This is a petition by certiorari, filed by Trinidad Ocampo Caniza, to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, C.A.-G.R. No. 20872-R, October 31, 1957, which holds that under Section 8, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, the supersedeas bond filed in the case (Civil Case No. 19123, Municipal Court of Manila)  could not be executed to implement the decision of the Court of First  Instance  (Civil  Case No. 17059, on appeal).

The facts in this case are not in dispute.   Petitioner filed an action against Apolinario Velasco in the Municipal Court of Manila for  ejectment and  collection  of  unpaid rentals (Civil  Case No. 19123).  The  Municipal Court rendered judgment in  favor of petitioner  and  ordered Velasco to pay the amount of P2,237.30 for  rentals due and unpaid up to January  31, 1952, and to pay  monthly rentals from February 1, 1952 at  the rate of P750.00 a  month, and to vacate the premises.

On April  23, 1952, petitioner as plaintiff in  said  case, moved for the immediate execution of the  decision, which motion, on  June  12, 1952, was granted by the  Municipal Court (Annex B). On June 13, 1952, defendant Velasco filed a notice of appeal, appeal bond and docket fee, and the Municipal Court allowed the appeal  and suspended the writ  of execution issued on June 12, 1952, at the  same time  giving the defendant three days within which to file a superseqleas bond to  stay execution, which period  was later extended to June 19, 1952 (Annex  C).   After the perfection of the  appeal, the order for immediate execution was stayed, pending filing of supersedeas bond, Annex D.

Defendant Velasco failed  to  file the  supersedeas  bond within the period granted him,  and on June 20, 1952, the Municipal Court issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution (Annex E).  Possession of the property in question was given to plaintiff.   On July 11, 1952, before the records were elevated to the Court of First Instance, Velasco filed a supersedeas bond  which was approved by the Municipal  Court.   On July  21, 1952,  Velasco petitioned the Court of First Instance that  he be restored to the possession of the property, on  the strength of his supersedeas bond.  (Annex G).   The trial court issued an  order dated July 30, 1952, directing the Sheriff to restore possession to him.

Petitioner Trinidad Ocampo-Cañiza  then initiated certiorari  proceedings in the  Court of Appeals, to annul the said order of the Court of First Instance.   The Court of Appeals forthwith issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P2,000.00 pending hearing and final determination of the petition for certiorari.   It also denied the urgent motion for dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by it on July 31, 1952  (Annex H).

On August 5,  1954, the  trial court  decided  Civil Case No.  17050 in favor of plaintiff Trindad Ocampo-Cañiza, ordering the defendant, Velasco, to pay plaintiff P6,159.74. Later, an  order of execution was issued  against the supersedeas  bond filed by Velasco.

On February 5, 1957,  a first alias writ of execution was issued by the trial court against the supersedeas bond.  On March  23, 1957, Velasco filed a motion to quash the alias writ of execution, but it was denied by the trial court.  So was a motion for reconsideration.

On July 26, 1957, respondent  Velasco filed a petition for injunction in the Court of Appeals (CA-G. R. No. 20872R).   It was opposed by herein petitioner Trinidad.  On October 31, 1957, the Court of Appeals decided  the case in favor of Velasco, ruling that inasmuch as the supersedeas bond did not stay execution of the judgment of the inferior court, the order of execution of the supersedeas  bond was not  warranted.  Petitioner Trinidad moved for reconsideration.  Upon denial of said motion, she filed the present appeal or  petition to review  said decision of the Court of Appeals, which petition was given due course.

The line of reasoning of the Court of  Appeals in deciding the case as it did, is reflected in that portion of its decision which we quote:

"Obviously,  a  defendant, whose appeal takes the ordinary  course if properly  perfected, is not  required to post a supersedeas bond should he not  seek the suspension of the execution  of the judgment. In the same token, if a supersedeas  bond is filed after the execution of the judgment it answers no purpose at all. This is exactly the situation  obtaining in the case  at  bar.  The supersedeas  bond in question was  put up by the  herein petitioner after the judgment rendered against him was executed, and notwithstanding the  supersedeas bond he had thus filed, he was never restored to the possession of the leased premises.  *  *  *".

In connection  with this  question  of execution  of  the  judgment of the Municipal Court, the Court of Appeals,  in its decision, also  said the following:

"* *  *.  In  the case  at bar, the  execution of the  judgment was effected before the appeal was certified  to the Court of First Instance, and we may logically assume  that such execution included both the restoration  of the possession of the leased property  and the rents due."

The whole trouble with the  above  ruling  and finding is that the Court  of Appeals "logically" assumed that the execution  effected  included the payment of  the rents due. This is not correct.   Only the  possession of property was given to the plaintiff. The back rentals remained unpaid, as shown  by the fact that said back rentals including the P2,237.30  which the Municipal  Court  ordered defendant to pay as  rentals in arrears,  were included in the decision of  the trial court.   So,  the  judgment  was  only partly executed.  It should be borne in mind  that there are two parts to an execution of  a  judgment  in a  forcible entry and detainer case; one is the restoration of the  possession to the plaintiff; second is the payment of back rentals. The Court of Appeals recognizes this principle because in its  decision,  it made the following citation:

"The execution of the judgment is not only for the restoration of the  possession of the premises leased but also for the, payment of the rents due as determined by said judgment,  (p. 318, Comments on the  Rules of Court by  Moran, 1952 edition)."

It  is,  therefore, a  fact that contrary to  the  conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals, the filing of the supersedeas bond  of the  defendant was not wholly useless and without a purpose for the  reason that the defendant was allowed to prosecute his appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court without paying the back rentals.

The  defendant-respondent  Velasco contends  that the supersedeas  bond he have was invalid and void for the reason that it was given  out of time, namely,  after the execution of the judgment of the Municipal Court and after the latter had lost jurisdiction over the  case  because of the perfection of the appeal.  As already stated, the execution in  this case was only partial, not whole.  In the  second place, it would appear that the supersedeas bond was filed by the defendant before the record was  elevated  by the Municipal Court to  the Court of First Instance.  Furthermore, the defendant should be the last person to question the validity of the supersedeas bond he filed because in the Court of First Instance, not  only did he fail to question said  validity, but he  led the adverse party and the  trial court to believe that said supersedeas bond was valid. In fact, he invoked the existence and validity of his supersedeas bond in his attempt to regain possession of the property  in question, and the trial court, acting favorably  upon his petition, ordered  that he, the defendant, be placed  in possession.  But the Court of Appeals where the plaintiff resorted  for relief  from this order  of the trial court, restrained  the enforcement of the trial court's order about giving possession to the defendant, not because the supersedeas bond was invalid, but for the reason that the Court of  Appeals deemed it advisable to  keep  the parties in status quo,  giving its  reasons therefor.

In view of the  foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court of  Appeals is hereby reversed,  with  costs  against the  respondent-defendant,  Apolinario  Velasco.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, and Barrera, JJ., concur.