Petition for certiorari against  an order  of  the  Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon.  Edilberto Barot, presiding  enjoining petitioners  herein,  Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU)  and Majestic and  Republic Theaters  Employees Association, their  members, representatives, agents, and all other persons assisting or acting for them,  to immediately  cease and desist from picketing respondent's  (herein) premises and preventing said respondent from  the  lawful and peaceful  possession and  use of said premises, and from molesting, interfering or preventing persons  who desire to enter the Republic and  the Majestic Theaters, and from committing any act of violence or intimidation against the respondent company and  said persons. The incidents giving rise to  the above orders are as follows:

Before March 31, 1955, L. C. Eugenio & Co., Inc., owner of the Republic and  the  Majestic  theaters,  leased  the theaters to the Republic Theater Enterprises, Inc., and the Majestic Theater, Inc.   These  two  corporations operated the said theaters.   On  February 16,  1955, these two corporations entered  into  a collective bargaining  agreement with the PAFLU,  some of the members of which were employees of the  Republic Theater Enterprises and  the Majestic Theater,  Inc.  This agreement was to  expire on December 31, 1956, renewable  for  another  period of  two years,  if neither party rescinds the contract.  On March 31, 1955, L. C. Eugenio sold the Republic and the Majestic theaters to the Goodwill Trading Co., Inc. for the sum of P950,000,  of which P301,545.25 was paid at the  time of the  execution of the sale.  On April 25, 1955, the former owner terminated the  lease of the two theaters in favor of the  Republic  Theater  Enterprises  and  the Majestic Theater, Inc., and on April 26, 1955, the Godwill Trading leased the said theaters to Rema, Inc., respondent in these proceedings.  As a result of the contract of sale and the termination of the lease  of the theaters by the Republic Theater  Enterprises and the Majestic Theater, Inc., the respondent Rema, began to operate the two theaters,  employing persons other than these employed therein by the Republic Theater Enterprises  and the Majestic Theater, Inc.  The unions to which the employees  belong started picketing the said theaters, claiming that they could not be  deprived of their right under the collective bargaining agreement of February 16, 1955, and alleging further that the contract of  sale with the Goodwill Trading was  a fictitious sale.  Thereupon Rema, instituted civil case  No. 26169 in the Court of First Instance of. Manila  against the said labor unions for declaratory  relief  with preliminary injunction.  The respondent judge set  the petition  for preliminary injunction  for hearing,  and at this hearing Rema  submitted  evidence consisting of affidavits  A, A-l, B, B-l, C, C-l, D, D-l  and E.  These affidavits show that members of the respondent union were committing acts of violence on persons desiring to  enter the theaters and were threatening  customers of  the said  theaters.  The respondent union and association were permitted is submit counter-affidavits,  but they  did not  do  so,  and  upon  the expiration of the period granted them the court issued the order subject of  the present petition for certiorari.

The  ground upon which the present petition  is based is that the controversy between the  union  of the employees formerly working in  the two theaters and the new operator of  the  said  theaters,  the respondent Rema,  is  a  labor dispute, and that the respondent court, therefore, did  not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same or to issue injunction in ,the case.   The trial judge held  that there was no relation  of  employee and  employer between  the petitioning union  and  the respondent Rema.  This issue has already been passed upon  in the case of PAFLU, et al., vs. Tan  and Rema,  supra, p. 854.   We held  in that case, which .involves the same parties and the same facts and circumstances as the one at  bar, that a labor dispute exists. 

"*  *  *   Thus it was  held that  The disputants need not stand in relation  of  employer and employee for case  to involve a 'labor dispute' within  Norris-La  Guardia  Act regulating  issuance of restraining  order or injunction in cases involving labor disputes" (Green, et  al.  vs. Obergfell, et al., 121 F  2d.,  46).  While, under our own Industrial  Peace  Act,  the term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms,  tenure,  or  conditions of  employment, 'regardless of whether the  disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee [Section 2, (j), Republic Act 872.]  In our opinion, considering the equities involved, the relation of  petitioners to respondent comes within the purview of this definition."

But we also  held therein that the Court of Industrial Relations has  no jurisdiction  to take  cognizance  of cases involving  labor  disputes since the approval of  Republic Act No. 875, except when the dispute relates  to certain specific cases like the  following: 

"*  *  *   (1) When the labor dispute affects an industry which is indispensable to the national interest and is so certified by  the President to the industrial court (Section 10, Republic Act 875J; (2) when the controversy refers to minimum wage under the Minimum  Wage Law  (Republic Act 602);  (3)  when  it involves hours of employment under the Eight-Hour  Labor  Law (Commonwealth Act 444); and (4) when it involves  an unfair labor practice [Section   5,  (a),  Republic   Act  875]. *  * *."  (p.   8,  Decision  in PAFLU, et al., vs.  Tan, et aL L-9115.)   '

It follows, therefore,  that the Court of  First Instance of Manila  had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action instituted by the  Rema,  Inc., against the labor union  and associations,  petitioners herein.   So, the question remaining to be decided is whether or not the respondent court of  first instance abused  its  discretion in granting  the preliminary injunction.

Republic Act No. 875  expressly  provides for the procedure to be  followed by courts  in the consideration of petitions  for  injunction  against  picketing.   Section  9, paragraph d, expressly provides: 

"(d)  No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent injunction in any case  involving or growing out of a labor dispute, as herein defined, except after hearing the testimony of  witnesses  in open court  (with  opportunity for cross-examination)  in  support  of  the  allegations  of a  complaint made under oath,  and testimony in opposition  thereto, if offered, and except after finding of fact by the Court, to the effect:

"(1) That unlawful  acts have been  threatened and will be committed unless  restrained, or have been committed and" will be continued unless restrained, but no injunction or temporary restraining order  shall be issued on  account of  any  threat or unlawful act  excepting  against  the  person  or  persons,  association,  or  organization  making  the threat or committing the unlawful act  or  actually authorizing  or  ratifying  the  same after actual knowledge thereof;   

"(2) That substantial and irreparable injury  to complainant's property will follow;

"(3) That as to each  item of relief granted greater injury will  be inflicted upon complainant by the denial  of relief than will  be inflicted upon defendants by  the  granting  of relief;   

"(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and

"(5)" That  the public officers charged  with the  duty to protect complainant's property are  unable or unwilling to furnish adequate  protection. 

"Such hearing shall  be held after  due and personal notice thereof has been given,  in such  manner as  the Court shall direct,  to all known persons against whom  relief is sought, and also to the chief of those public officials of the province or city  within which the unlawful acts have been threatened  or committed charged with the duty to protect complainant's property:  *  *  *."

Judged  by  the  above-quoted  provision, the  order  complained of is subject to the following objections: (1) there was no hearing of  the testimonies  of witnesses  in  open court;  (2)  there is no  finding of fact by the court  that unlawful acts have  been threatened and will be. committed nor that complainant has  no adequate remedy at law, and that public  officers  charged with the duty  to protect complainant's  property are   unable or  unwitting to  furnish adequate protection.

The order also prohibits the petitioning union and associations "from picketing plaintiff's premises."   This is a denial of a fundamental right granted employees of labor unions, which the courts may not validly prohibit.   What may be enjoined is the use of violence or the  act  of unlawful picketing, such as the commission of acts of violence or intimidation against employees or those who want to see the shows not lawful picketing.

It is evident, therefore, that while the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition, it had  transcended  the powers (called jurisdiction  in the Act) because it enjoined the petitioners from picketing, a legitimate labor right, and because the procedure expressly outlined in the law  for the issuance of an injunction was not strictly followed.

Wherefore, the writ prayed for is hereby  granted, and the order complained of annulled.  Without costs.

Padilla, Montemeyor, Bautista  Angelo, Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, J., with whom Paras, CJ., concurs:

I concur in the result, for the reasons, and  subject to the qualifications, set forth  in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Mr.  Justice Reyes (J. B. L.) in PAFLU vs. Tan and Rema Incorporated,  (supra,  p. 854).