On October 22, 1954, Yu Hai alias "Haya" was accused in the Justice of the Peace Court of Caloocan of a violation of Article 195, sub-paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, for having allegedly permitted the game of panchong or paikiu, a game of  hazard,  and having acted as maintainer thereof, in the municipality of Caloocan on or about the 26th day of June,  1954.  The accused moved to quash the information  on the ground that it charged more than one  offense and that the  criminal action  or liability therefor had already been extinguished; and the Justice of the Peace Court, in its order  of December  24, 1954, sustained the motion to quash  on the theory that the  offense  charged was a  light  offense which,  under Article 90 of  the Revised Penal Code, prescribed in  two months.

The provincial fiscal  appealed  to the Court of First Instance of the province, which  affirmed the order of dissmissal  of  the  information.  Wherefore,  the  provincial fiscal appealed directly to this  Court.

The sole issue is the period for the prescription of the offense charged,  punishable under Article  195 of  the Revised Penal Code by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.  The lower  court  held that  the crime charged  is a light offense as  defined in Article  9 of the  Code, and prescribed  in two  months;  while  the Solicitor  General argues that as the  crime charged may be punished  by a maximum fine of P200 (a correctional penalty  under Article 26), the same prescribe,  also under Article 90,  in ten years.

The  pertinent legal provisions  of the  Revised Penal

Code are: 

"Art, 90. Prescription  of crimes.

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 Those punishable by  a correctional penalty  shall  prescribe  in ten  years; with the exception of those punishable  by  arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in  five  years. 

The crime of libel or other  similar offenses prescribe in two years. The  offenses  of oral  defamation  and  slander  by  deed  shall prescribe  in  six months.

Light offenses prescribe in two months.

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'Art. 9. Grave felonies, less grave felonies, and light felonies.

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Less grave  felonies  are  those which the  law  punishes with penalties which in their  maximum  period  are correctional,  in  accordance with the  above  mentioned article.

Light felonies are  those infractions of law for  the commission of  which  the  penalty of arresto mayor or  a  fine not  exceeding 200 pesos or both, is  provided."

"Art. 26.  Fine,  when  afflictive, correctional,  or  light. A  fine, whether imposed as a single  or as an alternative penalty, shall  be considered an afflictive  penalty,  if  it exceeds 6,000 pesos;  a correctional  penalty,  if  it  does not exceed 6,000  pesos  but is  not less than  200 pesos; and a  light penalty  if it  be less  than  200 pesos."

Under Article 90, supra, "light offenses  prescribe  in two  months".  The definition  of "light  offenses"  is  in turn to be  found  in Article  9,  which classifies  felonies into  grave,  less grave, and  light, and defines "light felonies" as "those infractions of  law  for  the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos  or both is  provided"'.  The offense charged  is  punishable  by arresto  menor or  a fine  not exceeding 200  pesos (Article  195).  Hence,  it is a "light offense"  under Article 9  and prescribes  in  two months under Article 90.

The Solicitor General argues that as the crime charged may be punished by a maximum fine of P200, which under Article 26  is  a correctional  penalty, the time for prescription  thereof is ten  years,  pursuant  to  paragraph 3 of Article 90.  This argument is untenable.   In the first place,  while Article 90 provides that light  offenses prescribe in two months,  it does not define what is meant by "light offenses",  leaving it to Article 9 to fix its meaning. Article 26,  on the  other hand,  has  nothing to do  with the definition of offenses, but merely classifies fine, when imposed as a  principal  penalty, whether  singly  or  in the alternative into the categories of afflictive, correctional, and light penalties.   As the question at  issue is the prescription of a crime and not the prescription of a penalty, Article 9 should  prevail over Article 26.

In the second place,  Article 90 could not have intended that  light  offenses as defined  by  Article 9 would  have two  prescriptive periods two  months if  they are penalized by arresto  menor and/or a fine of  less than P200, and  ten years if penalized  by a maximum  fine of P200. Under the  theory  of the  Solicitor General, the difference of only one peso in the imposable fine would mean all the difference   of  nine years  and  ten  months  in  the prescriptive period  of the offense.  And what  is worse, the proper prescriptive period could not be ascertained until and unless the court decided which of the alternative penalties should be imposed; which the court could not properly do  if  the  offense had prescribed, for  then it  could no longer be prosecuted.   These absurd results the law-makers could not have wittingly intended, especially since more serious offenses as  those punishable by arresto mayor (a correctional penalty)  prescribe, also  under Article 90, in five years, while other "less grave" offenses like libel, and oral defamation and slander, prescribe in even shorter periods of time, two years and six  months respectively. As held in the case of People vs.  Florendo, 73 Phil. 679, there is no reason to suppose that the law-maker would raise the prescriptive period for certain  light  offenses over other light offenses.

It should also  be noted that under Article 9, a light felony is one punishable by arresto  menor of a  fine not exceeding 200 pesos  or both.  Now,  if we are to follow the  argument of  the Solicitor General that Article 26 should prevail over Article 9 if the  offense is punishable by  a maximum fine  of  P200, we would again  have the absurd situation  that an  offense penalized  by  arresto menor or fine not exceeding P200 in the  alternative, would be a less grave felony, while  the more serious one, which the law penalizes with both imprisonment of arresto menor and a fine  not  exceeding P200,  remains  only  a  "light offense".

Finally,  criminal statutes are to. be  strictly construed against the  government and liberally  in favor  of  the accused.  As it would be more favorable to the herein accused to apply the  definition of "light felonies"  under Article 9 in connection with the prescriptive period of the offense charged, the same should  be followed.  Under Article 90, the offense charged, being a  light offense,  prescribed in two months.  As it was allegedly committed on June 26, 1954 and the information filed only  on October 22, 1954, the lower court correctly ruled that the crime in question has already prescribed.

The decision appealed from is  affirmed, with costs de oficio.  So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion,  Endencia  and  Felix,. JJ., concur.