At  about 11:00 o'clock  in the  evening of  November 5, 1953,  the reports  of gunfire awaked the  spouses  Vicente Pacson and Cipriana Tadeo, the 4  minor  children and Cipriana's mother, Monica del  Mundo,  in their house  at barrio Tikiw,  San  Antonio, Nueva Ecija.   Whereupon, Vicente Pacson crossed the room and shouted to one Tata Pisio that  persons were going up their house and then hid himself inside the ceiling.

In the meantime, someone broke! the wall of the kitchen at the back of the house, and a few moments later a person suddenly entered the dining room and shouted that the door  leading to the  living room  be  opened.  As no  one of the h6use members obeyed,  the  intruder removed  3 board pieces in the  wall and through  the opening  thus made he entered the living room.  The  intruder who was armed with a hunting knife was recognized  by Cipriana Tadeo to be Agustin Mangulabnan,  who  was  previously known to her.  Agustin removed the iron bar from the door  leading to the balcony and after opening  said door, 2 persons whose identity has not been ascertained entered. Agustin  then approached  Cipriana Tadeo and snatched from her neck one necklace valued at P50 and also  took from her person P50 in the paper bills and P20 in silver coins.  Meanwhile, one of the two unidentified marauders searched the person  of Monica del Mundo and  took from her P200 in cash and in gold necklace valued at P200. But not contented with the loot,  the same  individual asked from Monica del Mundo to give her diamond  ring which the  latter could not produce, and for  this reason, he strucked her twice on the face with the butt of his gun. One of the small children  of Vicente  Pacson  who was terrified called to his mother and that unidentified person, irked by the boys impudence, made a move to strike him, but  Monica  del Mundo  warded  off the  blow  with  her right arm.  At this  juncture,  the  second  unidentified individual put  his companion aside and climbing  on  the table, fired his gun at the ceiling.  Afterwards, appellant and his two unidentified  companion left the place.

After  they were gone, Cipriana Tadeo called  to  her husband  Vicente  Pacson, and receiving no  answer  she climbed the ceiling and she found him lying face downward already dead.  According to Dr.  Vicente P. Llado, who performed the autopsy, Vicente Pacson sustained the injuries described in his autopsy reports, which reads as follows:

November 6, 1953

To Whom It May Concern:

Post-mortem findings on cadaver Vicente Pacson, age 37 years, married, of barrio  Tikiw, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija.

Time taken:  8:20 a.m.

1. Entrance fracture of the frontal region of head due to gun shot  wound.
   Exit wound at left side of the head, about the upper portion of the left ear.
   
2.  
3. Entrance gunshot wound, left lateral side of the left middle arm.
   Exit gunshot wound inner side of left arm.
      
   
4. Entrance gunshot wound, left  lateral of the left  forearm. Exit gunshot  wound, left inner  side of the left  forearm.
   
5.  
6. Entrance gunshot wound  around 2 inches more or less above the middle of the right clavicle.
   Exit gunshot wound at the back in the region  of the spinal cord between the two  scapula.
      
   Cause of death severe hemorrhage due to gunshot wound of the frontal region of. the forehead.
      
   (Exhibit C) 

The incident was reported to the police authorities that same evening  and in the ensuing investigation Cipriana Tadeo informed the Chief of Police that Agustin Mangulabnan was one  of  the  malefactors  who  entered  their house.  When the latter was investigated,  he  readily and voluntarily subscribed before the Justice of the Peace  of San  Antonio,  Nueva Ecija, an  affidavit  admitting  his participation in the robbery and killing of Vicente Pacson (Exhibit A and B).   Much later, however, he subscribed to another affidavit  before  the Clerk  of  Court wherein he  exculpated from  any  participation  Crispin Estrella, one of those he implicated in his previous affidavit, though admitting the  truth  of  the other allegations  contained therein  (Exhibit  D).

As the result  of  the  investigation  conducted  by the authorities a complaint was filed  in the  Justice of the Peace  Court  of  San  Antonio,  Nueva  Ecija,  against Agustin Mangulabnan alias Guinita, a surrendered Huk and  10 other  unidentified  persons.  But the  complaint was  amended on  January 13, 1954, to include Dionisio Sarmiento, together with Arcadio  Balmeo, Patricio Gonzales, Florentino Flores, Crispin Estrella, Pedro Villareal, Claudio Reyes, "Peter Doe"  and "John Doe", who were still  at large, as defendants.   After the preliminary  investigation the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija  where defendants were  accused of robbery with homicide.   In that Court, Agustin Mangulabnan was found guilty of  the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify Monica del Mundo in the sum of  P400; Cipriana Tadeo in the sum P132; P6,000  to the heirs of Vicente  Pacson, and  to pay the costs.  Defendant Dionisio Sarmiento was acquitted  while the information as  against the other defendants who continued to be at large was dismissed for lack of evidence, with the proportionate part of the costs de oficio.

Agustin Mangulabnan  moved for a new trial on  the ground of newly discovered evidence, but the motion was denied for lack  of merit.  Hence his appeal which is now before Us.

The motion for a new  trial was based on the affidavits of  Dr. Numeriano D. Lustre, Marino Ventura,  Marcosa Mudlong  and Patricio Gonzales but they were not really newly discovered  nor could they alter the conclusion arrived  at  by the  trial Court.   As stated by the Solicitor General, it is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that before a new trial may be granted on the ground  of newly  discovered evidence, it must  be shown: (a) That the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) That such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence (U. S.  vs. Tan Jonjua, 1 Phil. 51; U.S. vs. Palanca, 5 Phil. 269; U.S. vs. De  Leon, 1 Phil. 188; U.  S.  vs.  Zamora, 2  Phil. 582; U. S.  vs.  Torrente, 2 Phil. 1); and  (c)  That it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching (U. S. vs. Luzon,  4 thil.  343), and of such a weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted  (U. S. vs. Zamora,  supra;  U.  S. vs. Alvarez, 3 Phil. 24; U. S. vs. Luzon, supra.; U. S. vs. Hernandez 5 Phil. 429; U. S. vs. Magtibay, 17 Phil. 417; U. S. vs. Tongco, 2 Phil.  189; People vs. Cu-Unjieng, 61 Phil. 906; and People vs. Reyes, 71 Phil. 598).  The  motion for new trial did not comply with these requisites and was properly denied by the  trial Court.

Appellant's objection to  the  admissibility  in  evidence of post-morten report (Exhibit C) is evidently untenable. The fact  that it is a mere carbon copy is of no  moment, for it  has  been  signed by the physician  who  executed the same and  his  signature was  identified by  him  at the witness stand.  Furthermore, appellant  did not  offer any objection to its  admission when it was presented in evidence  at  the hearing.  His  objection now comes too late (Hodges vs. Salas et al., 63 Phil. 567;  U. S.  vs. Ong Shiu,  28 Phil. 242).

The  lower  court  did neither  err in  rejecting  Exhibit 1  for  the  defense.   This  is  an  affidavit  purportedly executed  by Sgt. Adan Fernando of the Philippine  Constabulary.  The main portion of it  (quoted  in appellant's brief, page  32,  and  appearing on page 21 of the record), is as  follows:

"The  Chief of Police  of  San  Antonio,  Nueva Ecija,  who  first arrived  at the scene of the crime,  have already picked up the empty shells  of Cal. 30, Carbine type and were delivered to Cpl. Lopez, one of the investigators of our unit.  Information revealed that Civilian Commando of barrio Pulo,  San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, has something to do with  the crime  committed, so I proceeded to barrio  Pulo  to  confiscate  their arms.  Among those arms  confiscated  were those registered under  Pedro  Villareal and Claudio Reyes and upon  examination of the Ballistic Experts  in  Camp Crame, it  appeared positive as per Ballistic Report" (Exhibit 1). As may  be  seen,  the  latter  part of the aforequoted testimony of Sgt. Adan Fernando is hearsay and, anyway, it is  of no moment  in the case at  bar, because  2 of the 3 persons who entered the dwelling of the spouses Pacson were unidentified.

There  is  no denial that  the  crime  of robbery  with homicide was committed as described in the information. By appellant's  own admission (Exhibits A and B) and the testimony  of Cipriana Tadeo, we  cannot have any doubt as to appellant's participation in the execution thereof. And as pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant and the rest of the  malefactors  came  together to the house  of the  offended  parties  to  commit the robbery perpetuated  therein  and together went away from the scene  of  the crime  after its perpetration.  This shows conspiracy among  the offenders  which  rendered each  of them  liable  for  the acts  of   the  others  (People vs. Delgado, 77 Phil. 11).

Moreover,  the  record shows that appellant participated in  the criminal  design to commit the  robbery with his co-defendants (People vs. Flores, et al.,  G. R.  No.  L-231, August 21,  1946),  and it is a settled rule in this  jurisdiction that  unity  of purpose and action arising from a common  design  makes all parties thereto  jointly  liable (U. S. vs. Matanug, 11 Phil. 188), each being responsible for the result, irrespective of the character of their individual participation (U. S. vs. Ramos, 2 Phil., 434).

It may be argued that the killing of  Vicente Pacson undertaken by  one  of  the 2 unidentified  persons who climbed up a table and fired at the  ceiling, was an unpremeditated act that surged on the spur of the moment and possibly Without any idea that  Vicente Pacson was hiding therein,  and  that the English version  of Article 294, No. 1, of  the  Revised Penal  Code, which  defines the special, single  and indivisible crime of robbery with homicide  only punishes any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of  any person, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua when by reason or on occasion  of the robbery, the crime  of homicide shall re see, therefore, that in order to, determine the existence of the crime of robbery with  homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the  occasion of the robbery  (Decision of the  Supreme Court of Spain of November  26,  1892,  and January 7, 1878, quoted in 2 Hidalgo's Penal Code, p. 267 and 259-260, respectively). This High Tribunal speaking of the accessory character of the circumstances leading to the homicide, has also held that it is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident  (Decision of September  9,  1886;  October 22, 1907; April 30, 1910 and July 14, 1917), provided that the homicide be produced by reason or on  occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction  as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the  commission of the  crime,  that  has  to be taken  into consideration (Decison of January 12/1889 see  Cuello Calon's Codigo Penal, p.  501-502).

The crime  committed in the  case  at bar, of  which appellant  Agustin  Mangulabnan is a  co-participant, is the crime of  robbery  with homicide covered by Article 294, No. 1, of the Revised  Penal Code and punished with reclusion perpetua to death.  The commission of the  offense was attended by the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, abuse of superior  strength and with the aid of armed  man,  and in consonance with the provisions of Article  63,  No. 1 of the same legal body, appellant should be sentenced to the capital punishment, as recommended  by the Solicitor General.  However, as the required number of votes for the imposition of the capital penalty has not been  secured in this  case, the penalty have been committed, but this English version of the Code  is a poor translation of the prevailing Spanish text of said paragraph, which  reads as follows:

"1. Con la pena  de  reclusion  perpetua a  muerte,  cuando con motivo o con ocasion  del robo resultare homicidio."

We see, therefore, that in order to, determine the existence of the crime of robbery with  homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the  occasion of the robbery  (Decision of the  Supreme Court of Spain of November  26,  1892,  and January 7, 1878, quoted in 2 Hidalgo's Penal Code, p. 267 and 259-260, respectively). This High Tribunal speaking of the accessory character of the circumstances leading to the homicide, has also held that it is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident  (Decision of September  9,  1886;  October 22, 1907; April 30, 1910 and July 14, 1917), provided that the homicide be produced by reason or on  occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction  as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the  commission of the  crime,  that  has  to be taken  into consideration (Decison of January 12, 1889 see  Cuello Calon's Codigo Penal, p.  501-502).

The crime  committed in the  case  at bar, of  which appellant  Agustin  Mangulabnan is a  co-participant, is the crime of  robbery  with homicide covered by Article 294, No. 1, of the Revised  Penal Code and punished with reclusion perpetua to death.  The commission of the  offense was attended by the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, abuse of superior  strength and with the aid of armed  man,  and in consonance with the provisions of Article  63,  No. 1 of the same legal body, appellant should be sentenced to the capital punishment, as recommended  by the Solicitor General.  However, as the required number of votes for the imposition of the capital penalty has not been  secured in this  case, the penalty to be  imposed  upon  Agustin Mangulabnan is  the next lower  in degree or reclusion perpetua (Section 9, Republic Act No. 296, known as the Judiciary Act of 1948).

Wherefore the decision appealed from being  in  accordance with  law and the evidence, is hereby  affirmed with

costs against appellant.  It is so ordered.

Paras, C.  J., Padilla, Montemayor,  Bautista Angelo, Labrador,  Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and  Endencia, JJ., concur.