Petitioner Nita Flores has applied for a writ of habeas corpus to recover the possession of her daughter Asuncion Cruz, from respondent  Felisa V. Cruz, who, it is claimed, refuses to surrender said minor to  her aforementioned mother.

Asuncion  Cruz was born outside wedlock, on May  25, 1939. Since then Asuncion had lived continuously with  her mother, petitioner herein.  In July, 1954, when the latter was staying at No.  14  South 10 Street,  Diliman,  Quezon City, in the house of one Dr. Silva, under  whose employment she  had.been,  and still  is, seemingly, as housemaid, petitioner sent Asuncion to her paternal  grandmother,  respondent  Felisa V. Cruz, residing  at No. 21 K-2 Street, Kamuning, Quezon City, in order to keep  her away from a given suitor.  About a  month later, when petitioner bade Asuncion  to return to their  house,  respondent allegedly did  not permit it.   Hence,  this  case was instituted in October, 1954, in the Court of  First Instance of Rizal.

Respondent testified  that Asuncion lives freely  in  her (respondent's) house and is neither deprived of her liberty nor prevented from returning to her mother, if she (Asuncion) wants to do so.  This was corroborated by Asuncion herself.  It  thus appearing that said minor is  under no restraint  of any kind  whatsoever, the  lower  court dismissed the case.   From the resolution to this effect, petitioner seasonably appealed directly to this Court.  Although her brief contests the truth of some of the statements made in said resolution, the substantial accuracy of the facts (as  distinguished from the conclusions)  therein set forth is impliedly admitted by appellant.   In  effect, therefore, the appeal raises merely questions of law.

The issue is whether a writ of habeas  corpus lies when a minor voluntarily decides to stay in a  house other than that  of the person entitled  to her  custody and  refuses to live  with the latter.  This question has already been settled in  the  affirmative.  In Salvaña vs. Gaeta  (55 Phil., 680), this Court after  invoking the  precedent established in Reyes  vs. Alvarez (8 Phil, 723) said:

"In the case of In re Swall  (Ann. Cas. 1915B, pp. 1015, 1016), decided on July 15, 1913, by the Supreme Court of Nevada, the  court said:

 'If the contention of counsel for petitioners is  correct, that they are entitled to the custody of their minor child by  virtue of the mere  fact that they are his natural parents  and are not shown otherwise to be improper persons to be intrusted with  the custody of such minor, petitioners  should prevail unless there is something in the contention of respondents that they are not holding said minor  under any physical  restraint.  In this, as in probably  most cases  where a  minor is abiding with persons who as  to him are in loco parentis,  no physical restraint  is necessary, for the natural inclination of the child does away with any necessity of force.  But where, as in this case, a  right  to the possession of the minor is claimed, the right  to retain such possession by such  force as may be necessary may  be assumed and that, if necessary, it would be exercised.  Proceedings in  habeas corpus have not  frequently been reported to determine the  right  to the possession of a minor that the question of  physical restraint need be given little or no consideration where a lawful right is asserted to retain possession of the child.' 

"The fact, then, that  a minor daughter  is in the custody  of a third  person of her own  free will, and without said person's having the slightest intention  of detaining her,  is  no  hindrance to the issuance of a writ  of habeas corpus to enable her parents to regain custody of  her person."

To  the same effect are our decisions in Celis vs. Cafuir (47 Off. Gaz.  [Supp. 12]  p. 179)  and  Chu  Tian  vs.  Tan Niu G. R. No. L-7509, August 25, 1954).  . Said four (4) cases are squarely in point.  They are conclusive on the issue  before  us.

We are not unmindful of the fact that, in dismissing the present case, His  Honor,  the trial  Judge  was,  seemingly influenced by the circumstance that Asuncion does not want to  return to her  mother,  because the  latter  wants her (Asuncion)  to be  a maid of the aforementioned Dr. Silva. Considering,  however,  that  petitioner  is  poor,  that she herself was,  and is, a maid  of Dr. Silva, and that nothing dishonest or immoral appears to be  connected  with such work, we see nothing wrong in said wish of the petitioner. Furthermore, said  wish  is not  even  comparable to  the  alleged behaviour  of the  petitioners  in the  cases above referred  to.

Thus, for instance, the case of Alvarez vs. Reyes (supra), involved  a girl whose  parents left her in a convent when  she  was  two and one-half years of age.   Thirteen years  later, the parents sought  to obtain her  custody by a writ  of habeas corpus.  In  granting the same although it appeared that the Mother Superior of the Convent had  no objection thereto and that the child, then fifteen (15) years  old,  was  unwilling  to  return to  the parental  home this Court held: 

"The guardianship which parents  exercise  over their children by virtue of  the paternal authority granted them by law has for its purpose their physical development, the cultivation of their intelligence,  and the  development  of their intellectual  and  sensitive  faculties.  For such purposes  they are  entitled to  control  their children and to keep them in their company in order to properly comply with their paternal obligations, but it is also their duty to furnish them with a dwelling or a place where they may live together.

 "Although the right of. the parents may be expressly or tacitly waived, under no consideration can there be a waiver of their duty without violating the provisions of the law, as may be seen from the simple reading thereof.  It is, therefore,  not possible to prove that the parents of Valentina Reyes  had waived, nor  could they waive,  the duty to support, instruct, educate, and to  keep her with them, from the moment when they have expressed their will to take her out of the convent where she has resided for thirteen years. They can not be denied the right to recover their daughter, and with the greater reason, when it appears that the mother superior of said convent has not shown her intention to retain the girl  therein."

The  case of Salvaña vs. Gaeta  (supra) referred to  another girl who abandoned her home and found asylum in the  house of the  local justice of the  peace, alleging  that her  parents had maltreated her and were compelling  her to marry a man she did  not love.  Despite the  fact  that she  was  already pregnant, in consequence of illicit relations with another lad whom she  wanted to marry, and that said justice  of the  peace had never  curtailed  her liberty,  we  declared:

 "(1) That the writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor daughter, even though the latter be in the custody of a third person of her  own free will; and; (2) that neither the fact that the parents of a minor daughter sought to compel her  to' marry against  her will, where it does hot appear such a  purpose has continued, nor their refusal to consent, to her marriage to another young  man, by whom she is pregnant, is a legal ground for depriving said parents of their parental  authority and the custody of said daughter."

The position of petitioner-appellant  in the case at  bar is much stronger  than that of the petitioners in the  (2) two cases already adverted  to.  Indeed, the former  had always had the custody of her daughter, unlike the petitioners in the Alvarez case, who had left their daughter, for 13 years, under the care of a religious institution.  Again, petitioner herein is not guilty of any of  the acts imputed to the petitioners in the Salvaña case.

Despite the commendable concern displayed by the lower court for the welfare of Asuncion Cruz, it is incontestable that a denial  of the writ  prayed for by  petitioner herein would defeat the parental authority vested by law in  her (Article 316,  Civil Code of the Philippines).  Obviously, such result which amounts to a deprivation of said  authority can not be countenanced except in the cases  authorized by law  (see Articles 327 to 332,  Civil Code of the  Philippines)  and. this not one of them.

Wherefore,  the  resolution appealed from  is  reversed and the writ  prayed  for granted, without special  pronouncement as to  costs.  It is so ordered.

Paras, C. J, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia,  and Felix, JJ., concur.