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[ADRIANO PAJARILLO v. ANDRES MANAHAN](https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c34e1?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
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[ GR No. L-8949, Sep 28, 1956 ]

ADRIANO PAJARILLO v. ANDRES MANAHAN +

DECISION

99 Phil. 1000

[ G.R. No. L-8949, September 28, 1956 ]

ADRIANO PAJARILLO, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. ANDRES MANAHAN, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

D E C I S I O N

PARAS, C.J.:

The plaintiffs-appellees filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija against the  defendants-appellants, to compel the latter to  convey to the former the two parcels  of land  described  in the  complaint  and to recover fifty cavanes of palay annually beginning the agricultural years 1951-1952, or their  equivalent money value at  twelve  pesos  per cavan;  it being alleged that appellees  gave  to the  appellants  the  sum  of P2,000 for the latter to buy in behalf and for the account off the former the said parcels  of land but  that,  contrary to their  agreement,  the appellants made  the purchase in their own  name and have refused to deliver  the land to the appellees.

In their answer the appellants alleged that they neither received from the appellees the sum of P2,000 nor agreed to buy  the land in question for appellees'  account,  the truth being that  they purchased the same for themselves.

The appellants Subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, setting  up the statute of frauds and alleging that an express trust, upon which appellees' cause  of  action was based, cannot be  proved by  parole evidence.  After  the appellees  had filed their answer to  the motion  to dismiss, and after preliminary hearing, the  court issued an order on January 28, 1953, the dispositive part of which reads as follows: "Wherefore,  the  Court finds that the claim of the  plaintiffs as  set  forth' in  the  complaint is  one based upon an express trust, there being  no writing or memorandum  it is barred by  the statute of frauds, apart from the fact that it cannot be proved by parole evidence; and  pursuant  to the  provisions of Rule  8,  section 1, paragraph (h) of the  Rules of Court,  the complaint is dismissed  with costs  against  the  plaintiffs."  The  appellees  thereafter filed a motion  for  reconsideration in so far  only  as the court dismissed the  complaint even with  reference to their right  to recover  the  sum of P2,000 from  the appellants.  On April  15, 1953, the court issued an order  reconsidering the order  of January 28, 1953, "in the sense that the complaint in so  far as the alleged  delivery and return of the money  in question are concerned, be as it is hereby  reinstated." A  subsequent motion  for reconsideration filed by appellants was denied, and the trial of the case  was set for September 20, 1953. On this date,  in view  of  the  absence  of  attorney for appellants, and upon  motion  of attorney for appellees, the trial was postponed  to  October 15, 1953, when there was again no appearance for appellants.   Whereupon the court allowed  the  appellees  to present  their evidence; and on  December 8, 1953, a judgment  was rendered, sentencing the appellants to  return to the appellees the sum of P2,000, with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint, and to pay  the  costs.   The  defendants have appealed.

It is  argued for appellants  that the lower court erred in reinstating  the  complaint and  in sentencing them to return to the appellees the  sum of P2,000,  because said matter  was not litigated under the pleadings  and when said court dismissed the  complaint on January 28, 1953, nothing  remained  before it  for  adjudication.  This is without  foundation.  Pleadings  are to be liberally construed.   The complaint alleged the delivery to  the  appellants  of the  sum of P2,000, with the  agreement  on the latter's  part  to buy the  land  in question in  behalf  and for the account of the appellees;  and  in  addition  to the specific prayer for the conveyance by the appellants to the  appellees  of  said  land,  the  complaint  prayed  for "other  relief which may be  just and equitable  in the premises."  Ours are courts of law and equity.  In view of the dismissal of the  complaint as  to the  recovery of the land in  question, on the  technical ground that an express  trust  cannot be  proved  by  parol evidence,  it was but just and equitable  under the allegations of the complaint  and the prayer for other relief,  for the court to proceed with the determination of the question whether or  not  the appellees paid to  the  appellants the sum of P2,000 and whether the latter should be ordered to return the same.   In  Aguilar  vs. Rubiato, 40 Phil., 570, it  was held:  "That payment  of the  sum of  P800  was  not explicitly prayed for in the complaint, does not deprive the court of power to  render judgment for this amount because  it is a rule of good  pleading  that the  'demand in the complaint is no part of the statement of the cause of action.   The facts alleged do this, and the plaintiff is entitled  to so  much  relief  as they  warrant.'   Indeed, section  9 of Rule 35 of the Rules  of Court provides that "the judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in  whose  favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.''

But it is urged for the appellants that, assuming that the return .or delivery  of the  sum of P2,000 was a part of appellees' cause of action, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija did not have jurisdiction over the matter, as  the  justice of the peace or  municipal court  has exclusive original jurisdiction where the value of the subject matter or amount  demanded does not  exceed P2,000 exclusive of interest and costs  (section 88, Republic  Act No. 296).   This contention would  be tenable, if the complaint was  solely  for the  collection  of  said amount,  but not where, as  in the  case  at bar,  it  was merely part and parcel of the complaint for the  recovery of land.

It  appearing that due notice  was  served  upon  the appellants'  first, of the  hearing  set for  September 20, and secondly, of the hearing set  for  October 15, 1953, their  failure to appear amounted to a  waiver of their day in court.   It is not pretended that the appealed judgment is  not supported  by ,the evidence presented  by the appellees.

Wherefore,  the appealed judgment is  affirmed,  and it is so ordered  with costs against the  appellants.

Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo,  Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia,  and Felix,  JJ., concur.


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