On March 15, 1954, appellant Juan Dimson was charged in the Justice of  the Peace Court of Calauan, Laguna with the crime  of  light  threats  (Criminal  Case  No.  113). After trial judgment was rendered by  the  court on June 2, 1954 finding Dimson guilty as  charged, and sentencing him to pay a fine of P50  and costs.  On the same date, the court sent a notice to  Dimson that  judgment would be promulgated on June 19, 1954.  The notice was returned unserved, because Dimson could not be found in the place of  his residence in Barrio  Dayap.   On  June 26, 1954, the court again issued another  notice to   Dimson to appear for promulgation  of judgment  on July 10,  1954.   This notice  was also returned unserved because  Dimson was still absent from his residence.  Wherefore, on  July  17, 1954, the judge sent by  registered mail a  copy of the decision to Dimson's attorneys as well as the provincial fiscal at Sta. Cruz, Laguna,  duly received  by  them on July 20, 1954  and July 19, 1954 respectively.   Then on October 6, 1954, the judge, issued a notice  to  Dimson's bondsmen to produce  the accused in  court on October 23, 1954 "for the promulgation  of the judgment".  The bondsmen notified  Dimson to appear in court as required, but instead of appearing personally on the date  set,  Dimson filed, through his lawyers, an "Omnibus Motion" asking for the dismissal  of the case because the  delay in the promulgation of the decision  allegedly  violated  the  right of the accused to a speedy trial.  The judge denied the motion  on October 30,  1954,  holding that judgment had already been promulgated on July 20,  1954 when copy of the decision was received by the  defendant's  lawyers, and that the same had  already became final and executory; on  the  same day, the judge  sent  another notice to the bondsmen to produce the person of the accused in  court for the execution of the sentence.  On November 29,  1954, the accused, through counsel, filed a petition  for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary  injunction before the Court of First  Instance of Laguna, complaining  about the actuations of the respondent justice of the peace, and asking  that  all proceedings  in  criminal  case  No.  113  be annulled.  In answer, the respondent judge explained that the cause of the delay in the promulgation of his sentence was the continued absence of the accused from the  place of his known residence; that the service of a copy of the decision to the defendant's lawyers was sufficient promulgation of the  judgment;  that  as  said lawyers did not perfect an appeal  on time, the judgment had become final and executory; and that the notice to bondsmen to produce the body  of  the accused on October  23, 1954  was mistakenly worded for "promulgation of judgment"  when it should  have been a notice to produce the accused for the execution of the judgment.

The Court of First Instance found that service of a copy of the decision to  the defendant's lawyers was not equivalent to promulgation, but that the delay in the promulgation of the judgment did not render the proceedings void but  only  made  the decision ineffective; that said  delay was due to the fact that the accused could not be found in the place of his known residence; and ordered that the decision of the inferior court be promulgated in accordance with law.   From this judgment,  defendant Juan C. Dimson appealed to this court.

The appeal has  no  merit.

Appellant mainly complains about the alleged unreasonable delay in the promulgation of the sentence against him in criminal case  No.  113.   The records show, however, that whatever delay there was m the promulgation of said sentence was due  to no fault of the respondent justice of the peace, but to  appellant's continued absence from his residence, where respondent  judge sought twice to notify him of the judgment but failed because he  could not  be found therein.  When notice of  the judgment could not be served on, appellant, the judge, however, sent copy of the decision to his  attorneys and  notified  his bondsmen  to produce him in court  for the promulgation  of the  judgment.  The sentence then could  have been promulgated at this later  date, but appellant, instead of appearing personally on the day set for the  reading  of his sentence,  filed, through his  lawyers,  a  motion  asking for the dismissal of his case.   The delay in the promulgation of the sentence of the inferior court was therefore  caused by appellant's own acts, first,  his continued absence from his  place  of residence, and second, his filing a motion to dismiss the case against him instead of  appearing for the promulgation of the judgment.

The only error that can be attributed to the respondent justice of the peace  was his  having held,  in   denying appellant's motion to dismiss, that judgment had already been promulgated when notice of the decision was received by his lawyers on July 20, 1954.  Under section 6,  Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, judgment for a light offense as the one at bar is promulgated by  reading the sentence in the presence of the defendant or his attorney or representative.  The  reading of the sentence  to  the  accused or his attorney in open court is motivated by the necessity of fixing the start of the period for  appeal; it is only in verdicts  of acquittal that notice  of  the decision to the accused is deemed sufficient promulgation,  for then,  no appeal is necessary and the judgment becomes final and executory immediately after promulgation (Cea vs. Cinco, 50 Off. Gaz. No. 11, 5254).

Appellant also claims that the delay in the promulgation of his sentence  for more than  ninety days deprived the justice of the peace court of jurisdiction to act further in his case.  This argument is untenable, not only because, as already stated,  whatever delay in  the  promulgation of the judgment in criminal case No. 113 was due to appellant's own acts, but also for the reason  that the 90-day period fixed  by the law is for the  decision of  cases  or proceedings pending before the trial courts, and has  no application to cases already decided and disposed of.   Besides, failure to comply with the injunction for judges to decide their cases within 90 days from submission merely deprives them  of  their right to collect their salaries or to apply  for leave  (section  5, Judiciary  Act of 1948; section  129,  Revised  Administrative  Code) but does not deprive them of jurisdiction to  act in the causes pending before them.

The judgment appealed  from  is  affirmed,  with   costs against appellant Juan Dimson.  So  ordered.

Paras C,  J.,  Bengzon, Padilla,  Montemayor,  Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,  Endencia,, and Felix, JJ., concur.