This is an  appeal by certiorari under Rule 46  from a judgment  of the Court  of Appeals  reversing  one  of the Court  of  First Instance  of  Bulacan and remanding the case for new trial.

As  found by the Court of Appeals,  Vicente Valencia applied for  the registration of  two  parcels of  land described  in  the application  and plan  attached  thereto, claiming  that he  had  acquired  title  thereto  because the spouses   Laureano  Marquez  anti  Eusebia  Capiral had failed to repurchase the parcels  of land within the period of  time stipulated  in a contract of  sale  with a right to repurchase.  Laureano Marquez and  Eusebia Capiral objected to  the  application  averring  that  they were  the  owners of  the parcels of land  applied for registration , by Vicente Valencia  and that  the  parcels of land  were the  subject of  litigation  between  them  and the applicant then pending  in  the  Court of First Instance of  Bulacan  (civil  case No. 5250).  One  of the  parcels of land (lot  No. 1-b-2)  was excluded from the application because it was already registered in the name  of Felipia  Crisostomo, as evidenced by  certificate of  title No. 12353. By agreement of the parties  the hearing of the application for registration  of  the  remaining parcel of land (lot No. 1-b-3)  was postponed until  after final  judgment  shall have been  rendered in  civil case  No. 5250  between the  same parties! The  spouses Laureano Marquez and  Eusebia Capiral, the plaintiffs  in civil  case No.  5250, brought an  action  against  Vicente Valencia to secure  a declaration that  the deed of  sale  with pacto de retro  executed  by them  on 27 July 1931 in favor of the defendant was null  and  void.  The  Court of  First Instance  of  Bulacan held that  the contract was one of antichresis.   The  Court of  Appeals  held  that it was a sale with  pacto  de retro.  On  appeal  by certiorari  this Court held that it was not a sale with a  right to repurchase but an equitable mortgage only and ordered Laureano Marquez  and  Eusebia Capiral  to  pay  Vicente Valencia the mortgage debt of P7,000. In view  of this judgment, on 20 April 1948 Vicente Valencia amended his  application alleging that  he had acquired  the parcel  of land  (lot No.  l-b-3)  by  inheritance  from his  maternal grandfather, the late Pedro Crisostomo, and  that  he and his predecessors-in-interest have been  in possession  thereof from time immemorial, his possession having been interrupted only on 23 April  1947,  by the  heirs  of the late Laureano  Marquez who  also  claimed to be  the owners of the parcel  of land  by  inheritance  from  their  late parents.  After  hearing,  the  trial court  dismissed  the application for registration filed  by the respondent,  on the ground of res judicata, and decreed the  registration thereof in the name of the estate of  the late Laureano Marquez.  The dispositive part of the judgment reads as follows:

Por tanto, de acuerdo con la Seccion  87 de la ley 496, enmendada por  la  Secci6n 2  de la ley  3621,  este  Tribunal, previo sobreseimiento  de  la  solicitud de Vicente  Valencia, decreta, el registro y titulacion del  terreno  descrito en  el piano Psu-10759, Lote No. l-b-3, Exh. F, a nombre del Intestado  del difunto Laureano Marquez, con  todas las mejoras  existentes  en la misma. 

Ordena,  ademas,  que  el  Intestado del difunto  Laureano  Marquez  reemtbolse  al  solicitante de  los gastos  incurridos  por  este consistentes en derechos de  registro y derechos de publication por haberse presentado  de buena  fe la presente  solicitud de registro por el  solicitante.

  Una  ves firme este decision, expidase el decreto correspondiente.

From  this judgment Vicente Valencia appealed.   As stated at the beginning of  this  opinion,  the  Court  of Appeals reversed  the  judgment of the lower court, being of the opinion that the judgment in  civil  case  No. 5250  did not bar the filing of  an  amended  application for registration and  remanded the case  to the lower court for new  trial as prayed for by the applicant.

The rule that  a dismissal  of an  application for  the registration  of a parcel of land does not bar the filing of another  application, cannot be availed of in  the  case at bar, because a renewal of an application for registration of the same parcel  of  land  or an  amendment  thereto upon a ground different  from that alleged in the previous application may be allowed if the dismissal of the  first application was without prejudice and not when the ownership  or title to the parcel  of land was litigated by the same parties  and  a judgment  rendered for one party and against the other.  Under the  provisions  of section 37, Act No. 496,  if the  land registration court  "finds that  the applicant  has not proper title  for registration, it shall dismiss the  application  and  the dismissal  may be without prejudice.^[1]  The provisions  of section  37, Act No. 496, has been amended by adding three provisos. The pertinent  proviso reads as follows:

  * * * Provided, however, That in case where there is  an adverse claim, the court shall determine the  conflicting  interests  of the applicant and the  adverse claimant,  and  after taking  evidence shall dismiss the application if neither  of them succeeds  in showing that he  has proper title for registration, or shall enter a decree awarding the  land applied for, or any part thereof, to  the person entitled  thereto,  and such  decree,  when final, shall entitle to the issuance of  an original certificate of  title to  such person: * *  *. (Section 2,  Act  No. 3621.)

So that if by  virtue of or pursuant to  a final judgment the land registration court should decree the registration of a  parcel  of land applied for  in  the  name of the opponent, the  applicant  could not  apply anew for the registration  of the same  parcel of  land which had already been  decreed registered in the name of his opponent.  In this case the  parties agreed to have  the action brought by Laureano Marquez and Eusebia Capiral against Vicente Valencia to secure a  declaration that the  deed of  sale of the  parcel  of land with a right to  repurchase,  upon which Vicente Valencia based his application  for  registration  of the  parcel of land, was  a nullity,  (civil  case No. 5250) heard and  decided before  the application  for registration.   After the Court of First Instance of Bulacan and on appeal the Court of Appeals had  rendered their  respective judgments as  above  adverted  to,  this Court on appeal by certiorari held that the deed of  sale with a  right to repurchase  was only an equitable mortgage.  In view of this judgment Vicente Valencia amended his application claiming  that he had  inherited the  parcel of land from  his  late  maternal grandfather Pedro Crisostomo.  After hearing, the Court  of First Instance of Bulacan, acting as land registration court, found  that the judgment in the civil case  (No. 5250)  between the same parties  above referred to constitutes  res judicata and  bars the  claim  of the  applicant  to  have the  land registered in his name.   On appeal the Court of Appeals held otherwise, and as already stated  remanded the  case to the lower court for new trial.

The action for nullity or annulment of the deed of sale of a  parcel of land  with a right  reserved  by the  vendors to repurchase it brought  in civil  case  No. 5250 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan by the  spouses Laureano Marquez and Eusebia Capiral against  Vicente Valencia  was really  for reformation of the  contract or deed  of  sale.  The action  referred to involved ownership or title  to the  parcel  of land purportedly  sold  by the plaintiffs  to the  defendant with a  right reserved  by the  former  to repurchase  it  from  the  latter,  because whether the contract was of antichresis, of  sale or of mortgage, the only inference that  could be  drawn from it was  that the plaintiffs were the owners of the parcel of land.  By resisting the  claim  of the  plaintiffs  upon the  ground that he  had  acquired  title to the parcel of land  by a deed of sale  with a right to repurchase  and for  failure of the plaintiffs to  repurchase it  within the period of time stipulated in the deed,  the defendant expressly admitted that he had derived title to the parcel of land from the  plaintiffs.   If, aside  from relying solely on the  deed of sale with a  right to repurchase and  failure  on the part  of  the  vendors  to purchase  it  within the period  stipulated therein, the  defendant had  set  up an alternative though inconsistent defense^[1] that he had inherited the  parcel of  land from  his  late  maternal grandfather and  presented  evidence  in support of  both defenses, the overruling of the first would not bar the determination by the court of the second.  The defendant having failed  to  set up  such alternative defenses  and chosen or  elected to rely on  one only,  the  overruling thereof was a  complete determination of the controversy between the parties which bars a subsequent action based upon an unpleaded defense, or any other cause of action, except that of failure  of the complaint to state a cause of action and of lack of jurisdiction of the  Court.^[1]   The determination of the issue joined by  the  parties constitutes res judicata.  More, the finding of the trial court and  the Court  of Appeals  that  the respondent  took a lease on the parcel of  land  sought  to be registered by him  from the spouses  Laureano  Marquez and  Eusebia Capiral,  the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners, is another  proof that Vicente Valencia was  not the owner thereof.  A lease contract lawfully entered into precludes the lessee from questioning the title of the  lessor.^[2]

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed  and that  of the  trial  court  affirmed,  with  costs against the respondent.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Conception, Reyes, J. B. L.,  and Felix, JJ.,  concur.

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^[1] Section 37, Act No. 496.
^[1] Section 9, Rule 9;  Castle Bros., Wolf & Sons  vs. Go-Juno, 7 Phil., 144; Cia. General de Tabacos vs. Trinchera, 7 Phil., 689.
^[1]Section 10, Rule 9.
^[2] Article 1436, new Civil Code; Section 68 (b), Rule 123.