Robles Transportation Company, Inc., later referred to as the Company, is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, civil case No. 2013, ordering it  to  pay plaintiffs Emilio  Manalo and his  wife, Clara Salvador, the sum of P3,000 with  interest at 12 per cent  per annum from  November  14, 1952  plus the amount of P600  for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, with  costs.

The facts involved in this  case are simple and without dispute.   On August 9, 1947, a taxicab owned and operated by defendant appellant Company and driven by  Edgardo Hernandez its driver,  collided  with a passenger  truck at Paranaque, Rizal.  In the course of and as a result of the accident, the taxicab ran over Armando Manalo, an eleven year old,  causing him physical  injuries which resulted in his death several days later, .Edgardo Hernandez was prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence and after trial was found guilty of the charge and sentenced to  one year prison correctional, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of  P3,000, in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay costs.  Edgardo Hernandez served out his sentence but failed to  pay  the  indemnity.   Two writs of  execution were  issued  against him to satisfy the amount of the indemnity, but both writs were returned unsatisfied by the sheriff who  certified that  no property, real or personal, in Hernandez'  name could be found.'

On  February  17, 1953,  plaintiffs Emilio Manalo and his wife  Clara Salvador, father and mother respectively of Armando, filed the present action against the Company to enforce its subsidiary  liability, pursuant to  Articles 102 and  103 of  the Revised Penal Code.   The Company filed its  appearance and answer and  later an  amended answer with  special defenses and counterclaim.  It also filed a motion to dismiss the complaint unless and until the convicted driver Hernandez was included as  a  party defendant, the Company considering him an indispensable party..  The  trial court  denied  the  motion  to  dismiss, holding that Hernandez was not an  indispensable  party defendant.  Dissatisfied with this ruling, the Company filed certiorari proceedings with the  Court of Appeals,  but said appellate court held that  Hernandez  was not an indispensable  party defendant, and consequently, the trial court in denying the motion to dismiss acted within the proper limits of its discretion.  Eventually, the  trial court rendered judgment sentencing the defendant  Company to pay to  plaintiffs damages in the amount  of  P3,000 with interest at 12 per cent per annum from November 14, 1952, plus P600 for attorney's fees and expenses for litigation, with costs.   As  aforestated, the Company  is  appealing . from this decision.

To prove  their case  against the defendant  Company, the  plaintiffs introduced a  copy of  the  decision in the criminal case convicting Hernandez of homicide  through reckless imprudence, the  writs  of  execution to enforce the civil liability, and the returns of  the  sheriff  showing that the two writs  of  execution were not  satisfied because of the  insolvency of  Hernandez, the  sheriff being unable  to  locate  any property  in  his name.  Over the objections of the Company, the  trial  court admitted this evidence and based  its decision in the present case on the same.

Defendant-appellant  now contends  that this  kind of evidence is inadmissible and cites in support  of its  contention the cases of City of Manila  vs.  Manila Electric Company (52 Phil., 586), and Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Company (15 Phil., 75).  This  point has  already been decided by  this tribunal in the case of Martinez  vs. Barredo (81 Phil., 1).  After considering the same two cases now cited by appellant,  this court held that the judgment of  conviction, in the absence  of any collusion  between the defendant and  offended party, is binding upon the party subsidiarily liable.

The appellant also claims  that in admitting as  evidence the sheriff's return of  the  writs  of execution to  prove the insolvency of Hernandez,  without requiring said official's appearance in court, it was  deprived of  the  opportunity to cross-examine  said  sheriff.  A sheriff's  return is  an  official  statement  made by a public" official  in  the performance  of a  duty specially  enjoined  by law and forming part of official records, and is prima facie evidence of the facts  stated therein.  (Rule 39, section 11 and Rule 123, section 35, Rules of Court.)  The sheriff making the return need not testify in court as to the facts stated in his entry.  In the case of  Antillon vs.  Barcelon, 37 Phil., 151, citing Wigmore on  Evidence, this court said: 

"To the foregoing rules with reference to the method of  proving private documents an exception is  made  with reference  to  the method of proving public documents executed before and certified to, under the hand and seal of  certain public officials.  The courts and the legislature have recognized the valid reason for such an exception.  The  litigation is unlimited in which testimony by  officials is daily needed, the occasions in which the officials would be  summoned from his ordinary duties to declare  as  a witness are numberless. The public officers are few  in whose daily work something is  not done in which testimony is  not  needed from official sources.  Were there no  exception  to official statements, hosts of officials would be found  devoting  the  greater part of their time   to attending as witnesses in court or delivering their depositions before an officer. The work  of Administration of government  and  the interest  of the public having  business with officials  would  alike suffer  in consequence."

And this Court added:

 "The law reposes  a  particular confidence in public officers that ' it presumes they will discharge their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and,  therefore, whatever  acts they do In discharge of their public duty may be given  in evidence and shall be taken to be true under  such a  degree  of caution as the nature and circumstances  of each case  may appear to require,"

The appellant also contends that  Articles  102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code were repealed by the New Civil Code,  promulgated  in 1950, particularly, by the  repealing clause under  which comes Article  2270  of  the said code.   We find the contention untenable.  Article 2177 of the New  Civil Code expressly recognizes civil liabilities arising from negligence under the Penal Code, only that it provides that plaintiff cannot recover  damages twice for the same act of omission of the defendant.

 "ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence tinder the  Penal Code:  But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act of omission of the defendant."

Invoking prescription, appellant claims that the present action is barred by the Statute  of limitations for the reason that it is an action either, upon an injury to the rights of the" plaintiff, or  upon a quasi delict,  and that according  to  Article 1146 of the New Civil  Code,  such action must be instituted  within  four  years.  We  agree with  the  appellee that the present action  is based  upon a judgment, namely,  that in  the  criminal case, finding Hernandez guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence and sentencing him to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P3,000,  and, consequently may be instituted within ten  years.

As regards the other errors assigned by appellant, we find it unnecessary to  discuss  and rule upon them. Finding the decision appealed from to be in accordance ;with  law,  the same is hereby affirmed, with  costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Buatista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ.. concur.