Andrecito Bulalake and Florentino Acedillo were charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal  (in  Crim. Case No.  7701)  with the crime of  murder, for the killingof Igmidio Maala, under  the following information:

"That on or about the 28th day of February, 1958, in the municipality of Muntinlupa, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction  of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, who  are convicts confined in  the New Bilibid Prisons by virtue of final  judgments  rendered  against  them, conspiring,  confederating and  mutually helping and aiding one another, with evident premeditation and treachery,  all  armed with deadly weapons, did then and there  willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill Igmidio  Maala, also a convict confined in  the same  institution, by hitting, stabbing and striking him with iron pipes and ice picks, thereby inflicting him  multiple serious physical injuries  which directly caused his death;

"That the aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism  is present in the  commission of the crime in that the crime was  committed after the accused have been convicted by final judgments  and while they  are serving the said judgments in the New Bilibid Prisons. "Contrary to  law with the following aggravating  circumstances;

"1. That the  crime was committed  with insult  to  public authorities;
"2. That the crime was committed  by armed men or persons who insure  or  afford impunity;
"3. Use  of superior strength or means was employed to weaken the defense;
"4. That the crime was committed where public authorities were engaged in the  is charge  of  their duties."

Upon  arraignment,  the  accused  Bulalake,  assisted by his  counsel de oficio,  Atty.  Antonio Rodriguez,  pleaded guilty to the charge and  was, thereupon, sentenced by the court  to  suffer for the penalty of death, and to  pay indemnity  in the sum of P3,000.00 and  costs.   The case is now before us for review, pursuant to the provisions of Section 9, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court.

The new counsel de oficio appointed for  the accused in this instance  contends  that the trial  court erred  in not taking such evidence as  were  available and  necessary in support  of  the material allegations of the  information, including the  aggravating circumstances therein enumerated, for  the purpose of establishing beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused and determining the nature and extent  of the penalty to be imposed  upon him citing in support of his submission, the case of U. S. vs. Agcaoili (31  Phil., 92).

There is  merit in the contention.  In the Agcaoili case. it appears  that the  accused was  convicted of  the crime of assassination, upon his  formal plea of  "guilty" when arraigned, and sentenced to death.   No evidence in support of the  allegations  of the information  was taken at  the trial.   Elevated  to this  Court for review,  the  judgment of the  lower  court was  reversed and  a new trial ordered with the following statement:

"No evidence was taken at the trial, and after  a careful examination of the whole record  we  cannot  rid our minds of a reasonable  doubt as  to whether the  accused  did or did not  thoroughly understand the  precise nature and effect of his  plea upon  arraignment.  We are  not wholly satisfied that  he understood that in pleading  'guilty' of  the  crime charged in the  information,  he pleaded guilty to its  commission marked  with  all  the aggravating circumstances  alleged therein, and.  that the  penalty  prescribed  for the commission of the crime charged in the information, in  the manner and  form in  which it is there  charged, is death.

"In response to a suggestion by the trial  judge that he might withdrew his plea  of guilty and  substitute therefor a plea of not guilty,  the accused said  that he did not desire to do so because 'he was  responsible for the death of  two persons mentioned in the information.'

"We are inclined to think  that while the  undoubtedly intended on that  occasion, as also when he entered his plea of guilty, to confess  and admit  that  he took the lives of the persons mentioned in the information,  he  did not  intend to admit  that  he committed the  offense with the  aggravating circumstances  mentioned therein.  *  * *

"While it is true that a judgment convicting and sentencing  a defendant may lawfully be pronounced upon a solemn plea of 'guilty' in open  court and on arraignment entered  by  the accused with full knowledge of  the meaning and effect of  his plea  nevertheless, where the complaint charges a capital offense,  the possibility of misunderstanding or mistake in so grave a matter justifies and  in most instances requires the taking of such available evidence in  support of the allegations,  of  the information as  the trial judge  may deem necessary to remove all reasonable possibility that the accused might have entered his plea of 'guilty' improvidently, or without a clear and precise understanding  of  its meaning  and effect."  (Italics supplied.)

In the same case, attention was invited to the rule of practice recommended in the cases of U. S. vs. Talbanos (6 Phil., 541) and U. S. vs. Rota (9 Phil., 426)  that

"*  *  * in all cases,  and especially in cases where the punishment to  be inflicted is  severe, the court should be sure  that the defendant fully understands the nature  of  the charges preferred against  him and  the character of the punishment to be imposed before sentencing  him.  While  there is no law  requiring it, yet in every case under the plea of guilty where the penalty may be death it is  advisable for the  court to call  witnesses  for the  purpose of establishing the guilt and degree  of culpability of  the  defendant"

It is  of course true that the taking of such evidence is a matter  left to the  discretion of the trial court.  Nevertheless,  inasmuch as  judgments of conviction imposing the extreme penalty of  death are  subject to review  by  the Supreme  Court as law  and justice shall dictate, whether the defendant  appeals  or  not,  which automatic  review neither  the Court nor the  accused could waive or evade it would seem that the proper and prudent course to follow where  the accused  enters a  plea of "guilty"  to  capital offenses specially  where he is  an  ignorant person with little or no education, is to  take testimony not only to satisfy  the trial judge  himself but to aid  the  Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly understood and  comprehended the  meaning, full  significance and  consequences  of  his plea.

In  the instant case, while it appears that the accused, with the assistance of his counsel de oficio, pleaded guilty to  the  information,  voluntarily  and spontaneously,  the records   do not disclose that its  contents enumerating  several aggravating circumstances, were read and translated or clearly explained to him.   Neither does it appear that he  fully and completely understood the precise nature of the charges  preferred  against him and the consequences  of his plea.  No inquiry whatsoever was  made by the  trial judge in this respect notwithstanding  the fact that the accused was assisted only by an attorney de oficio whose appointment by the court for  this purpose might have been extended only on the date of the arraignment, as the records  show that the one previously appointed, Atty. Lazaro C. Sison,  did not  appear during the arraignment.

Wherefore,  in  line  with  our decision in the Agcaoili case, supra, the appealed judgment is hereby reversed, and the case is remanded for new trial to the court a quo which is  also enjoined  to  follow  the practice recommended by this Court in the Talbanos and Rota cases, supra.   Without pronouncement as to costs.  It is so ordered.

Paras, C. J.,  Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista  Angelo, Labrador, Ccncepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia,  and Gutierrez David,  JJ., concur.

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^[1] People vs. Villanueva, 93  Phil., 927; 49 Off, Gaz., (12) 5367,