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[PEOPLE v. COUKT OF APPEALS](https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c374d?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
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[ GR Nos. L-9111-9113, Aug 28, 1956 ]

PEOPLE v. COUKT OF APPEALS +

DECISION

99 Phil. 786

[ G.R. Nos. L-9111-9113, August 28, 1956 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE COUKT OF APPEALS AND SILVESTRE DOMALAON, RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

D E C I S I O N

BENGZON, J.:

Petitioner  asks for review of the  Court of Appeals' resolution  annulling the decisions  signed by Judge Anatolio C. Mafialac in  three criminal cases  of the Sorsogon court of first  instance.   Ground for  the annulment was its finding that said decisions had  been promulgated on  July  3,  1954 when Judge  Maiialac no longer presided said district, the Hon. Genaro Tan Torres having qualified as  judge thereof on the first  day of  the  same month.

The facts are the following: "It appears that  on February 5 and 7, 1954, the  provincial fiscal of Sorsogon filed  in  each of the above-entitled  cases an information charging the accused, Silvestre  Domalaon, with  the  violation of  Republic Act No. 145.  The  accused having entered the plea of not guilty  on arraignment, hearings on  the merits were had in said cases before the Honorable  Anatolio  Manalac,  then the judge  presiding  over the Court  of First Instance  of  Sorsogon, who,  after  the cases were submitted,  reserved his  decisions.

"Shortly after  these cases had been  submitted for decision, Judge  Manalac, who  since  March 4, 1954  had filed an application  for retirement  under the provisions of Republic Act  No. 660, went on  terminal leave of absence.  He  was,  however, duly authorized by the Honorable,  the  Secretary  of  Justice,  to decide in the  City of Manila the cases  he had tried in  Sorsogon which were pending decision.

"In the meantime, Judge Maiialae wrote the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, a letter asking that favorable action be taken  in  his  application  for  retirement,  and that  it  be made effective on September 13, 1954.  The Secretary of Justice indorsed this  letter to the  Government  Service Insurance System with a favorable recommendation.

"On June 21,  1954, His  Excellency, the President  of the Philippines,  appointed  the Honorable Genaro  Tan Torres ad interim Judge of the 10th Judicial District,  to preside  over the Court  of  First Instance of Sorsogon. Judge Tan Torres accepted  the  appointment and  on  July 1, 1954, qualified and  assumed office  as judge of the Court of First Instance of said province.

"Under the authority granted him to decide in Manila the cases he had pending decision, Judge Manalac drafted his judgments in these cases, placed them in an  envelope addressed to the  Clerk of Court of  Sorsogon, and deposited said  envelope in the Manila  Post Office on  July  1, 1954.  This envelope was received  in  the office of the clerk  of court of  Sorsogon on July 3, 1954, and the judgments therein contained bearing date of June 12, 1954, duly signed by Judge Manalac, were promulgated in  said court on the same date.  the accused appealed from  said judgment of conviction."

Speaking thru Justice  Natividad, the  appellate court declared that  the authority of Judge Manalac to decide those three cases ended on July  1, 1954, i.e., upon the qualification  of the new  judge,  and that as the  judgments were  promulgated on July  3, 1954 they were  not valid nor binding,  in  line  with several decisions of this Supreme Tribunal.[1]

Questioning this  resolution, the Solicitor General points out that according  to  Rodriguez vs. Commission on Election,[2] promulgation of  the  judgment "means delivery of  the  decision  to the clerk  of  court  for  filing and publication",  and that  when on July  1 Judge Manalac deposited his  decisions  in the Manila Post  Office,  addressed to the clerk of  court of Sorsogon, the judgments were thereby promulgated on  said date  and should  be considered valid, indulging of  course,  the presumption that Judge  Manalac forwarded them before  Judge Torres'  assumption  of the office.   The  argument must  be held  to  be   without juridical  foundation.  As  appellee's counsel maintain,  according  to specific  legal provisions (section 9 Rule 124),  the decision  signed by Judge Manalac  was "to  be filed in the court as of  the day the same was received by the  clerk" namely, as of July 3, 1954. The receipt,  not the sending, constitutes the filing.  Now then, if  in the eyes of  the law the decisions were filed on  July 3,  they could  not have been promulgated  on July  1.   Promulgation  takes  place after  the  clerk  receives the decision and  enters  it in the criminal, docket. (Cea vs.  Cinco, 50 Off.  Gaz., 5254).  It must be remembered that in courts  of first instance,  the promulgation of judgments in criminal proceedings  does not necessarily coincide  with the day they were delivered by the  judge to the clerk  for promulgation.  The accused or his  attorney must  be notified  first; and  then 

"SE. 6.  Promulgation  of judgment. The judgment  is  promulgated  by  reading the judgment or  sentence  in  the presence of the  defendant  and  the judge  of the court who has rendered it.

The  defendant must be  personally present  if  the  conviction is for a grave or less grave offense; if  for light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his attorney or representative.  And when the judge is absent or outside of the province, his presence is not necessary and  the judgment  may be promulgated or read to the defendant by the clerk of court."  (Rule 116).

Accordingly,  the principles, of construction would  be unduly strained, were we to  hold that Judge Manalac's decisions have  been promulgated on July  1, upon being mailed to the clerk of court.

The doctrine in Barredo vs. Commission on Elections, invoked by appellant, is not persuasive, because it refers to promulgation of decisions of this court, wherein Rule 116 above-quoted has  no application.

We have  then  that,  legally,  the decisions of  Judge Manalac were promulgated on  July 3, 1954.[3]   Wherefore, because he had left the  Bench before  that date,  his  decisions have no binding effect.[4]

The possibility has  been  explored of upholding Judge Manalac's authority by  adopting the theory that, as he had applied for  retirement "effective  September  1954", he could  not have been  replaced  before that date, therefore Judge Torres had been appointed  and qualified prematurely,  and  he was  still judge,  at least  on July 3, 1954.   Such  line  of  approach  would  expedite judicial business  except that it would imply illegality  of Judge Torres' appointment  and qualification,  which the prosecution does not suggest, perhaps because Judge Manalac did  not object to his  earlier retirement,  having urged approval  of  his resignation  "as  soon  as  convenient". Here is part of his letter  (Annex  C)  to the Secretary of Justice:

 "After a survey of  the  opportunities open to  a  private  endeavor in  Manila even under limited  circumstances, I  beg to reiterate my  request for optional  retirement under the provisions of Republic  Act No.  660  and to insist  that  it be  acted upon favorably as soon as  convenient,  so  that my  said retirement may take effect  immediately after  the exhaustion of  all the leave  I am at present enjoying and which  will  expire  on September 14, 1954." * * *

This leads to another  objection to the  theory of premature qualification: It was not debated m the lower court; and defendants might claim  that  if  it had been so debated they  could  have proved  Judge Manalac's consent to   his  earlier release.  Anyway,  the  presumption  ia against  illegality of the appointment.

In consequence  of  the  foregoing  considerations, the appellate court's ruling on the  validity of the  decisions must be, as  it is hereby  affirmed.

These  cases will be returned to the  Court  of  First Instance of  Sorsogon for  adjudication.   No new  trial shall be held; the  judge presiding that court  will decide on the strength of the evidence already  introduced.  So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.



[1] Luis Luna vs.  Rodriguez, 37 Phil.  186; Garchitorena vs.  Crescini,  37 Phil. 675; Rodriguez vs. Commission, 45 Off, Gaz.  4457.
[2] See supra.
[3] The Court of Appeals said so.  They must have been read to defendants and/or their attorneys, on said date.
[4] See cases under footnote 1.

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