We are asked in  this appeal to revoke an order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija denying appellant's petition for  a  writ of prohibition  with preliminary  injunction.

Petitioner-appellant Arturo B. Pascual had been elected mayor of San Jose,  Nueva Ecija, in November 1951  and reelected in 1955.  On October 6, 1956, the Acting Provincial Governor of that province filed with  the Provincial Board three administrative charges against  the said appellant.  Charge III was for  "Maladministrative, Abuse of Authority, and  Usurpation of Judicial  Functions," committed as follows:

"Specification I That on or about  the 18th and 20th day of December, 1954, in the municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, the above-named respondent, being municipal mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, and  while the justice of the peace of the said municipality was present therein, did then and there willfully, feloniously, criminally, without legal authority, and with grave abuse of authority, assumed and usurped the judicial powers of the said justice of the peace by accepting the criminal complaint  filed in Criminal Case No. 3556, of the said court, conducting  the preliminary investigation thereof, fixing the bail bond of P6,000.00, and issuing the corresponding warrant of arrest; and after the accused in the said criminal case had been arrested, while the justice of the peace was in his office in San Jose' Nueva Ecija, the herein respondent, in defiance of  the express refusal by the justice of the peace to reduce  the  bail bond of the accused in Criminal Case No. 1556, acted on the motion to reduce bail and did reduce the bail bond to P3,000.00.

After the  presentation of evidence regarding  the first two charges, petitioner-appellant filed with the respondent-appellee, the Provincial Board, a motion to dismiss the third charge above referred to, on the main ground that the wrongful acts therein alleged had been committed during his previous term of office  and could not constitute a ground for disciplining him during his second term.  Upon opposition filed by a special counsel for the respondent-appellee, the motion to dismiss was, denied by resolution of the  Board.

After the denial of a motion for reconsideration of that resolution, the appellant filed with this  Court a petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction (G. R. No. L-11730), to enjoin the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija from taking cognizance of the third charge, but the petition was denied by minute resolution of December 21, 1956 "without prejudice to action, if any, in the Court of First Instance."  Accordingly, the petitioner-appellant filed with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking to inhibit the said Provincial Board from  proceeding with the hearing of Charge No. III, for lack of jurisdiction.

Instead of filing an answer,  the respondent-appellee moved for the dismissal of the case  on the ground  that it states no cause of action because the petitioner-appellant had not complied with the cardinal principle of exhaustion pf administrative remedies before he could appeal to the courts, and because the  Provincial Board had jurisdiction over Charge No. III.  After responsive pleadings had been filed by both parties, the court below issued an order dismissing the petition "for being premature", for the reason that the petitioner had not first appealed to the Executive Secretary.  From that order,  the case was brought before us on appeal.  Upon urgent petition, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued  restraining the respondent-appellee from investigating petitioner-appellant on the charge abovementioned.

In his brief, petitioner-appellant  claims  that the court below erred: (1) in not holding that the alleged usurpation of judicial functions in December 1954 is not a legal ground for  disciplining the appellant during his second term of office after a reelection, and in not holding  that the respondent patently has no authority or jurisdiction to take cognizance of Charge No. 3; (2)  in holding that the petition for prohibition is premature and that the appellant must first  exhaust all administrative  remedies available to him  under the Revised Administrative Code; and (3)  in dismissing the petition for prohibition.

The first question posed is whether or not it was legally proper for  petitioner-appellant to have come to court without first bringing his case to the Executive Secretary for review.  True it is that, in this jurisdiction, the settled rule is that where the law has delineated the procedure by which administrative appeal or remedy could be effected, the same should be followed before recourse to judicial action can  be initiated  (Ang Tuan Kai vs. Import Control Commission, 91 Phil., 143; Coloso vs. Board, 92 Phil., 938; Miguel vs.  Reyes, 93 Phil., 542, and several other cases), but we believe that this rule is not without exceptions, as in a case like the present, where the only question to be settled in the  prohibition proceedings is a purely legal one whether or  not a municipal mayor may be subjected to an administrative investigation of a charge  based on misconduct allegedly committed by him  during his prior term.

"The rule is  inapplicable where  no administrative  remedy  is provided.  Likewise, the rule will be relaxed where there is grave doubt as  to the availability  of  the administrative remedy; where the question in dispute  is purely a legal one, and nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done; where although there are steps to be taken, they are, under the admitted facts, merely matters of form, and the administrative  process, as  a  process of judgment, is really over; or where  the administrative  remedy is not exclusive but merely cumulative or concurrent to a judicial remedy. A litigant need not proceed with  optional  administrative process before seeking judicial relief."  (73 C.J.S. p. 354) (Italic ours)

On the above authority, we are inclined to agree with the petitioner-appellant that his bringing the case to court  is not. a violation of, but merely an exception to, the cardinal rule above referred to.

In  a case (Mondano vs. Silvosa ^* 51 Off. Gaz., [6],  p. 2884), this Court granted a writ of prohibition against the provincial board of Capiz, notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner therein did not appeal to the Executive Secretary, the only  question therein involved being whether or not the charged filed against the municipal mayor of Calibo, Capiz, constituted any one of the grounds, for suspension  or removal provided for in sec.  2188 of the Revised Administrative Code.

We now come to the main issue  of the controversy the legality of disciplining an elective  municipal  official for a wrongful act committed  by him during  his  immediately preceding term of  office.

In  the  absence of any precedent in this jurisdiction, we have  resorted to American  authorities.  We found  that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes and constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to & divergence of views  with  respect  to the question of whether the subsequent election or appointment condones the prior misconduct.  The weight of authority,  however, seems to incline to the rule  denying the right to  remove one  from  office  because  of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.

"Offenses  committed, or acts  done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer was elected,  or  appointed."   (67 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice vs.  State,  161 S.W. 2d. 401; Montgomery vs. Nowell,  40 S.W.  2d. 418; People ex rel.  Bagshaw vs. Thompson,  130 P. 2d. 237;  Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher County vs. Shutler, 281 P.  222; State  vs. Blake, 280 P. 388;  In re Fudula,  147 A. 67; State vs. Ward,  43 S.W.  2d. 217).

The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms,  and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's  previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50 L.R.A. (NS)  553.  As held in Conant vs. Brogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 332, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281,  63 So. 559, 50 LRA  (NS) 553

"The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect  their officers.  When the people have elected a man to  office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults  or  misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.  It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the  will of the people."

In  view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby revoked; the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby granted and the preliminary  injunction heretofore issued made  permanent.  Without special pronouncement as  to costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Barrera, JJ., concur.

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^* 97 Phil., 143.