This is an action instituted by  plaintiff to annul title to property  issued  in  the name  of  defendants  Nicanor Padilla and Ambrosio  Padilla and to have one issued in his own name,  with damages  representing rentals  of said property, or,  in case  the above  cannot  be  granted, to recover the sum of P49,000 from, the defendants,  which amount  represents the value  of  said  property,  and in either case for attorney's fees  and  expenses.

The principal allegations of the complaint are: That on January 10,  1945 plaintiff bought the  property  (a residential lot in Sampaloc, Manila)  from defendant Arevalo, paying a price  of P12,000 therefor, but  assuming  a mortgage  thereon in favor  of Pedro  Reyes  in the amount of P30,000, and on. the  same date the  property  was  leased to Arevalo for P420 a month; that an option was  granted in the contract of lease for the vendor  to repurchase the property for the same price; that  Arevalo also secured a loan from plaintiff in the amount of  P4,000 payable on or before December 31, 1946; and that  the contracts of sale and lease were registered in the office of the  register of deeds of Manila on January  11, 1945;  that on July 22f 1946  defendant Arevalo sold  the  same property  to  her co-defendants Nicanor  Padilla  and Ambrosio Padilla for P25,000, notwithstanding the  fact that the latter knew of the previous sale of  the property to the plaintiff; that on April 11, 1947 Arevalo brought an action against plaintiff for a judicial declaration that the transaction between them, above set forth,  is an equitable mortgage and  not one  of sale  with  repurchase, but  the Supreme  Court decided that the contract was a  sale with right to repurchase, and that if Arevalo wanted to  redeem the property,  she could do so, only for PI6,000;  that defendants Padilla caused the deed of sale in their favor to be registered, notwithstanding the fact that they knew of  the pendency of  the  action instituted  by  plaintiff  against defendant Arevalo; and that defendant Arevalo has  not repurchased the property in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court,  and so plaintiff's title  thereto  has become consolidated.

Defendants Padilla filed a motion to dismiss the action, but the trial judge refused to consider it until after trial, so they filed their answer  to the complaint, denying  the supposed  registration of the sale in  favor of plaintiff; denying knowledge of said sale, or of the decision of  the Supreme  Court in relation  thereto;  denying  the alleged registration of the sale in their  (Padillas)  favor during the pendency of the Supreme Court suit and alleging that said registration took place on July 24, 1946; and denying the alleged consolidation  of  plaintiff's ownership in  the property.  By way of special defenses they alleged that at the time of the sale in their favor the property was registered in the name of  Arevalo and the only encumbrance or lien thereon was the  mortgage in favor of Pedro Reyes; that when the sale was agreed upon  between Arevalo  and themselves, they paid off the mortgage thereon and  secured the certificate of title of the property and Arevalo executed an affidavit that the property was free from liens of any kind; that they purchased the property in good faith, for value and without notice,  and the sale in their favor  was registered, and a transfer certificate of title was issued in  their name; and that  the  transaction between plaintiff and Arevalo was not validly registered,  because the certificate of title was not  surrendered or delivered for the registration thereon of the alleged sale in favor of plaintiff; etc.  By way of counterclaim, they aver that the allegation that they bought the  property  with actual notice  of  the  sale in plaintiff's favor is a malicious and defamatory imputation,  without basis  in fact and they have suffered and will suffer as  a consequence thereof moral damages estimated at P100,000. On the issues above set forth the parties went to trial and  thereafter the court rendered jud&imnt finding that the defendants Padilla did not have any knowledge of the sale  by Arevalo in favor of plaintiff, and holding that the attempted registration of said sale cannot prevail over that in favor of defendants Padilla; and further finding that the  bringing of the action  was  malicious.  It therefore sentenced plaintiff to  pay to defendants Padilla the sum of P100,000  as moral damages.  The  suit  was  further dismissed with costs against plaintiff.   Hence the  appeal.

The first error assigned is the refusal of the trial court to admit in  evidence Exhibit  "A",  the deed  of  sale  in favor  of plaintiff,  Exhibit  "B",  the  contract of lease executed by and between  him and Areyalo,  Exhibit "C", the  promissory note executed  in  his  favor by Arevalo, Exhibit "D",  the decision of this Court in  the case between plaintiff and Arevalo, and Exhibit "G", motion  of Arevalo that  she is not  in  a position  to repurchase the property  for  P16,000.  The above  documents  were objected to on the ground that they cannot affect the Padillas  as they had no previous knowledge thereof.  The trial court sustained the objection on the ground that the Padillas were not parties to the execution of the documents. The above ruling  is clearly erroneous.  The deeds were executed  by Arevalo prior to the sale by her in favor  of the  Padillas.  As the latter succeeded  to the  rights and interests  of  Arevalo,  they  are  bound by  the acts  of Arevalo prior to the sale in their favor  (Sec.  13, Rule 123, Rules  of Court),   The Padillas are privies  in  so  far  as Arevalo is concerned,  as  they obtained their title from the  latter; hence what is admissible against Arevalo before the  sale in their favor is admissible against them.  The documents prove  the  alleged purchase  made by plaintiff from Arevalo;  they are  therefore material  and relevant to the issues raised in plaintiff's complaint and denied  in defendants'  answer.  The fact that in point of law they may not be of any avail  against the Padillas, who are alleged  to  be  purchasers  in good faith, for  value  and without notice does not in any way affect or destroy their materiality or  relevancy or admissibility.  The claim  that the Padillas are purchasers  in  good faith  is  a special defense; the mere fact that this is a valid defense which may destroy plaintiff's right or title does not  make the documents indicative or probative of said title  or right immaterial or irrelevant and inadmissible.

The second error relates to the refusal of the trial court to admit evidence  offered of  the value  of the property subject  of the  action  on  the ground that  the same  is immaterial.   Again  the trial court committed the error. It is  to be  noted that the action is against the Padillas and  against Arevalo  also.  The  complaint  asks  for an alternative  relief, just  in  case  the original prayer for annulment of  the  Padilla certificate of  title can not be granted, which relief  is for the payment  of  the value of the  property and  of which value plaintiff  would be deprived if  his main  action is to fail.   Evidence of the actual market  value was therefore material  and relevant to plaintiff's claim to be paid the value of  the property if his  main case  for  annulment  cannot be sustained. Again the fact that the Padillas have a  supervening  special defense does not make the evidence  of the value less relevant or  less material.   The trial court should, therefore,  have admitted the prof erred evidence.

The third error imputed to  the trial court is the finding by  it that  no sufficient evidence was introduced  that the Padillas had no knowledge  in fact  of  the sale  and conveyance of the property in  plaintiff's  favor.  We have carefully read  the evidence.  The evidence  submitted to support  knowledge  on the part  of the  Padillas of the conveyance in  plaintiff's favor is the testimony of a  witness who supposedly heard a statement made by Arevalo to Ambrosio Padilla that she  (Arevalo) had previously sold the property to plaintiff.  The making of the statement  is improbable;  why  should  Arevalo tell  the prospective buyer that the  land she is selling had already been sold by her to another? No buyer will court trouble, buying property already sold to  another.   This  supposed statement  is  furthermore belied  by Arevalo's own affidavit that  the property is  free  from  liens of any kind. And the mere fact that the witness who testified thereto could not point out the specific occasion and date thereof when the statement was supposedly made, and the further fact that she spoke, of it voluntarily without being asked about  the matter point convincingly to its falsity and the probability of its having been fabricated.  On top  of all these circumstances, credible evidence was submitted that at the time of the  supposed meeting where the statement was supposedly made, Ambrosio  Padilla  had  not  yet occupied  the  room where  the  meeting  was  had, and further that  it was not  Ambrosio  Padilla  who arranged and concluded the sale with Arevalo, but his brother Dr. Nicanor Padilla. The finding of the trial court is correct; the evidence for plaintiff is insufficient and is  completely overcome by  the much more credible  evidence presented by  defendants.

The fourth  assignment of error has  reference  to the holding of the trial court that the registration of plaintiff's deed of sale is incomplete and cannot prevail over the rights  of  defendants  who had secured registration of the deed  of sale in  their  favor and  the issuance of a certificate of title in their name.  The above conclusion is also correct.  In the first  place,  the act of registration is the operative act to convey  and affect the land,  an unregistered deed only operating as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the register of deeds to make registration  (Sec.  50,  Land Registration Act.)  The registration  of defendants  Padillas'  deed affected the land conveying title thereto to them, as in fact a new certificate  of  title was issued in their favor.

As to  plaintiff's deed  of sale, as to which registration is voluntary, not  involuntary,  its presentation and entry in the day book without surrender  of the title, did  not operate to convey  and affect the  land sold or conveyed (Villasor vs.  Camon,  et al.,  CA. G. R. No. 8551, pronu June 29, 1951.)

Plaintiff appellant seeks excuse for his failure to complete registration in the troubled condition of the city at the time of the presentation of his deed.  It is not true that said failure was attributable to the lack of order in the city.  If he could secure the entry, he could also have secured complete registration.  The  real  reason for said failure may be found in the fact that he did not surrender the title, which was then in the hands of the mortgagee Pedro  Reyes  and  in  the  further  fact that  he  did  not make  any effort to  obtain its possession.  Perhaps  he knew that his right was subject to the, vendor's equity of repuchase  and he  did  not  care to have the  registration completed.  In any case as the title  was  not  surrendered thru neglect or oversight on his own part,  he  can  not invoke rights secured  by  registration,  which defendants have secured in their favor.

Another error assigned on the appeal  is the dismissal of the case as against Tomasa Arevalo, who  does  not appear to have answered the complaint and should have been declared in default.  The  reason  given by the trial court  is  the  supposed, failure  of  plaintiff-appellant  to prove bad faith.  We must note that Arevalo was merely a formal party defendant to the action.   As a matter of fact, according to the record on appeal, plaintiff-appellant did not even care  to have  her  declared in default. The principal purpose  of the suit was to  cancel the Padilla transfer certificate of title,  not  recover  damages  from Arevalo.  As  the principal parties defendants were  absolved, so  should the  defaulting party Tomasa Arevalo. Besides,  an^ claim by plaintiff against Tomasa  Arevalo relating  to the land subject matter of the action could not have been raised in the action, because said claim was barred by the decision in the previous suit betwwen plaintiff and  Arevalo,.

The last error is the award of moral damages of P100,000. Moral damages have been  defined  as  follows:

"ART. 2217.  Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,  fright,  serious anxiety, besmirched  reputation,  wounded feelings,   moral  shock, social humiliation, and  similar injury. Though incapable of  pecuniary  computation,  moral  damages may be recovered if they  are the proximate result  of the  defendant's wrongful  act  or omission."  (Civil  Code.)

The grant of moral damages is not subject to the whims and caprices of judges  or court.  The court's  discretion in  granting  or refusing it is  governed by  reason and justice.  In  order  that  a person may be made liable to the payment of moral damages,  the law requires  that his act be wrongful.   The  adverse  result of an  action  does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the actor to the payment  of moral  damages.  The law  could  not have meant  to impose a penalty on the right to  litigate; such  right is so precious that  moral damages may not be charged  on those who  may exercise it erroneously.  For these the law taxes costs.

The question  to be  decided,  therefore, is,  Was  the action "wrongful?"  It must be  remembered that Barreto had a valid  deed of sale in his  favor.  This  was entered in the day book of the register  of deeds  office.   The sale of the property in favor of the Padillas was subsequent to that  in favor of Barreto,  and subsequent also to the entry of .Barreto's deed.  Granting  that the Padilla  deed was registered, the same would not avail against Barreto's if the Padillas had knowledge  of  the  previous  sale  in favor of Barreto.   Barreto was under no obligation  to presume that the Padillas did not have knowledge of the sale; here was a mere presumption only that good faith existed.  As against such presumption  Barreto  had  the right to introduce  evidence  to the contrary.  He  had the right to have that matter  of knowledge investigated in a judicial proceeding;  he had the right to litigate such fact. And no right to damages can accrue  if it happens that the litigation is decided adversely against him.   No injury can  accrue by the exercise of a  right.

On the  other hand,  the Padillas have no right to claim that Barreto should have known that they were purchasers in good faith.  Knowledge by the  Padillas of Barreto's prior sale may have been fabricated.  Supposing  it was so,  the party  introducing the evidence, if innocent of the wrong,  can not be  held liable for moral  damages.  The witness may be held to account for perjury, but this does not create the presumption that the  party who introduced the witness was aware thereof.  Proof  of knowledge or of complicity in the perjury must be introduced to make the plaintiff's action  wrongful and entitle  the adverse party prejudiced thereby to moral damages.   In the case  at bar, no  such proof existed.  In the  same  manner  that  good faith is presumed on  the  part of the  Padilla, so  should it be in favor of Barreto. The results of litigation, especially on issues of law, are indeed very uncertain; facts and  circumstances are elicited in  the course of  trial which are  never expected.  The  fact  that   the result  of  the trial were adverse to  Barreto did not alone make  his act in bringing  the  action wrongful.   If  we held  thus,  all actions  would be wrongful because in  most  cases  one party will lose; we would be imposing an unjust condition or limitation on  the right to  litigate.  We hold that the award of  moral damages in the case at  bar is not justified by the facts and circumstances as well  as the law. The judgment  appealed  from is  affirmed insofar as it dismisses  the action of  plaintiff-appellant, but  it is reversed insofar as it  awards moral damages to  defendants Padilla.   Costs against plaintiff-appellant.

Paras,  C.  J., Bengzon,  Montemayor, Bautista  Angela Reyes, J.  B. L., Endencia  and  Felix, JJ., concur.