that can be presented against such an amendment.  One is that such an amendment  is not one of form but  of substance, especially  as the offense charged was not  yet punishable on December 28,  1954, when the original information was filed.  The acts charged in  the  original  information  were  not punishable at the time  of its  filing  in  1954;  the violation  charged in the amended information took place in 1955.  The amendment is certainly on a matter of substance because in 1954 the act was not punishable yet.  The amendment cannot be allowed because the accused, petitioner herein, had already pleaded not guilty to the original information.  Another reason is the fact that when  the original information was filed the violation was not yet subject to prosecution because the law had not yet been published.   It is true that since the information was filed the law had become effective; but  the law can have no  retroactive effect.   Since  an amended  information is supposed to retro act to the time of the filing of the original information, and at the time of the  filing of the original information the offense was not yet punishable, the proper  course would  have been not to amend the previous information but to file another one.  In civil  cases,  if a  cause  of action does not exist at the time the complaint is filed, but accrues  thereafter, the defect can not be cured  by an  amendment; a new complaint must be filed because  the  cause of action must exist prior to the time of the filing of the complaint (Limpangco vs. Mercado,  10 Phil., 508).   Similarly, an information filed before the effectivity of a law punishing an offense may not be amended after the law punishing the crime had  come into effect to  charge a violation after the law had come into effect.  As an amendment retro acts  to the time  of  the  presentation  of  the amended pleading, the amended information would contain a violation committed after its filing.  A crime charged should have  been  committed  prior  to  the filing of  the  information; no information can  be  filed for a future violation.   In the case at bar the court should have dismissed the original information and authorized the presentation of a new one.

For  the  foregoing  considerations, the orders  of  the court complained of  are hereby, as they are,  set aside, and  the respondents  directed to  act conformably with this decision.  Without costs.

Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.