The defendant  has  appealed from  a decision  of the Court of First  Instance of Manila  sentencing him to pay to the plaintiff the  sum of Pl,339.90, with legal interest from  the date of the filing  of the complaint and with costs. The amount  represents license fees and  Mayor's permit fees due from the defendant on  his retail  sales  of flour under the  provisions of Ordinance  No. 3364.

The appellant  insists that the  promulgation of  Executive Order No. 305 and passage of Republic Acts Nos. 426 and 650 rendered Ordinance No. 3364 oppressive and unenforceable.  He expands his view by  alleging that this ordinance was  conceived when flour was free  commodity and could be  imported by anyone, unlimited as to quantity or time; when  it could be sold to anybody, also unlimited as to price or  time; whereas, in view of the passage of Republic Acts Nos. 426 and 650 and the promulgation of Executive Order No.  305, flour is controlled, an importer has to secure an import license, the importation is made in the name of  the Government and  limited as to quantity, and there is  control even  as  to whom to sell and as to the selling price.

Upon the other  hand, it is contended for the appellee that the circumstances mentioned  by the appellant are immaterial, the principal consideration  being  that there is nothing in  Republic Acts Nos.  426 and 650  or in Executive Order No. 305 which suspends or repeals Ordinance No. 3364.

We are of the  opinion  that the  appealed decision is correct.  Republic Act No. 426, as amended by Republic Act No. 650, merely enumerates what  commodities are controlled,  regulates  importation,  creates  the  Import Control Office,  and provides penalty for violations of its provisions. Executive Order No. 305 merely created the PRISCO and  dissolved the PRATRA  and  the  NARIC. There is absolutely nothing in said Executive  Order or acts which suspends or repeals the provisions of Ordinance No. 3364. Apart from the rules that repeal by implication is not favored,  it is quite clear that the  Acts and Executive Order in question may be enforced  consistently with Ordinance  No. 3364.  The ordinance  impose  a  fee  on merchants and dealers who sell goods  in retail, based on the amount of sales  and regardless of  profits, with the result that it cannot  be said to  be  inconsistent with Republic Acts Nos. 426 and  650 which merely impose controls  on  certain  commodities.   In making reference  to the circumstances affecting a retail flour  dealer, the  appellant undoubtedly wishes  to  convey the fact that  as flour is now a controlled commodity, his profits will necessarily be diminished,  if  not  altogether eliminated.  The point is again immaterial, considering that the lawmakers, in  enacting Republic  Acts Nos.  426  and  650, must  be deemed to have taken into account the existing conditions, and if repeal  or  suspension  of any law or ordinance is now  in order, that function  belongs  to   the  legislative branch of the Government.   At any rate,  it is admitted that,  in the fixing of the selling and buying  prices  of flour as controlled commodity, the profit is  usually certain and pro-determined, with the result that the enforcement of the ordinance  in question  cannot be said to be oppressive and concienceless.

Wherefore, the appealed decision is  affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.,  Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.