On 26  January,  1955, the plaintiff,  a minor  assisted by her father  Gabriel Reyes for whose appointment as guardian  ad litem she prayed,  filed a complaint dated 7 December  1954  against  the  defendant  spouses  to  recover moral and exemplary  damages  for physical injuries inflicted upon her, and slander or defamation uttered against her  honor, by the  defendant Betty Santos de la Rosa, all committed  in a public  place and in  the presence  of many people.  The  total  amount sought  to  be recovered  is P45,000.  She also prays that  the defendants be made to pay attorney's fees and  costs.

The defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint on  the ground (1) that the  complaint does not state  a cause of action; and  (2)  that the complaint is barred by a  prior judgment.  They  contend that  in  criminal case No. 4473-1, People vs. Betty Santos de la Rosa, for slight physical injuries,  the  Municipal Court  of Pasay  City found that the physical injuries suffered  by the complainant might have been inflicted upon her by Delfin B. Zaleta; that the complainant did not reserve in said criminal case No. 4473-1 her right to institute a separate civil  action; and that in the judgment rendered by the municipal court no amount of damages was  awarded  for failure  of the complainant to prove any.

On 26 February 1955, the  complaint was dismissed by the Court of  First  Instance of Quezon City.   A motion to set aside the order of dismissal and to set the case for hearing on the merits was denied.   Hence this appeal. Article '33 of the new Civil Code  provides that: 

In cases  of  defamation, fraud, and physical injuries,  a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought  by the  injured  party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Under  these  provisions, independently of  the criminal action for defamation and  physical  injuries, a civil suit for recovery of damages arising therefrom may be brought. The fact that the complainant did  not reserve her right to institute a separate  civil action for damages  does not preclude  her  from  bringing  such action.  As the  jurisdiction  of the municipal court is limited to P2,000,^[1] failure of the plaintiff to prove the amount of  damages she had suffered in the criminal action brought  in the municipal court, which she now seeks to recover in this civil  action, cannot be  deemed a Waiver nor can  it operate to bar such recovery.

In her complaint the plaintiff alleges that early in the morning of 15 of June 1954 she was assaulted, slandered and libeled by the  defendant Betty  Santos  de la Rosa in the presence of many  people at the Riviera nightclub, as a result of which  she suffered moral  and exemplary damages.

The  Municipal  Court of Pasay City found the defendant Betty Santos de la Rosa guilty of having hit the plaintiff with a handbag  and sentenced  her to. pay a  fine  of  P50 (case No.  4473-1).   The act of hitting the  plaintiff alleged under the  first cause of action of  the complaint, whether it constitutes physical injuries  or  slander by deed, is a  sufficient cause of action  for the  recovery of damages under the new Civil Code.   The libel or slander uttered by the defendant Betty Santos de la Rosa pleaded under the second  cause of action of the complaint was not involved in the criminal case.  The trial court should not have dismissed the complaint without affording the plaintiff the opportunity to introduce evidence in support of her claim for damages.

There is  nothing  alleged in the complaint which  constitute a cause of action against Jaime de  la Rosa.  The fact that he is the husband of the defendant Betty Santos de la Rosa and was present on the occasion the physical injuries or  slander by deed  was inflicted  upon, and  the libel or slander was uttered against, the plaintiff  by his wife, does not make him liable for the wrongful acts of his wife.   Under  the former law his joining as party defendant was necessary because the conjugal property or income might have to answer  for the payment of damages should the court find the defendant wife liable to  pay for them. Under  article 113 of the  new Civil Code, however, in an action  against the wife upon civil liability  arising from a criminal offense the  husband need not be joined.

The  orders  appealed from,  in so far as  the defendant Betty Santos de  la Rosa  is concerned, are set  aside and the  case  remanded to the court from whence it came for further proceedings  in  accordance  with law.

Paras,  C. J., Montemayor,  Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,  J.  B. L.,  Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.

 

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^[1] Section  88, Republic Act  No.  296, as amended  by Republic Act No. 644,  in connection with section 44(c), Republic Act No. 296.