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[BENITO ORIT v. BALRODGAN COMPANY](https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c34ad?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
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[ GR No. L-12277, Dec 29, 1959 ]

BENITO ORIT v. BALRODGAN COMPANY +

DECISION

106 Phil. 800

[ G. R. No. L-12277, December 29, 1959 ]

BENITO ORIT, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. BALRODGAN COMPANY, LTD., DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

D E C I S I O N

PADILLA, J.:

On 22 November 1955 the plaintiff brought  an action in the Court  of  First  Instance  of Camarines Norte to collect from the defendant the sum of P5,000, the balance of an account due for export logs purchased by the latter from  the former, P1,500 as attorney's fee, P3,000 as moral damages, P2,000 as exemplary damages and costs, and to obtain any other just and equitable relief  (civil No. 750).

On 7 January 1956 the defendant filed an  answer.  On 25 September 1956 the parties, assisted by their respective counsel, entered into a stipulation of facts and submitted it to the Court.  The terms of the stipulation are:
That the defendant admits in open court its obligation to the plaintiff in the amount of FIVE  THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), Philippine Currency,  plus interest thereon from December 8,  1955 and costs;

That the  parties  mutually  agreed to submit to the Court  a fixed date when the  defendant should pay the plaintiff the above obligations, the  submission  of  which date  is hereby  mutually agreed to be up to not later  than November 6, 1956;

That for failure of the parties to submit to the Court the agreed date of payment on November 6, 1956,  they mutually agreed  that the Court shall have the full power  to fix a reasonable time when the defendant should pay,  and  a judgment therefor  shall issue based upon this stipulation of facts.
The parties failed to submit to the Court the date when the defendant  had to pay its debt  to the  plaintiff.  On 6 November 1956 the plaintiff filed an ex-parte motion praying that  judgment be rendered upon the stipulation of facts and that the Court fix the time within which the defendant should pay the sum due to the plaintiff.  On 28 November 1956  the Court rendered  judgment  as prayed for  ordering defendant to pay the plaintiff within thirty days  from receipt of  notice of judgment the sum of P5,000 with legal interest  thereon from 8  December  1955  until fully paid and to pay the  costs.   On 21 January 1957 the Court denied the defendant's motion for reconsideration dated 12 January 1957.   The  defendant has appealed.

The appellant admits that it owes the appellee the sum of P5,000.  Under the second paragraph of the stipulation of facts, they agreed to set a date for the appellant to pay the appellee, to be submitted to the Court  not later than 6 November 1956 and under the third paragraph of  the same stipulation, should they fail to set  a date for payment on 6 November 1956, the Court may set a reasonable  time for the appellant to pay the appellee.   As they failed to set a date for payment and submit it to the Court, on motion of the appellee, the Court  rendered judgment  upon the stipulation of facts  and ordered the appellant to pay the appellee within thirty days from receipt of notice of judgment.  The judgment rendered by the Court was but in pursuance of the compromise agreement  embodied in the stipulation of facts  entered freely and voluntarily by the parties with the assistance of their respective counsel.

The appellant cannot now  claim and complain  that the period fixed by  the Court is unreasonable.

Citing article 1196 of the new  Civil Code  in  support of its appeal, which provides that:
Whenever in an obligation a  period is  designated, it is presumed to have  been established for the benefit of  both the  creditor and the debtor, unless from the tenor of the same or other circumstances it should appear that the  period has been established in favor of one or of the  other;
the appellant claims that the period  of thirty days  fixed by the Court redounded to  the benefit only of the creditor, the  appellee, and not mutually to the creditor and the debtor.  In  its  brief, the appellant prays  that  it  be granted at least a year within which to pay the appellee. The article cited by  the  appellant cannot be applied to the case at bar where the parties entered into a compromise agreement ending a controversy and authorizing the Court to fix a reasonable time within which the appellant should pay its debt to the appellee, if they fail  to agree upon a date for payment and submit it to the Court.  It applies where  the  parties to a contract themselves  have fixed a period.

The  appeal interposed by the appellant is manifestly to delay but not to evade payment of  its debt.  Nothing has been agreed upon by the parties in their stipulation on that contingency.  Hence the collection or recovery of the sums of P1,800  as attorney's fee, P3,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as exemplary damages  sought by the appellee in its motion dated 6  May 1957 filed in this Court cannot be  granted.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with treble costs  against the appellant.

Paras,  C. J.,  Bautista Angelo,  Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.  B. L.,  Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

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