In three separate informations identically worded except that each referred to a different offended  party, Corazon Aquino was accused, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, of  the  crime of  grave oral  defamation  for having allegedly uttered in  public,  on or about June 4, 1954, words to  this  effect:  "You, Merrera lawyers,  are stealers ***   shameless ***   impolite." . Three   informations  were filed  on the theory that, as there were three lawyers bearing the  surname  "Merrera",  three separate crime of  defamation  were committed.   But  the  lower court, upon motion of the defense, ordered the informations consolidated into one on the ground that, as the defamatory statement was uttered but once and on a single occasion against a group  of persons not mentioned individually, the act complained of constituted only one offense.  From this order, the  prosecution appealed to this Court.

In  support  of its order,  the lower  court cites various cases of libel  decided by this Court (among them,  that of U.  S. vs. Kelly,  35  Phil., 419)  in which, regardless of the number of persons libelled, the accused were sentenced for only one offense.  The court also  cites decisions holding that a person who, on the same occasion and in the same place, steals properties belonging to  different  owners,  is guilty of only one crime of theft.

At common law, "a libel on two  or more persons contained in one writing and published by a single  act constitutes but one  offense so as to warrant a single  indictment therefor"  (State vs. Hoskins, 60 Minn., 168), this for the reason that "the law makes the publication of libel punishable as a crime, not because of  injury to the reputation, but because the publication of  such articles tends to affect injuriously the  peace and good  order of  society." The Solicitor General, however, cites  the case of People vs. Del  Rosario, et al.  (86 Phil.,  163) where this Court upheld the  theory  that  a "libelous publication  affecting more  than  one  person  constitutes one crime or  more". That  decision,  it is to  be noted,  was  predicated  on  the ruling laid down in the case of People vs. Luz Jose, 76 Phil.  599, to the effect that libel  or defamation of the nature of that committed in the present cases cannot be prosecuted de oficio  but only at the  instance of the offended party  or parties, from  which this  Court deduced the conclusion that in libel or  defamation  of that kind the policy of the law is to redress the injury  to the individual rather than the  injury to  the  peace and  good order of society. But that conclusion is now without basis, for the  said case of People vs.  Luz Jose  had already been overruled by the more  recent cases  of  People vs. Juan B. Santos,  et al. (98 Phil., Ill), promulgated December  19,  1955  where this Court said: 

"A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime that may be prosecuted de oficio, or of a crime that may not be prosecuted de oficio, 'or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition,  status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or  contempt of a natural  or  juridical  person, or to  blacken the memory of one who is dead  In libel imputing the commission of a crime that may be prosecuted  de  oficio, the complaint of the offended party  is not  necessary,  and the information filed by the prosecuting officer is enough to confer  jurisdiction upon the court to try the  defendant charged with the crime.  A libel imputing the commission of a crime which cannot  be prosecuted de oficio, such as adultery, concubinage,  seduction,  abduction, rape  and acts of lasciviousness, cannot be prosecuted except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party.   A libel attributing a defect or vice, real or  imaginary, which  does not constitute a crime but  brings into  disrepute, scorn or ridicule or  tends to cause him dishonor,  discredit, or  contempt, does not come under the last paragraph of article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that 'No criminal action for defamation which consists, in the imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party.'   This is the only exception provided for by law in which the instance and complaint of the offended party are required in order  to vest or confer jurisdiction upon the court to take cognizance of the crime of libel and try the defendant charged with it. If this is the only exception, then it cannot be extended  beyond the import and terms of the law.  A  libel ascribing a defect or vice, real or imaginary, which does not  constitute a crime but brings or tends to  bring the offended party into disrepute, scorn,  or ridicule or tends to cause him dishonor,  discredit, or contempt is not included in the exception.  Hence the informations filed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija for the City Attorney charging the defendants with  libel which consists of an imputation of  a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of  a  natural or juridical person, are sufficient in  law to  confer jurisdiction upon the court to try the defendants charged with the crime."

In line with this latter decision, we have to hold that the utterance of the defamatory statement complained of in the present cases  should be regarded as only one offense and made the subject of only one information, the utterance having been made  but once and referring apparently  to a family of lawyers designated by  their common surname but not separately mentioned.

Wherefore, the  order  appealed  from is affirmed.   No costs.

Paras,. C. J., Bengzon, Padilla,  Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.