[ G. R. No. L-6608, December 29, 1954 ]
LUZON LABOR UNION, PETITIONER, VS. LUZON BROKERAGE COMPANY, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, A., J.:
Premised on the hypothesis that the claimants, though made to work for the U. S. Army in December, 1941, nevertheless continued to be in the employ of the company for the duration of the war, the claim was, in addition, founded on a specific promise that they would be given two or three years backpay at war's end, the promise; having been allegedly made by F.H. Myers, president and general manager of the company, and his son T.O. Myers, as an inducement for the men to go to Bataan and brave the perils of war there, and reiterated in 1945 as an inducement for some of the men to give testimony that should enable the company to recover the value of its trucks from the U.S. Army.
The company denied liability for the claims, alleging that such of the claimants as went to Bataan did so by order of the U.S. Army, that no promise of backpay was ever made of them, and that in any event the claim had already prescribed. After hearing, the court found that such promise was really made by F.H. Myers; that relying on such promise, the claimants went to Bataan and rendered service to the U.S. Army (in connection with the transportation of war materials); and that, as the promise was thus accepted, "there was a meeting of the minds between the claimants and the company and consequently the contract of employment existed." The court, however, denied the claim for backpay on the ground of prescription, but awarded a separation pay equivalent to one month's salary to eight of the claimants on the theory that these, notwithstanding their temporary employment by the Army, had remained in the service of the company. The other claimants were not given this award because of earlier separation from the service of the company or for failure of proof.
After going over the record, we find that the ruling below that claimants' action has already prescribed cannot be sustained. Aside from the fact appearing from its articles of incorporation that the company was owned principally by Americans and could therefore be regarded as an enemy corporation (Filipinas Compañia de Seguros vs. Christern, Huenefeld & Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-2294, promulgated May 25, 1951; S. David Winship vs. Philippine Trust Company, G.R. No. L-3869, promulgated January 31, 1952) so that the claimants were not at liberty to sue it during the Japanese occupation, there is the further consideration that for the claimants to assert their claim in court they would have to divulge that they had gone to Bataan and helped the U.S. Army transport its war materials, and such revelation would have exposed them to Japanese reprisal. Moreover, it would seem that myers' promise contemplated payment at war's end since the backpay was to be for two or three years.
In our opinion the claim for backpay has not prescribed and the lower court should, therefore, not have limited recovery to one month's separation pay. But while we have come to this general conclusion, we are not in a position to make specific awards for that will have to be determined for each of the 425 claimants and the evidence of record for that purpose would appear to be incomplete because of the denial of a motion for new trial for the presentation of that evidence for most of the claimants. Such being the case, we think that justice would be better served if a new trial were ordered.
The objection to this appeal being too late has been considered but found to be without substantial merit.
Wherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the case remanded to the court below for new trial. In the new trial the lower court shall be at liberty to decide the question of whether, as insinuated, some claimants have really waived appeal by asking for a writ of execution or receiving the amounts awarded.So ordered.No costs.
Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur