This refers to  the petition for bail filed by defendant-appellant Amado Hernandez on June 26, 1954, and renewed on December 22, 1955.   A similar petition, filed on December 28, 1953, had been denied by a resolution of this court dated  February 2,  1954.  Although not  stated in said resolution, the same was due mainly to these circumstances: The prosecution maintains that Hernandez is charged with, and has been convicted  of, rebellion completed with murders,  arsons and robberies,  for which the capital punishment,  it is claimed, may be imposed, although the lower court  sentenced him merely to life  imprisonment.   Upon the other hand, the defense contends, among other  things, that rebellion can  not be complexed  with murder, arson, or robbery.   Inasmuch  as the issue  thus  raised had not been previously settled  squarely, and this  court was then unable, as yet,  to  reach a  definite conclusion thereon,  it was deemed best not  to disturb,  for the time being, the course of action taken  by the lower court,  which  denied bail to the movant.  After  mature deliberation,  our considered opinion on said issue is as follows:

The first two paragraphs of the amended information in this case read: 

"The undersigned accuses  (1) Amado V. Hernandez alias Victor alias Soliman  alias Amado  alias AVH alias Victor Soliman, (2) Guillermo Capadocia alias Huan Bantiling alias Cap alias G. Capadocia,  (3) Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony Collantes alias Bonifacio,  (4)  Alfredo Saulo alias Elias alias Fred  alias A.B.S. alias A.B., (5)  Andres Baisa, Jr. alias Ben alias  Andy (6) Genaro de la Cruz alias Gonzalo alias Gorio alias Arong, (7)  Aquilino Bunsol alias Anong, (8) Adriano Samson alias Danoy, (9) Juan J. Cruz alias Johnny 2, alias Jessie Wilson alias William,  (10)  Jacobo  Espino, (11)  Amado Racanday,  (12) Fermin Rodillas,  and  (13)  Julian Lumanog alias Manue, of the crime of  rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies committed as follows: 

"That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some  time before the said date and  continuously thereafter until the present  time, in the City  of Manila,  Philippines,  and  the place which  they  had chosen  as the  nerve center  of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the  Philippines, the said.accused,  conspiring, confederating, and cooperating with each other, as  well as with the thirty-one  (31) defendants  charged in criminal  cases Nos. 14071, 14082, 14270, 14315, and 14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and also with others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown, the said  accused and their co-conspirators, being then officers and/or members of, or otherwise associated with the Congress of  Labor Organizations  (CLO) formerly known as the Committee on Labor Organization  (CLO), an active agency, organ, and instrumentality of the Communist Party  of the Philippines  (P.K.P.),  with central offices in Manila and chapters and affiliated or associated labor  unions and other 'mass organizations' in  different places in  the Philippines, and as  such agency,  organ, and instrumentality, fully cooperates in, and synchronizes itjs activities with the  rebellious activities  of the 'Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan, (H.M.B.) and other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist Party  of the Philippines (P.K.P.) to thereby  assure, facilitate,  and  effect  the  complete and  permanent success  of the armed rebellion against the Republic of the Philippines, as the herein defendants and their co-conspirators have in  fact synchronised the activities of the CLO  with the  rebellious activities of the HMB and other agencies,  organs and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the Philippines and have otherwise master-minded or promoted the cooperative efforts between the CLO and HMB and other agencies, organs, and instrumentalities of the P.K.P. in the prosecution of the rebellion against the Republic of the Philippines, and being then also high ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with, the Communist Party of the  Philippines  (P.K.P.), which is now actively engaged  in an armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines through acts therefor committed and planned to  be further  committed in Manila and other places in the Philippines, and of which party the 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan'  (HMB), otherwise or formerly known as the 'Hukbalahaps' (Huks), is the armed force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully  and feloniously help, support, promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or command the 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan' (HMB) or the 'Hukbalahaps'  (Huks) to rise publicly and  take arms against the Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such  armed public uprising, for the purpose of removing  the territory of the  Philippines from the allegiance to the government and laws thereof as in fact the said 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan' or 'Hukbalahaps' have risen publicly and taken arms  to attain the said  purpose by then and there making armed raids,  sorties and  ambushes, attacks  against  police, constabulary and army detachments as well  as innocent civilians, and  as a  necessary  means  to commit  the  crime of  rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of private and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as follows, to wit:" 

Then follows a description of  the murders,  arsons and robberies allegedly perperated by the accused "as a necessary means to commit the crime  of  rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof."

Article 48 of  the Revised Penal  Code  provides that: 

"When a single act constitutes two or more  grave or less grave felonies, or when an  offense is a necessary means  for committing the other,  the penalty for the  most  serious crime shall be  imposed, the same  to be applied in  its maximum  period."

It is obvious, from the language of this article, that the same presupposes  the  commission of  two  (2) or more crimes, and, hence,  does  not  apply  when the culprit is guilty of only one  crime.

Article  134 of said  code  reads: 

"The crime of rebellion  or  insurrection  is  committed by rising publicly and taking arms  against the Government for the purpose of removing from the  allegiance to said Government  or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or  of  depriving the Chief Executive  or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any  of  their powers or  prerogatives."

Pursuant  to Article  135 of the same code "any person, merely participating or executing the commands of  others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period."

The penalty is increased to prision  mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000 for "any person who promotes, maintains or heads  a rebellion or insurrection or who, while holding any public office or employment, takes part therein": 

1. "engaging in  war against the forces  of the  government",
2.  
3. "destroying  property",  or
4.  
5. "committing   serious  violence",
6.  
7. "exacting contributions or"
8.  
9. "diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which  they have been  appropriated".

Whether performed singly or collectively, these five (5) classes of acts constitute only one offense, and no  more, and are, altogether, subject to only one penalty prision mayor and a fine not to  exceed P20,000.  Thus for instance, a public officer who assists the rebels by turning over to them, for use in  financing the uprising, the public  funds entrusted to his custody, could neither be prosecuted for malversation  of  such  funds, apart  from  rebellion,  nor accused and convicted  of the complex  crime of rebellion with malversation  of  public funds.  The  reason is that such malversation  is inherent in the  crime of rebellion committed by him.  In fact, he would not be guilty of rebellion  had  he not so misappropriated  said funds.  In the imposition, upon said public officer, of the penalty for rebellion it would even be improper to consider the aggravating circumstance of advantage taken by the offender of  his public  position,  this being an essential element of the crime he had  perpetrated.  Now,  then, if the  office held by said offender and the nature of the funds malversed by  him cannot aggravate the penalty for his offense, it is clear that neither may it worsen the very crime committed by  the culprit by  giving  rise, either  to  an independent crime, or to  a complex crime.   Needless  to say, a mere participant in the rebellion, who is not a  public officer, should not  be placed at a  more disadvantageous position than the promoters, maintainers or  leaders of the movement,  or the public  officers who join the  same, insofar as  the application  of Article 48  is  concerned.

One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in  the words  of  said Article 135, is by "engaging in war against the forces of  the  government" and "committing serious violence" in the prosecution of  said "war".  These expressions imply everything that war connotes, namely; resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the hunger, illness  and unhappiness that war  leaves in  its wake except that, very often, it is worse than war in the international sense, for it involves internal struggle, a fight between brothers, with a bitterness and passion or ruthlessness seldom found in a contest between strangers.  Being within the purview of "engaging in war" and "committing serious violence'", said resort to arms, with the  resulting impairment or destruction of life and property, constitutes not  two or  more  offense, but only one crime that  of rebellion plain and simple.  Thus, for instance,  it has been held that "the  crime of treason may be committed  'by executing either a single or similar intentional overt acts, different or similar but distinct, and for that reason, it may be considered one single continuous offense.  (Guinto vs. Veluz, 77  Phil., 801,  44 Off. Gaz., 909.)"   (Peoples. Pacheco, 93 Phil., 521.)

Inasmuch as the acts specified in said Article  135 constitute, we repeat, one single crime, it follows  necessarily that said acts offer no  occasion  for the application  of Article  48,  which  requires therefor the commission of, at least,  two crimes.  Hence, this  court  has never in  the past, convicted  any person of the "complex crime of rebellion with murder".  What is more, it appears that in every one  of the cases of rebellion published in the Philippine Reports, the defendants were convicted of simple rebellion, although they had killed several persons, sometimes peace officers (U. S. vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil.,  472; U. S. vs. Baldello, 3 Phil,  509, U. S. vs. Ayala, 6  Phil.,  151;  League vs.  People, 73 Phil., 155).

Fallowing a parallel line are our decisions in the more recent cases of treason, resulting from collaboration with the Japanese during the war in the Pacific.   In fact, said cases went  further  than the  aforementioned  cases  of rebellion,  in that the theory  of the prosecution to  the effect that the accused in  said treason  cases were guilty of the complex crime of treason with murder and  other crimes was  expressly and  repeatedly  rejected  therein. Thus, commenting on the  decision of the  People's Court finding the accused  in People  vs.  Prieto  (80 Phil., 138, 45  Off. Gaz.,  3329)   "guilty of   * * *   the  crime of treason complexed by murder and  physical injuries"  and sentencing him  to  death,  and on  the  contention of the Solicitor General that Prieto had committed  the "complex crime  of  treason  with  homicide", this cburt,  speaking through Mr. Justice  Tuason, said: 

"The execution of  some of  the  guerrilla suspects  mentioned in these  counts and the infliction of physical injuries on others are not offenses separate from  treason.  Under  the  Philippine treason law and under the United States constitution denning treason, after  which the former was  patterned, there must concur both adherence to  the enemy and giving him aid and comfort.  One without the other does not make treason. 

"In the nature of tilings, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some  kind  of action. Its very nature partakes, of a  deed  or physical activity as opposed  to a  mental  operation. (Cramer vs. U.S., ante.)  This deed or physical activity may be, and  often  is,  in itself  a  criminal  offense under  another  penal statute or  provision.  Even  so,  when the deed is  charged as an element of  treason it becomes  identified with  the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as  Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides.  Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling  in a prosecution for robbery,  because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and  in  robbery  respectively, so may not a  defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as  in this case, it is averred as a  constitutive  ingredient  of   treason.  * * *  Where murder or  physical injuries  are  charged as overt  acts of treason* * * they can  not  be  regarded  separately  under  their  general denomination."   (Italics   supplied.)

Accordingly, we convicted the accused  of  simple  treason and  sentenced him to life imprisonment.

In People vs. Labra, 81  Phil.,  377, 46  Off.  Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p. 159, we used the following  language: 

"The lower court found  appellant  guilty not  only  of treason, but of  murder,  for the killing of  Tomas  Abella, and,  following the provisions of Article 48 of the  Revised Penal Code  sentenced him to death,  the maximum  penalty  provided by article  114. "The lower court erred in finding appellant guilty  of  the murder of Tomas Abella.  The arrest and killing of Tomas Abella for being a guerilla, is alleged  in  count 3 of the information, as one of  the  elements of the crime  of treason for which  appellant  is prosecuted.  Such  element  constitute  a  part  of  the  legal  basis upon  which appellant stands  convicted of the crime  of treason. The killing of Tomas Abella cannot be considered as legal ground for convicting  appellant of  any  crime other than  treason.  The essential elements  of  a given crime  cannot be  disintegrated  in different parts,  each  one  stand  as  a separate  ground to  convict the accused  of  a different  crime or  criminal offense.  The elements constituting a given  crime are integral and inseparable parts of a whole.  In the contemplation of the law, they  cannot be  used for double or multiple purposes.  They can  only be used for the sole  purpose  of showing  the  commission  of  the  crime  of which  they  form  part.  The  factual  complexity  of  the  crime  of treason does not  endow it with  the  functional  ability  of worm multiplication or amoeba reproduction.   Otherwise, the accused will have  to face as many prosecutions and convictions  as  there are elements in the  crime of treason, in open violation of the constitutional  prohibition  against double jeopardy."   (Italics supplied.)

The same  conclusion  was  reached  in  People  vs. Ali botod  82 Phil.,  164, 46 Off. Gaz., 1005, despite the  direct participation of the defendant therein in the maltreatment and killing of several persons.

In  People vs. Vilo 82 Phil., 524, 46 Off.  Gaz., 2517, we held: 

"The People's Court, however, erred in classifying the crime  as treason with murder.  The killing  of  Amado Satorre   and one Segundo is charged  as an  element of  treason,  and  it   therefore becomes identified with the latter  crime, and  cannot  be the subject of a separate punishment or used in combination with treason to  increase  the penalty as Article  48 of the Revised Penal Code provides,"  (People vs. Prieto, L-399, 45 Off. Gaz. 3329.   See, also People vs. Labra, L-386,  46  Off. Gaz.,  [Supp. to  No.  1], 159.)" (Italics supplied.)

To the same effect was our decision in People vs. Roble 83  Phil., 1, 46  Off. Gaz., 4207.   We  stated therein: 

"The  court held that the facts alleged in the information  is a complex crime of  treason with murders, with  the result  that the penalty  provided  for  the most serious offense  was to be imposed on its maximum degree.  Viewing the case from  the standpoint of modifying circumstances, the court believed  that the  same result obtained.  It  opined  that the killings were  murders  qualified by treachery  and  aggravated  by  the  circumstances  of  evident  premeditation, superior strength, cruelty, and an armed band. 

"We  think this  is  error.  The tortures  and murders set  forth in the information are merged in and formed part of the treason. They  were in this case the overt acts which, besides traitorous intention supplied a vital ingredient in the crime."  (Italics supplied.)

The  accused  in People vs. Delgado 83 Phil., 9,  46  Off. Gaz.,  4213,  had been  convicted by  the  People's Court of  "the  crime  of  treason  complexed with the crime of murder" and sentenced to the  extreme  penalty.  In  our decision, penned by Mr. Justice Montemayor, we expressed ourselves as  follows: 

The  appellant  herein  was  and  is a  Filipino citizen.  His adherence to the  Japanese  forces of occupation  and giving them aid and comfort by acting as  their spy,  undercover man, investigator, and even  killer when necessary to cow  and compel the inhabitants to  surrender  their firearms  and  disclose  information about the guerrillas has been fully established.  His  manner of  investigation and maltreatment of  some of his  victims like  Tereso  Sanchez and Patricio Suico,  was so cruel, brutal and  inhuman that it is almost unbelievable that  a  Filipino can commit and practice such  atrocities especially on his own countrymen.  But, evidently, war, confusion and opportunism  can and do  produce  characters and  monster unknown during  peace  and normal  times. 

"The  People's Court found the appellant guilty of  treason  complexed  with  murder.  The  Solicitor  General,  however, maintains that the  offense  committed is simpletreason, citing  the  doctrine laid down by this court  in the case  of  People vs. Prieto,  (L 399, 45  Off. Gaz.,  3329)  but accompanied by the aggravating circumstance under Article 14,  paragraph 21,  of  the  Revised Penal Code, and not  compensated  by  any mitigating  circumstance,  and  he recommends the imposition  of the penalty of death.  We agree with the Solicitor General  that  on the basis  of the ruling of this  court in the case of People vs. Prieto, supra, the appellant may be  convicted only of treason, and that the killing and infliction of physical injuries committed  by  him may  not be  separated  from the crime of treason but  should  be regarded as acts performed in the commission of treason, although, as  stated in said  case, the brutality with which the  killing  or physical injuries were carried out  may be taken  as an  aggravating circumstance."  (Italics supplied.)

and reduced the  penalty  from death  to  life  imprisonment and a  fine of  P20,000.

Identical were the  pertinent  features  of the  case  of People vs. Adlawan,  83 Phil., 194,  46  Off.  Gaz.,  4299, in which,  through Mr. Justice Reyes  (A),  we declared: 

"* * * we find  merit in the contention that appellant should have not been convicted of the so-called 'Complex crime  of treason with murder, robbery, and rape.'  The killings, robbery, and raping mentioned  in  the  information  are  therein  alleged  not  as  specific offenses but as mere elements  of (the  crime  of  treason  for  which the accused is  being prosecuted.  Being merged in  and identified with the general  charged, they  can not be used in combination vrith the  treason  to increase the penalty under Article  US of the Revised Penal Ctfde.  (People vs. Prieto,  L-339, January 29,  1948, 45 Off. Gaz., 3829.)  Appellant shoufld, therefore, be held guilty  of  treason only."   (Italics supplied.)

In People vs. Suralta,  85 Phil., 714, 47 Off. Gaz.,  4595, the language  used was: 

"* * * But the People's Court erred  in finding the  appellant guilty of the complex crime of treason with murder, because murder was an ingredient of the crime of treason, as  we  have  heretofore held in  several cases.  (Italics  supplied.)

This was reiterated  in People vs. Navea, 87  Phil., 1, 47 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 12, p.  252: 

"The  Solicitor  General  recommends  that  the  appellant  be sentenced  for the complex crime of treason with  murder.   We have already ruled, however,  that where,  as  in the  present case,  the killing  is  charged as an element of treason, it  'becomes  identified with the  latter  crime  and cannot be the subject of a separate punishment, or  used in  combination with  treason  to increase  the penalty  as  Article  48  of  the  Revised  Penal Code  provides" (Italics supplied.)

The question at bar was, also, taken up in the case of Crisologo vs. People and Yillalobos  (94 Phil., 477), decided on February 26,1954.  The facts and the rule therein laid down are set  forth  in our unanimous decision in  said case,  from which we quote: 

"The petitioner Juan  D.  Crisologo, a captain in the USAPFE during the  last world war and at the time of the filing of  the present petition a lieutenant  colonel in the  Armed Forces of  the Philippines, was  on March 12, 1946,  accused  of  treason under Article 114 of the Revised  Penal Code  in an information  filed in the People's Court.  But before the accused could be brought under the jurisdiction of the court, he was on January 13, 1947,  indicted for violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as the Articles of War, before a military  court created by authority of the Army  Chief  of Staff,  the  indictment  containing  three charges, two  of which, the first and third,  were those of treason consisting in  giving information and aid to the enemy leading to the capture of USAFFE officers and men and other persons  with anti-Japanese reputation and in urging members of the USAFFE to surrender  and cooperate with the  enemy,  while the second  was that of having certain  civilians  killed in time of war.   Found innocent  of the  first and third charges but  guilty of the second, he was on May, 8, 1947, sentenced by the military court to life imprisonment. 

"With  the  approval  on June 17, 1948, of  Republic Act  No. 811 abolishing  the  People's  Court, the  criminal  case  in that  court against the petitioner was, pursuant to the provisions of  said  Act, transferred to the  Court  of  First  Instance  of  Zamboanga  and there the  charges  of  treason were amplified.  Arraigned in  that court upon the amended information, petitioner  presented a motion to quash,  challenging  the  jurisdiction  of  the court  and  pleading double jeopardy  because of his previous  sentence  in  the  military court. But the court  denied  the  motion  and, after petitioner had pleaded  not  guilty, proceeded  to  trial,  whereupon,  the present petition  for  certiorari and  prohibition was  filed in  this  court  to have the trial  judge  desist from proceeding with the trial and dismiss the case. 

"It is, however, claimed that the offense charged in the military court different from that charged in the  civil  court and that  even granting that the  offense was identical the  military court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same because the People's Court had previously  acquired jurisdiction over the case  with the result that the conviction in the court martial was void. In support of the first point, it is urged that the amended  information filed in the Court of First Instance  of  Zamboanga contains overt acts distinct from those charged in  the military court.   But we note that while certain overt acts specified in the amended information  in the Zamboanga court were not specified in the indictment in the court martial,  they all are embraced in the general  charge of  treason, which is  a continuous offense and one who commits ft is not criminally liable for as many crimes as there are overt acts, because all evert act 'he has done or might have done for  that purpose constitute but a  single  offense.  (Guinto vs.  Veluz, 44  Off. Gaz., ,909; People  vs. Pacheco,  L-4750, promulgated July 31, 1953.)  In other words, since the offense charged in the amended information in the Court of First Instance  of Zamboanga is treason, the  fact that the said  information contains an enumeration of additional overt  acts not specifically mentioned in the indictment  before  the military court is immaterial since the new alleged overt  acts do not  in themselves constitute a new and  distinct  offense from  that of  treason,  and this court has repeatedly held that a person cannot be found guilty of treason and  at the same  time also  guilty of  overt acts specified in the information for treason even if those  overt acts considered separately t are  punishable  by  law,  for  the simple  reason that those  overt  acts are  not  separate offenses distinct from  that of treason  but constitute  ingredients thereof.**  (Italics suuplied.)

Thus, insofar as treason is concerned, the opinion of this court, on the  question whether  said. crime  may be  complexed   with  murder, when the former   was  committed through the latter,  and it is so alleged in  the information, had positively and clearly crystalized itself in the negative as early as January 29, 1948.

We have not overlooked the decision in  People vs. Labra (L-1240, decided on May 12, 1949), the dispositive part of which partly reads: 

"Wherefore, the verdict  of  guilty  must be  affirmed.  Articles 48, 114  and 248 of the Revised Penal Code  are applicable to the offense of treason with murder.  However for lack of sufficient votes to impose the extreme penalty, the appellant will  be  sentenced to life imprisonment.  * *  *."

Although it mentions Articles 48 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code and "the offense of treason with murder," it should be noted that vie  affirmed therein the action of the People's Court, which, according to the opening statement of our decision, convicted Labra of "treason aggravated with murder".  Besides, the applicability of said articles was not discussed in said decision.  It is obvious, from a mere perusal thereof, that this court had no intention of passing upon such  question.  Otherwise, it would  have explained  why it did not follow the rule laid down in the previous cases of Prieto, Labra (August 10,  1948), Alibotod,  Vilo,  Roble,   Delgado and Adlawan  (supra),  in which  the issue was  explicitly examined and decided in the negative.   Our  continued  adherence to this view in the subsequent cases of  Suralta,  Navea,  Pacheco  and Crisologo, without even a passing reference to the second Labra  case, shows that  we did not consider the same as reflecting  the opinion of the court on  said  question.   At any rate,  insofar as  it  suggests otherwise,  the position taken in the second  Labra case must be deemed reversed by our decisions in said  cases  of Suralta,  Navea, Pacheco and Crisologo.

It is true  that  treason and rebellion are  distinct and different from each  other.   This does not  detract, however, from the rule  that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and, hence, are absorbed  by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by  the application  of Article 48 of  the Revised  Penal Code.   Besides there is more reason to apply said  rule in the crime  of  rebellion than in that of treason, for the law punishing  rebellion   (Article 135, Revised  Penal  Code) specifically mentions tne act  of engaging in war and committing serious violence  among its essential elements thus clearly indicating that  everything done in the prosecution of said war,  as a  means necessary therefor, is embraced  therein unlike the  provision on  treason  (Article 114,  Revised  Penal  Code)  which is less  explicit thereon.

It is urged that, if the crime of assault upon a person in authority  or an  agent of a person in authority may be committed with  physical injuries  (U. S. vs. Montiel, 9 Phil.,  162), homicide  (People vs. Lojo,  52 Phil.,  390) and  murder  (U. S.  vs.  Ginosolongo,  23 Phil., 171; U.  S. vs. Baluyot, 40  Phil.,  385), and rape may  be perpetrated with physical injuries (U. S. vs. Andaya,  34 Phil., 690), then rebellion may,  similarly, be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.  The  conclusion Does  not follow, for engaging in  war, serious  violence, physical  injuries and destruction of life and property are inherent in rebellion, but  not  in assault upon persons in authority or agents  of persons  in authority  or  in  rape.   The word "rebellion" evokes, not merely a challenge  to  the constituted authorities, but, also, civil  war, on  a bigger or lesser scale, with all the evils  that go  with  it,  whereas, neither rape nor assault  upon  persons  in authority connotes necessarily, or even  generally, either physical  injuries, or murder.^[1]

In support of the theory that a rebel who kills  in furtherance of  the insurrection   is  guilty of  the complex crime of rebellion  with murder,  our attention has been called to Article 244 of the old Penal Code of the  Philippines, reading: 

"Los delitos  particulares  cometidos en una rebeli6n o sedicion, o con  motivo de  ellas,   seran castigados  respectivamente  segun  las disposiciones de este Codigo. 

"Cuando no  puedan  descubrirse sns autores seran penados comb tales los  jefes  principales de la rebelion o sedicion."

and to  the following observations of  Cuelto Calon  (Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p.  110), in  relation  thereto: 

"Se  establece aqui  que  el  en una  rebelion  o sedicion,  o  con motivo de ellas, comete otros  delitos (v.g., roba, mata olesiona), sera responsable de estos ademas de los delitos de rebelion o sedicion.  La dificultad consiste en estos casos en separar los accidentes de la rebelion  o sedicion de  los delitos  independientes  de  estas, y como las  leyes no contienen en este punto precepto alguno aplicable,  su solucion ha  quedado encomendada a los tribunales.  La jurisprudencia que estos han sentado considera  como accidentes de la rebelion o sedicion cuya criminalidad queda embedida en la de estos  delitos, y,  por  tanto, no son punibles especialmente los hechos de escasa gravedad  (v.g., atentados, desacatos, lesiones menos graves); por el contrario,  las infracciones graves,  como  el  asesinato o las lesiones graves, se consideran como  delitos  independientes  de la rebelion o de la sedicion."

It should be noted, however, that said Article 244 of the old Penal  Code  of the Philippines has not  been included in our Revised Penal Code.  If the applicability of Article 48  to rebellion was determined by the existence of said Article 244, then the elimination of the latter would be indicative  of the contrary.

Besides, the crime of  rebellion, referred to  by  Cuello Calon, was that punished in the Spanish Penal Code,  Article  243  of which  provides:

"Son  reos de rebelion  los  que  se  alzaren  publicamente y ev abierta  hostilidad contra el Gobierno para cualquiera de los objetos siguientes: 

1. "Destronar  al Rey, deponer al Regente o Regencia del Reino, o privarles de su libertad personal n obligarles a ejecutar on  acto contrario a su voluntad.
2.  
3. "Impedir la celebracion de las elecciones para  Diputados a Cortes o Senadores en todo el Reino, o la  reunion legitima de las
4.  
5. "Disolver las Cortes o impedir la deliberacion de alguno de los Cuerpos Colegisladores o  arrancarles alguna resolucion.
6.  
7. "Ejecutar cuallquiera de los delitos previstos en el artfculo 165.
8.  
9. "Sustraer  el Reino o parte de el o algun  cuerpo de tropa de tierra  o de mar, o cualquiera otra clase de fuerza armada, de la obediencia  del  Supremo Gobierno.
10.  
11. "Usar y ejercer por si o despojar a los Ministros de la Corona de sus facultades constitucionales, o impedirles b coartarles su libre ejercicio.   (Articulo  167, Codigo Penal de  1850. Veanse las demas concordancias del articulo 181.)"

Thus, the Spanish Penal Code did not specifically declare that rebellion includes the act of engaging in war against the forces of the Government and of using serious violence for the purposes stated in Article 134  of the Revised Penal Code.   In view of this  express statutory inclusion  of the acts of war and  serious violence among the  ingredients of rebellion in  the Philippines, it is  clear that  the distinction made  by  Cueilo Calon between  grave and less grave offenses committed in the course of an insurrection cannot  be  accepted in  this jurisdiction.  Again, if  both classes  of offenses are  part and parcel of a rebellion, or means necessary therefor,  neither law nor logic justifies the exclusion of the one and the inclusion of the other.  In fact, Cueilo Calon  admits that "the difficulty lies in separating the  accidents of rebellion or sedition from the offenses independent therefrom."  Ergo, offenses that are not  independent therefrom, but. constituting  an integral part thereof committed, precisely, to carry out the uprising to its successful conclusion are beyond the purview of Article 244.   Indeed, the above quoted statement of Cueilo Calon to the effect that grave felonies committed in the course  of  an insurrection are  independent  therefrom was based upon a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 5, 1872, which we find reported in the Codigo Penal  de  Filipinas, by  Jose Perez Rubio,  as follows: 

"El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia  en sentencia  de  5 de  Febrero de 1872, tiene decWado:   Que segun los articulos 184 del Codigo Penal de 1830, y 259 del reformado (1870), los delitos particulars cometidos en una rebelion o sedici6n o con motivo de ellas se castigan respectivamente segun las disposiciones de los mismos Codigos;  y con arreglo al decreto de amnistia de 9 de Agosto de 1876 estan solo comprendidos en aquella gracia las personas sentenciadas, procesadas 6 aujetas a responsabilidad por delitos  politicoa de cualquiera especie cometidos desde el 29 de Septiembre  de 1868; Que el asesinato del Gobernador Civil de Burgos no fui resultado de movimiento alguno politico,  sino de  un  mero  tumulto  que imprimio el fanatismo, y cuya tunica aparente tendencia era impedir jue aquel funcionario inventariase ciertos objetos artisticos, que se  decian existentes  en la Catedral: Que esto  lo demuestran las salvajes voces de muerte proferidas por los asesinos contra la persona del Gobernador;  sin que al ejecutar en el mismo recinto del  templo los horrorosos hechos que aparecen en la causa, alzasen bandera politica  alguna ni dieran otrb grito que el, en aquel momento  sacrilego e" impio, de  'Viva la religion:' Que la  apreciar la Sala sentenciadora los hechos referentes al Gobernador Civil de delito de asesinato, penarlo con arreglo al Codigo y declarar  inaplicable  el  citado Decreto de  Amnistia, no ha cometido el error de derecho senalado en los casos 1.°  ZJ del articulo 4.° de la ley sobre establecimiento de la casacion criminal, ni infringido los articulos 250 y 259 del  Codigo Penal de 1870."   (Page 239; Italics  supplied.)   (See, also, "El  Codigo  Penal", by Hidalgo Garcia,  Vol.  I, p. 623.)'

It  is apparent  that said  case is  not in point.  There was no issue therein on whether murder may be completed with rebellion or sedition.  The  question for determination was whether ttye killers  of the  victim were guilty  of the common crime  of murder, or should have been convicted only  of rebellion or sedition.  The court adopted the first alternative, not because of  the  gravity of the  acts performed by the  accused, but  because they  had no political motivation.   Moreover, the footnote to said quotation from Cuello  Calon  reads: 

"Los  atentados desacatos y lesiones a  la autoridad u  otros delitos contra el orden publico cometidos en la sedicidn o con  motivo  de ella, no son delitos distintos de la sedicion, 3 octubre 1903,  19 noviembre 1906;  la  resistencia  o acometimiento a  la fuerza publica por los  sediciosos es accidente de la rebelion, 23 mayo 1890. 

"El asesinato de un gobernador cometido en el curso de un tumulto debe penarse como tin delito comun  de  asesinato,  5 febrero 1872. Sin  embargo, la jurisprudencia,  tratandose  de  ciertos delitos,  es vacilante; asi,  v. g., el acometimiento al teniente  de alcalde se  ha declarado en un fallo independiente de la perturbacion tumultuaria promovida para impedir al  alcalde  el cumplimiento de sus providencias, 16 marzo  1885, mientras que un hecho analogo se ha considerado en  otra sentencia ya citada como  accidente de la rebelion, 8 Octubre 1903.   El  acometimiento  de  los sediciosos  a la  fuerza publica  es accidente de la  sedicion y no  uno de los  delitos particulares  a que se refiere este articulo, 23  de mayo 1890.  Entre estos delitos  a  que  alude el precepto  se hallan  las lesiones que  puedan causar  los sediciosos, 19 noviembre 1906."  (Footnote 21, II Cuelo Calon,  Derecho Penal,  pp. 110-111.)   (Italics supplied.)

Thus  in  a decision, dated  May 2, 1934, the  Supreme Court  of  Spain held: 

"Considerando que la nota deferencial  entre Ids delitos de rebelion y sedicion,  de una  parte,  y el  de  atentado, esta constituida  por la circunstancia de alzamiento publico que caracteriza a los primeros, las cuales, por su  indole  generica, absorben a los de atentado  y deltas infraeciones que  durante su comiston y  con su motivo se cometan, y afirmandose como hecho  en la sentencia recurrida que el procesado Mariano Esteban Martinez  realizo,  en  union de  otros, el atendado que se le imputa  sin alzarse  publicamente, cae por su base el recurso fundado en supuesto distinto."   (Jurisprudencia Criminal, Tomo  130,  p.  551.) (Italics  supplied.)

To the same effect are,  likewise, the following: 

"La provocacion y el ataque  a la Guardia Civil por paisanos alzados tumultuariamente para impedir al Delegado  de un Gobernador civil el cumplimiento de sus providencias, no pueden estimarse constitutivos de un delito  distinto del de  sedicion, ni ser, por'tanto, perseguidos y penados  separadamente. 

"La resistencia o el acometimiento de los sublevados a la fuerza publica  constituye, en su caso, una circunstancia o accidente  de la sedicion y no es delito de los  que el Codigo  Penal en este  articulo (formerly Article  244, now Article 227) supone que pueden  cometerse en ella o con su  motivo, los cuales denomina delitos particulares, y manda que se penen conforme a las disposiciones del propio Codigo. (S. 23-5-890; G. 23-6-890; t.  44; pagina  671)" (II Doctrina  Penal del Tribunal  Supremo, p.  2411.)   (Italics supplied.) 

"La Audiencia condeno  como autores de atentado a  dos  de los amotinados que agredieron al alcalde, e interpuesto recurso de casacion contra la sentencia,  el Tribunal Supremo  to casa y anula,  teniendo en cuenta lo dispuesto  en el articulo  250  (numero 3.°)  del Codigo  Penal; 

'Considerando que el acto llevado a cabo por  el grupo constituye una verdadera sedicion, sin que sea  licito el dividir este hecho y calificarlo de atentado respecto a las personas que agredieron a dicho alcalde,  porque el acometimiento fue un accidente de  la sedicion, de la  cual'  eran  todos  responsables,  ya   se  efectuara  por  los agrupados  en conjunto   o por  uno  solo,  por  ser  comun  el objeto que se proponian y no individual; y al calificar  y  penar este hecho  la  Audencia de Gerona,  de atentado *  * *, ha incurrido en  error de derecho  e infringido  los articulos 250  y siguientes del Codigo Penal, por no haberlos aplicado, y el 263, numero 2.°,  en relacion  con  el 264,  numeros  1.° y 3.°,  por su  aplicacion * * *" (Sent. 3 octubre  1903. Gac. 12 Diciembre)  (Enciclopedia Juridica Espafiola, Tomo xxviii, p. 250).

These cases are in accord with the text of  said Article 244, which  refers, not to all  offenses  committed  in the course of a rebellion or on the occasion thereof, but only to "delitos particulares" or common crimes.   Now, what are "delitos particulares" as the  phrase is used in said article 244?   We quote from Viada: 

"Las disposicidn defi primer parrafo de este artfculo no puede  ser mas justa;  con arreglo a ella, los delitos  particulares o comunes cometidos en  una rebelidn  or sedici6n no deberanv reputarse corao accidentes  inherentes a  estas, sino como delitos especiales, a dicha rebelidn y  sedicion ajenos, los que deberan ser respectivamente castigados con las penas que en este Codigo se las  senalan,  Pero, que delitos deberan considerarse como comunes,  y cuales  como constitutivos de la propia rebelion  o sedicion?   En  cuanto  a la rebelion, no  ofrece  esta cuestion dificultad alguna, pues todo hecho  que no este comprendido en tmo y  otro  de los  objetos  especificados en los seis numeros del articulo 243 sera extrano a la rebeli6n, y si se ballare definido en algun otro articulo del Codigo, con arreglo a este debera ser castigado como delito  particular.  Pero tratandose de la sedicion, comprendiendose como objetos de la misma, en los numeros 3.°, 4.° y 5.° del articulo 250, hechos que constituyen otros tantos ataques a  las personas o a la propiedad, cuales se consideran como accidentes  inherentes a la propria  sedici6n,  y cuales deberan  reputarse como delitos particulares  o comunes?  En cuanto a los casos de  los numeros 4.°  y 5. , estimanos  que el objeto politico y social que se requiera  para la realizaci&n  de  los actos en aqueUos eomprendidos es el que  debe servirnos de norma y guia para distinguir lo inherente a la sedicidn de lo que es ajeno o extrano a ella.  Cuando no  exista  ese  objeto politico y social, el acto de odio o  venganza, ejercido contra los particulares o cualquiera  clase del Estado, y el atentado contra  las  propiedades  de los  ciudadanos  o corporaciones mentados en  el numero 5."  del articulo  250,  no seran constitutivos del  delito de sedicidn, sino  que deberan  ser apreciados y castigados como  delitos  comunes, segun las disposiciones  respectivas  de  este Cddigo y por lo que toca  a los  actos de odio o venganza ejercidos en  la persona o bienes de alguna Autoridad o sus agentes, estimamos que deberan reputarse como delitos comunes todos  aquellos hechos innecesarios ^[2] para la consecucion del fin particular que se propusieran los  sediciosos; y como  esenciales, constitutivos de la  propia sedici6n todoa aquellos actos de odio o venganza que sean  medio racionalmente necesario para el logro  del  objeto especial a que se encaminaran los  esfuerzos de los  sublevados.   Asi, en el caso de  la Cuesti6n  1 expuesta en  el comentario  del  articulo  258, es evidente  que el fin que se propusieron los sediciosos fue no pagar el  impuesto a cuya cobranza iba a proceder el comisionado; pero para lograr este objeto, como  lo lograron, fue preciso  hacer salir del pueblo al ejecutor, y a este efecto, lo amenazaron,  lo persiguieron  y llegaron hasta lesionarle.  Esas amenazas y lesiones no pudieron apreciarse, ni las aprecio tampoco la Sala sentenciadora, como delito comiin, sino  como acddente inherente a la misma sedition, por cuanto fueron un medio racionalmente necesario para la consecudin del fin deierminado que se propusieron los culpables. 

"Pero  cuando  tal  necesidad  desaparece, cuando se  Were por herir, cuando se mata por matar,  el hecho ya, no pttede  ser  considerado  como un accidente propio de la  sediaion,  sino como un delito especial,  al que debe aplicarse  la  pena al  mismo correspondiente."   (HI  Viada,  pp. 311-312.)  (Italics supplied.)

Cuello Calon is even more illuminating.  He says: 

"La doctrina cientifica considera los delitos llamados politicos como infracdones  de un caracter especial distintas de los denominados delitos comunes. De esta apreciacion ha nacido  la division de los delitos, desde el punto  de vista de su naturaleza intrinseca, en delitos politicos y delitos comunes  o de derecho comun. 

"Se reputan delitos comunes aquellos que  lesionan bienes juridicos individuales  (v. gr., los delitos  contra la vida,  contra la honestidad, contra la  propiedad, etc.). 

"La nocion del delito pcflltico no parece tan clara.  Desde  luego revisten  este caracter los que  atentan contra  el orden politico del Estado, contra su orden  externo  (independencia de la  nacion, integridad del  territorio,  etc.), o contra el interno (delitos contra el Jefe del Estado, contra la  forma de  Gobierno, etc.).  Pero tambien pueden eer considerados como politicos  todos los delitos,  cualesquiera que sean incluso  los de derecho com/An,  cuando fueron cometidos por moviles politicos.  Deben,  por tanto,, estimarse como  infracciones de  esta clase, no solo las que  objetivamente tengan tal caracter por el interes politico que lesionan,  sino tambien las que, apreciadas subjetivamente, maninestan una motivactdn de caracter politico. 

"Asl  podria formulares  esta definici6n:  es  delito politico  el cometido  contra el  orden politico del Estado, asi como todo  delito de cualquiera otra clase deierminado  por moviles politicos."  (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Tomo I,  pp. 247-249.)

In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such  common  crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose.  The decisive factor is the intent or motive.  If a crime usually regarded as common, like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance "to the Government the territory of the Philippines Islands  or  any part thereof." then said offense becomes stripped of its "common"  complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.

Conformably  with the foregoing, the  case  of murder against the defendant  in U.  S. vs. Lardizabal  (1 Phil., 729) an insurgent  who killed a prisoner  of war because he was too weak to march with the retreating rebel forces, and could not be left behind  without endangering the safety of the latter was dismissed  upon the ground that the execution of said prisoner of war formed part of, and was included in, the  crime of sedition, which, in turn, was covered  by an  amnesty, to the  benefits  of which  said defendant was entitled.

True, in U. S. vs.  Alfont  (1 Phil., 115), the commander of an unorganized group of insurgents was, pursuant to Article  244 of our old  Penal Code,  convicted of homicide for having shot and killed  a woman who was driving a vehicle.  But the complex crime of rebellion with homicide was not considered in that case.  Apart from this, the accused failed to established the relation between her death and the insurrection. What is more, it  was neither proved nor alleged that he had  been prompted by political reasons. In other words, his offense was independent from the rebellion.  The latter was merely the occasion for the commission of the former.

It is noteworthy  that  the aforementioned decisions of this court and the  Supreme Court  of Spain in  cases of treason, rebellion and sedition, are  in line with  the trend in other countries, as well as in the field of international relations.  Referring to the question  as to what offenses are political  in nature, it was  said in  In re  Ezeta  (62  Fed. Rep.,  972) : 

"What constitutes an offense  of a political character has not yet been determined by judicial authority.  Sir James Stephens,  in his work, History of the  Criminal Law of  England  (Volume 2, p. 71), thinks  that it should be 'interpreted to mean that fugitive criminals are not to be  surrendered  for extradition crimes if those crimes were incidental to and formed a part of political  disturbances.'  Mr. John Stuart  Mill, in  the house of commons,  in  1866, while discussing an amendment to the act of 'extradition, on which  the  treaty between  England  and France  was founded, gave  this  definition: Any offense committed in the course of or furthering of civil war, insurrection,  or political  commotion,'  Hansard's Debates Vol. 184, p. 2115.  In the Castioni Case,  supra, decided in 1891, the question was discussed by the  most eminent counsel at the English bar, and considered by distinguished judges, without a definition being framed that would draw  a fixed and  certain line  between  a municipal or common crime and one of political character. 'I do not think,' said Denman, J., 'it is necessary or  desirable  that we should  attempt to put into  language, in the shape of an. exhaustive definition, exactly the whole state of things, or every state of things, which might bring a particular  case within the description of an offense of a political character.'  In that case, Castioni  was  charged with the  murder of  one Rossi, by shooting  him with a  revolver, in the  town of Bellinzona, in the canton of Ticino, in Switzerland.  The deceased, Rossi,  was a member of the state council of the canton of Ticino. Castioni was a citizen of the same canton.  For  some time previous to the  murder; much  dissatisfaction had been felt and expressed by a large number of inhabitants of Ticino  at the  mode in which the political  party then in power were conducting  the  government of the canton.   A request was presented to the government for  a  revision  of the constitution of the canton and, the  government having declined to take a popular vote on  that  question, a  number  of the citizens of Bellinzona, among whom was Castioni, seized the arsenal of the  town,  from which they took rifles  and ammunition, disarmed the gendarmes,  arrested  and bound  or handcuffed  several  persons connected with the government, and forced them to march in front of  the armed crowd to the  municipal palace.  Admission to the  palace was demanded in the name of the people, and was  refused by Rossi  and another member  of the government,  who  were in the palace. The crowd then broke open the outer gate of the palace, and rushed  in,  pushing before  them   the government  officials whom  they had arrested and bound.  Castioni, who was armed with a  revolver,  was  among  the first to enter.  A second door, which was locked, was broken open, and at this time, or immediately after, Rossi, who was in the passage,  was shot through the body  with  a revolver, and died very soon  afterwards.  Some other  shots were fired,  but no one else was injured.  Castioni fled to England,  His extradition was requested by the federal council of Switzerland.  He was arrested and taken before a police magistrate, as provided by the statute,  who  held  him for extradition.  Application  was  made by the accused  to the high court  of  justice of England  for  a writ of habeas corpus.  He was  represented by  Sir Charles  Russell, now lord chief justice.  The  attorney  general, Sir Richard Webster, appeared for the crown, and the solicitor  general, Sir Edward Clarke,  and Robert Woodfal, for the federal council of Switzerland. This array  of distinguished counsel, and the high character of the court, commends the case as one of  the highest authority.  It appeared from an admission by one of the parties engaged in the disturbances 'that  the  death of Rossi was a  misfortune,  and not necessary for the  rising/  The opinions of the judges as to the political character  of the crime  charged against Castioni,  upon the facts stated, is exceedingly interesting, but I need only refer to' the following passages.   Judge Denman says: 

"The question really is whether, upon the facts, it is  clear that the man was acting as one of a number of persons engaged in acts  of violence of  a political character with a political object, and as part of the political movement and rising in which he was taking part.' "Judge Hawkins, in commenting upon the  character of political offenses, said: 

'I cannot  help thinking that  everybody  knows  there are, many acts  of a  political  character  done  vrithout  reason,  done  against all reason;  but  at the same time one  cannot  look too  hardly, and weigh in golden scales the acts of men hot in their political excitement.  We  know that in heat,  and in heated blood,  men  often do things which are against and contrary  to reason; but none  the 'less an act  of this description may be done for the purpose of furthering and in  furtherance  of a political rising, even  though it  is an act which may  be deplored  and  lamented,  as  even cruel and against all reason,  by those  who can calmly  reflect upon it after  the battle is over.' 

"Sir  James Stephens, whose definition as  an author has  already been cited,  was one of the judges,  and joined in the views taken as to the political character of  the crime charged  against Castioni. The  prisoner was  discharged.  Applying,  by  analogy, the action of  the  English court in that case to the four  cases  now before me, under  consideration, the  conclusion follows  that the  crimes charged here, associated  as  they are  with the actual conflict  of armed forces, are  of a political  character. 

"The draft of a treaty on International  Penal Law,  adopted by the congress of  Montevideo in  1888, and recommended by the International American Conference to the governments of the  Latin-American nations in 1890, contains the following provisions (Article 23): 

'Political  offenses, offenses subversive of  the internal and external  safety  of a state or  common offenses  connected  with these, shall not warrant extradition.  The  determination  of  the  character  of the  offense is incumbent  upon  the  nations  upon  which the  demand for extradition  is made; and  its  decision shall  be made  under  and according to  the provisions of  the  law  which shall prove to be most favorable to the accused: 

"I am not aware that  any part of this Code has been made the basis of treaty  stipulations between any  of the American nations, but  the article  cited may  be  at least accepted as expressing the wisdom of leading  jurists and diplomats.   The article is important with respect to two of its features:   (1)  provides  that a fugitive shall not be  extradited for an offense connected with a  political offense, or with an offense subversive of the internal  or external safety of the state; and  (2) the decision  as to the character  of the offense shall be made  under and according  to  the provisions  of the law  which  shall prove most favorable to  the accused.  The first provision is  sanctioned by Calvo,  who, speaking  of the exemption from extradition of persons charged  with  political offenses, says: 

'The exemption  even  extends to acts  connected with  political crimes or offenses,  and it is  enough, as says Mr. Fuastin  Helio; that a common  crime   be connected with  a  political act, that it be the  outcome of  or  be  in  the outcome  of  or be in the execution  of such, to be covered by  the privilege which protects the latter Calvo, Droit  Int. (3me ed.) p. 413, section 1262. 

"The second provision of the article  is founded on the  broad principles  of  humanity found everywhere in  the  criminal  law,  distinguishing its administration with respect to  even the worst features of  our civilization  from the  cruelties of barbarism.  When  this article was  under discussion  in the  international  American  conference in Washington, Mr. Silva, of Colombia, submitted some observations upon the difficulty of drawing  a line between an offense of a political character  and a common crime, and incidentally referred to the crime of robbery, in terms worthy of some consideration here. He said.: 

'In  the  revolutions,  as we  conduct them  in our countries,  the common offenses  are   necessarily  mixed  up  with  the  political  in many cases. A  colleague General Caamano  (of  Ecuador)  knows how we carry on wars.  A  revolutionist needs horses for moving, beef to feed his troops,  etc.; and since he  does  not go  into  the public  markets  to  purchase  these horses and that beef,  nor  the arms and  saddiles to  mount  and equip his forces,  he takes them from  the  first pasture or  shop he  find at  hand.  This is called robbery everywhere, and is a common offense in time of peace,  but in time of war  it is  a circumstance closely allied  to  the  manner of waging it.'  International  American  Conference, Vol.  2, p. 615." (Italics supplied.)

We quote  the following  from footnote  (23)  on pages 249-250,  Vol. I, of  Cuello Calon's aforesaid work on "Derecho Penal." 

"En algunos Codigo y leyes  de fecha proxima  ya se halla una definicion  de  estos delitos.   El Codigo penal  ruso, en el articulo 58, define  como 'delitos  contra revolutionaries' los hechos encaminados a derrocar o  debilitar el poder  de los  Consejos de  trabajadores y campesinos y  de  los  gobiemos de la Union de Republicas socialistas sovieticas,  a  destruir  o debilitar la seguridad  exterior de la Union de Republicas Sovieticas y las conquistas economicas, politicas y  nacionales fundamentals de la revolution proletariat  El Codigo Penal italiano de 1930 considera en su articulo  8." como delito politico 'todo delito que  ofenda un interes politico del Estado o un derecho politico del ciudadano/  Tambien se reputa politico el delito comun determinado, en todo o en parte por motivos politicos.  En la ley alemana de extradition de 25 diciembre 1929 se definen asi:  'Son delitos politicos los atentados  punibles directamente ejecutados  contra  la existencia o la seguridad del Estado,  contra el  jefe o  contra un miembro  del gobierno del Estado  como tal, contra  una corporation constitucional, contra los  derechos politicos las buenas relaciones con el extranjero.' parrafo 3.°,  2. 

"La 6a.  Conferencia para la Unification del Derecho penal (Copenhague, 31 agosto 3  septiembre  1935)  adopto la siguiente notion del delito  politico: 

"1. Por delitos  politicos se entienden los  dirigidos contra la organization y funcionamiento del Estado  o contra los  derechos que de  esta organization y funcionamiento provienen  para el  culpable. 

"2. Tambien se consideran como delitos  politicos los delitos  de derecho comun que  constituyen hechos conexos con la ejecucion  de los delitos previstos en section 1.°:  como  los  hechos dirigidos a favoreeer la ejecucion de un delito politico o a permitir al autor de este delito sustraerse a la aplicacion de  la ley penal. 

"3. No se consideraran  delitos politicos aquellos a  los  que su autor sea inducido por un motivo egoista  y vil. 

"4. No se consideraran delitos los que  creen un peligro para la comunidad  o un  estado  de terror."  (Italics supplied.)

Thus, national, as well  as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their  character  as "common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are  mere ingredients,  and, consequently, cannot be punished  separately from the  principal  offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.

There is one other reason and  a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at  bar.  If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this  could be  done), the following  penalties would  be imposable  upon the  movant, namely: (1)  for the crime of rebellion, a fine not  exceeding P20,000 and prisidn mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying  circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prisidn mayor; and  (2) for the crime of murder, reclusidn  temporal in its maximum period to death,  depending upon  the modifying  circumstances present.   In other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty  could not  be imposed upon him, However, under Article 48, said penalty would have to be meted out to him,  even  in  tke absence of a single  aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the  prosecution,  would be unfavorable to the movant.

Upon the other, hand, said Article 48 was  enacted  for tfee purpose of  favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately.   In the word  of  Rodriguez Navarro: 

"La unificacion de penas en los  casos de concurso de delitos  a que hace referenda este articulo (75 de Codigo de 1932), esta basado francamente en el principio pro reo." (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)'

We are aware of the fact that  this observation  refers to Article 71  (later 75)  of the Spanish Penal Code  (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then  in  1932,  reading: 

"Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables  en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro. 

"En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave  en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que  represente la suma  de  las que pudieran imponerse,  penando separadamente los delitos. 

"Cuando  la pena asi computada exceda de este limite,  se sancionaran los  delitos por separado."  (Rodriguez  Navarro, Doctrino Penal del  Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II,  p. 2163.)

and that bur Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment, restricting the  imposition  of the penalty for the  graver offense  in  its maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged  were dealt' with separately.  The  absence of  said  limitation  in  our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of  said Article 48.   Indeed, if one act constitutes two  or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a  punishment graver than  that prescribed  for  each one  of  said offenses put together.   In  directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had  no other  purpose than to  prescribe a penalty  lower than the aggregate  of the penalties for  each offense,  if  imposed  separately.  The reason for this  benevolent spirit of Article 48 is readily discernible.  When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him  for  each  crime independently from the other, he  must  suffer  the  maximum  of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense.

Did the framers  of Article 48 have a different purpose in dealing therein with an offense which is a means necessary for the commission of another?  To begin with, the culprit can not, then,  be considered  as displaying a greater degree of malice  than when the two offenses are independent of each  other.  On the contrary,  since one offense is a necessary means for the commission of the other, the evil intent is one, which, at least, quantitatively, is lesser than when the two offenses are unrelated to each  other, because, in such  event, he is twice guilty of having harbored criminal  designs and  of carrying the same  into execution. Furthermore, it  must  be presumed that the object of Article US,  in  its entirety, is  only one.  We  cannot  assume that the purpose of the lawmaker, at the beginning of the single sentence of which said article consists, was to favor the accused, and  that,  before the sentence endedf the former had a change  of heart and  turned  about face against the latter.   If the second part of Article 48 had been meant to be unfavorable to the accused and, hence, the exact opposite  of  the  first  part each would  have  been placed in separate provisions, instead of in one single article.  If the first part sought to impose, upon the culprit, a  penalty less grave than that which he would deserve if the two or more offenses  resulting from his single act  were punished separately, then this, also,  must be the purpose of the second part, in dealing with an offense which  is a necessary means for the  commission of another.

The accuracy of this conclusion is borne out by the fact that, since 1850,  when the counterpart of our Article US was inserted in the Penal Code of Spain,  or for  over a century,  it does not appear to  have been applied  by the Supreme Court thereof to crimes of murder committed in furtherance of an insurrection.

Incidentally, we cannot  accept  the  explanation  that crimes committed as a means necessary for the success of a rebellion had  to  be prosecuted  separately under the provisions of Article 259  of the Penal Code of Spain, which is the counterpart of Article 244  of our old Penal Code. To begin with, these articles are part of a substantive law. They do not govern the manner or method of prosecution of the culprits.  Then again, said  precepts ordain that  common crimes committed during a  rebellion or sedition, or on the occasion thereof, "shall be  respectively punished  according to the provisions of this Code."  Among  such provisions was Article 90 (later Article 71, then Article 75) of the Spanish Penal Code, and Article 89 of our  old Penal Code, of which Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines is a  substantial  reproduction. Hence, had the Supreme  Court  of Spain or the Philippines believed that murders committed as a means necessary  to attain the aims of an uprising  were "common" crimes,  the same would have been complexed with the rebellion or sedition, as the case may  be.

The cases of People vs. Cabrera  (43 Phil., 64) and People vs.  Cabrera (43  Phil., 82) have  not escaped our attention.  Those cases involved members of the constabulary who rose publicly, for the purpose  of performing  acts of hate  and vengeance upon the police force of Manila, and in an encounter with the latter, killed some members thereof.   Charged with and convicted  of sedition in the first case, they were accused of murder in the second case.  They pieaded double jeopardy in the second case, upon the ground tiiat  the facts alleged in the information were  those  set forth in the charge in the first case, in which  they had been convicted.  This plea was rejected upon the ground that the organic law prohibited double jeopardy for the same offense, and that the offense of sedition is distinct and different from that of murder, although both were the result of the same act.

The question whether one offence was  inherent in, or identified with, the other was not discussed or even considered in said cases.  Besides, the lower court applied, in the murder case Article 89 of the old Penal Code which is the counterpart of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code but this Court refused to do so.   Again, simply because one act may constitute two or more offenses, it does  not follow necessarily that a person may be prosecuted for one after conviction for the other,  without violating the  injunction against double jeopardy.  For  instance, if a man fires a shotgun at another,  who suffers thereby several injuries, one of which produced his death, may he, after  conviction for murder or homicide, based upon said fatal  injury, be accused or convicted, in a separate case, for the non-fatal injuries sustained by the victim? Or may the  former be convicted of the complex crime of murder or homicide with serious and/or less serious physical injuries?   The mere formulation of these questions  suffices to show that the limitation of the  rule on  double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for  the same offense  does not constitute  a license for the separate prosecution of two offenses resulting from the same act, if one offense is an essential element of the other.  At any rate, as regards this phase of the issue, which was not touched in the Cabrera cases, the rule therein laid down must necessarily be considered modified by our decision in the cases of  People vs.  Labra  (46  Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p. 159) and  Crisologo  vs. People  and Villalobos  (supra),  insofar as inconsistent therewith.

The main argument  in support of the  theory seeking to complex rebellion with murder and other offenses is that "war" within the purview of the laws on rebellion  and sedition may be "waged" or  "levied"  without killing.

This premise does not warrant, however, the conclusions drawn therefrom that any killing done in furtherance of a rebellion or sedition is independent therefrom, and may be complexed therewith, upon the ground that destruction of human life is not indispensable to the waging or levying of war.   A  person may kill  another without  inflicting physical  injuries upon the latter, such, for instance, as by poisoining, drowning, suffocation or shock. Yet it  is admitted that he who fatally stabs another cannot be convicted  of homicide  with  physical  injuries.  So too,  it is undeniable that treason may be committed without torturing or murdering  anybody.   Yet, it is well-settled that a citizen who gives aid and comfort to the enemy by taking direct part in  the  maltreatment and assassination of his (citizen's) countrymen,  in  furtherance of the  wishes of said enemy, is  guilty of plain treason,  not  complexed with murder or physical injuries, the later being as charged and proven mere ingredients of the former.  Now then, if homicide may be an ingredient of treason, why can it not be an ingredient of rebellion?  The proponents of the idea of rebellion complexed with homicide, etc., have not even tried to  answer this question.   Neither have they assailed the wisdom of  our aforementioned  decisions  in treason cases.

The Court is conscious of the keen interest displayed, and the considerable efforts exerted, by the Executive Department in the apprehension  and prosecution of those believed to be guilty of  crimes against public order, of the lives  lost,  and the time  and money spent in connection therewith, as well as of the possible  implications or repercussions in the security of the State. The careful consideration  given to said policy  of  a  coordinate and co-equal branch of the Government is reflected  in the time consumed, the extensive and intensive research work undertaken, and the  many meetings held by the  members of the court for the purpose of elucidating on the question  under discussion and of settling  the same.

The role  of  the judicial department under the Constitution is, however, clear to settle justiceable controversies by the application of the law.  And the latter must be enforced as it is with all its flaws and defects, not affecting its  validity not as the judges would have it.   In  other words, the courts must apply the policy of the State as set forth in its laws, regardless of the wisdom thereof.

It is evident to us that the policy of  our statutes on rebellion is  to  consider all acts committed in furtherance thereof as  specified in Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal  Code as constituting  only  one crime, punishable with one single penalty namely, that prescribed in said Article 135.  It is interesting  to note, in  this connection, that the penalties provided in our old Penal Code  (Articles 230 to 232) were much  stiffer, namely: 

1. Life imprisonment to death for the promoters, maintainers and leaders of the rebellion, and, also,  for  sub-ordinate officers  who  held positions  of authority,  either civil or ecclesiastical, if the purpose of the movement was to proclaim  the independence of any  portion of the Philippine territory;  
2.  
3. Reclusion  temporal in its  maximum period for said promoters,  maintainers and leaders of the  insurrection, and for its subordinate  officers, if the  purpose of the rebellion was  any  of those enumerated  in  Article  229, except that  mentioned in the preceding paragraph;   
   
4.  
5. Reclusion temporal: (a) for subordinate officers other than those already adverted to; and  (b) for mere participants in the rebellion falling under the first paragraph of No. 2 of Article 174; and     
6.  
7. Prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its  minimum period for participants not falling, under No. 3.

After the  cession of the Philippines to the United States, the rigors of the old Penal Code were tempered.  Its aforementioned provisions  were superseded by section  3 of Act No. 292, which reduced the penalty to imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years and a fine not exceeding $10,000, or P20,000, for "every person who incites, sets on foot, assists or engages in any rebellion  or insurrection *  *  *  or who gives aid and comfort to any one so engaging in  such rebellion or insurrection."  Such liberal attitude was adhered to by the authors of the Revised Penal Code.  The penalties therein are substantially identical to those prescribed in  Act  292.  Although  the Revised  Penal  Code increased slightly the  penalty of imprisonment for the promoters,  maintainers  and leaders  of  the uprising,  as well as for public officers joining the same, to a maximum not exceeding twelve (12) years of priswn mayor, it reduced the,  penalty  of imprisonment  for mere participants  to not  more than  eight  (8) years  of  priswn  mayor,  and eliminated the fine.

This benign mood of the Revised Penal  Code becomes more significant when we bear  in mind it  was approved on December 8, 1930 and became effective on January 1, 1932.  At that  time the communists in the  Philippines had  already  given ample proof  of  their widespread activities and of their designs and potentialities.  Prior thereto, they had been  under surveillance by the agents of the law, who gathered evidence of their subversive movements, culminating in the prosecution  of Evangelista, Manahan (57 Phil., 354; 57  Phil., 372), Capadocia (57 Phil., 364), Feleo  (57 Phil., 451), Nabong (57 Phil., 455), and  others. In fact, the first information against the first two  alleged that they committed the crime of inciting to  sedition "on and during the month of November, 1930, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto."

As if this were not enough, the very Constitution adopted in  1935, incorporated  a formal and solemn  declaration (Article II, section 5) committing the Commonwealth, and, then the Republic  of the Philippines, to the  "promotion of  social justice".  Soon  later,  Commonwealth  Act No. 103, creating the Court  of Industrial Relations, was  passed.

Then followed a number  of  other statutes  implementing said constitutional mandate.   It is not necessary to go into the details of said legislative enactments.   Suffice  it to say that the same are predicated upon a recognition of the fact that a good many of the  problems confronting the State are due to social and economic evils, and  that, unless the latter  are removed or, least  minimized, the former will keep on harrassing the community and affecting the well-being of its members.

Thus, the settled policy  of  our laws  on rebellion, since the begining of  the century, has been  one of  decided leniency,  in  comparison with  the laws  enforce  during the Spanish regime.   Such policy has not suffered the slightest alteration.  Although the  Government  has,  for the  past five or six years, adopted a more vigorous course of action in the apprehension of violators of said law and in their prosecution, the established policy of the State,  as regards the punishment  of the culprits  has remained  unchanged since 1932.  It is not for us to  consider  the merits and demerits  of  such policy.   This falls within the province of the policy-making branch of the government the Congress of the Philippines.  However, the following quotation from Cuello Calon indicates the schools  of thought on this subject and the reason  that may have influenced our  law-makers in making their choice: 

"Durante muchos siglos, hasta tiempos relativamente cercanos, se reputaban  los hechos que hoy  llamamos delitos politicos como mas graves y peligrosos que los crimenes  comunes. Se  consideraba que mientras estos  solo causan un dano  individual,  aquellos produqen profundas  perturbaeiones en lla vida collectiva llegando a poner en peligro  la misma vida del Estado.  En consonancia con estas  ideas fueron reprimidos con extraordinaria  severidad y designados con la denominacion romana de delitos de lesa majestad se catalogaron en las leyes penales como los crimenes mas temibles.

"Pero desde hace  poco mas  de un  siglo se ha realizado  en este punto una  transformation profunda merced a la cual la delincuencia politica dejo de apreciarse  con los severos criterios de antano quedando sometida a un regimen penal, por regla  general suave y benevolo.

"El origen de este cambio se remonta, segun opinion muy difundida, a la revolucion que tuvo lugar en Francia en  el ano 1830,  El gobierno de Luis Felipe  establecio una  honda  separacion entre los delitos comunes y los politicos, siendo estos sometidos a una penalidad mas suave y sus autores exceptuados de la extradicion.  Irradiando a  otros  paises tuvieron  estas  tan  gran  difusion que  en  casi todos  los de regimen liberal-individualista se ha llegado  a crear un tratamiento desprovisto  de severidad para la represi6n  de estos hechos.   No solo las penas con que se conminaron perdieron gran parte de su antigua  dureza, sino que en algunos paises se cre6 un regimen penal mas suave para estos delicuentes, en otros se abolio para ellos la pena de muerte.  Tan profundo  contraste entre el antiguo y el actual tratamiento de la criminalidad politica en la mayoria de los paises solo puede ser explicado por las ideas  nacidas y difundiclas bajo los regimenes politicos liberales acerca de estos delitos y  delincuentes.  Por una parte se ha afirmado que la  criminalidad de estos hechos no contiene la misma inmoralidad que la delincuencia comun, que es tan solo relativa, que depende del  tiempo, del lugar,  de las circumstancias, de las instituciones del pais.  Otros invocan la  elevacion de los moviles  y sentimientos determinantes de estos hechos, el amor a la patria, la adhesion ferviente a determinadas  ideas o principios, el espiritu de sacrifkio por el triunfo de un ideal.

"Contra su  trato benevolo, del que no pocas veces se han  beneficiado peligrosos  malhechores, se ha iniciado hace algun tiempo una fuerte reaccidn (vease Cap.  XV, 3.", b), que Uego a alcanzar considerable severidad en las Iegislaciones de tipo  autoritario,  y  que tambien ha hallado eco, en forma mas suave, en las de otros paises de constitucion democratica en los que, especiahnente en los ultimos anos, la  frecuehcia de agitaciones politicas y  sociales ha originado la publicacion  de numerosas leyes encaminadas a la proteccidn penal del Estado."   (Cuello Calon,  Derecho Penal, Tomo 1, pp. 250-252.)

Such  evils as may result from the failure of the policy of the  law  punishing  the  offense  to  dovetail  with  the policy of  the law enforcing agencies in the apprehension and prosecution of the offenders are matters which may be brought to  the attention of the departments  concerned. The  judicial  branch can not amend the former in  order to  suit  the latter.   The  Court cannot indulge in judicial legislation without violating the principle of  separation of powers, and, hence, undermining the foundation of our republican system.   In short, we cannot accept  the theory of the prosecution without causing much bigger  harm than that which would allegedly result from the adoption of the opposite view.

In  conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons end robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for  the perpetration of said offense of rebellion;  that the crime  charged in the aforementioned amended information is,  therefore, simple  rebellion,  not  the  complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and  robberies; that the  maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prisidn mayor and a fine of P20,000;  and that, in conformity with the policy of  this  court  in dealing  with  accused persons amenable to  a similar  punishment, said defendant  may may be allowed bail.

It is urged that,  in  the exercise  of  its discretion, the Court should deny the motion under consideration, because the security of the State so requires, and because the judgment of conviction appealed from indicates that the evidence of guilt of Amado  V.  Hernandez is strong.  However, as held in a  resolution of this  court, dated  January 29, 1953,  in  the case of  Montano vs. Ocampo  (G. R. L-6352): 

"* *  * to  deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of  guilt is  strong; it must also appear that  in case of conviction the defendant's criminal liability would probably call for a capital punishment.   No clear or conclusive showing before this Court has  been made."

In fact,  in  the case at bar, defendant Amado  V. Hernandez was sentenced by the  lower court, not to the extreme penalty, but  to life imprisonment.  Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours,  to be denied upon mere general  principles  and  abstract consideration  of  public safety.  Indeed, the  preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political system that, not  satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of  section  (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4),  (5),  (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13),  (14), (15), (16),  (17), (18), and (21) of said  section  (1) to the protection  of several aspects of freedom.  Thus, in  line with the  letter and  spirit of  the fundamental  law, we said  in  the aforementioned case of Montano vs.  Ocampo: 

"Exclusion from bail in capital offenses being an exception to the otherwise absolute right guaranteed  by the constitution, the natural tendency of the courts has  been toward a fair and liberal appreciation, rather than otherwise, of the evidence in the  determination of the  degree  of proof and presumption of guilt necessary to warrant a deprivation  of that  right." 

"In the evaluation of the evidence the probability of flight is one other important factor to be  taken into account.  The sole purpose of confining accused in jail before conviction, it has been observed, is to assure his presence at the trial.   In other words, if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it  is only  on the  theory that the  proof being strong, the  defendant  would  flee,  if  he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury.   Hence, the exception to the fundamental right to  be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent  of the probability of evasion of prosecution. 

"The possibility of escape  in this case, bearing in mind the defendant's official and social standing and his other personal circumstances,  seems remote if not nil."

This view applies fully to Amado V. Hernandez, with the particularity that there is an  additional circumstance  in his  favor he has been detained since January 1951, or for more than five  (5)  years, and it may still take  some time to  dispose of the case, for the same has not been,  and is not in a position to be, included, as yet, in our calendar, in-asmuch  as the briefs for some appellants other than Hernandez as well  as  the  brief for the  Government,  are pending submission.  It  should be noted,  also, that the decision appealed from  the  opposition to  the  motion  in question do not reveal satisfactorily and  concrete, positive act of the accused showing, sufficiently,  that his provincial .release, during the pendency of the appeal, would jeopardize the security of the State.

Wherefore, the aforementioned motion for bail of defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez is hereby granted and,  upon the filing of a bond, with sufficient sureties, in the sum of F30,000, and its approval by the court, let said defendant-appellant be  provisionally released.   Is  13  so ordered.

Paras, C. J.,  Reyes,  A., Bautista Angelo and Reyes. J. B. L., JJ., concur.

Bengzon, J., concurs in the result.
   
   

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^[1] In the Andaya case the victim was a girl twelve years of age.
^[2] The information in the case at bar alleges that the acts therein set forth were committed "as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion."
^[3] See, also the comentarios el Codigo Penal, by A. Quintano Ripolles (Vol. I, pp. 396-397) and Derecho Penal, by Federico Puig Peña (Vol. I, p. 289).
^[4] In the language of the information.

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DISSENTING
   

PADILLA, J.,

Amado V.  Hernandez  and others  were charged in the Court of  First  Instance of Manila with  the crime  of rebellion with  multiple  murder,  arsons and  robberies. The body of the information  charged that  he and his co-defendants conspired and  that "as a necessary means to commit  the crime of rebellion,  in  connection there with  and in furtherance thereof," "have then  and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting,  plunder, arson, and  planned  destruction of private  and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear  so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid  purpose," and  recited the different crimes  committed by the defendants.  After trial Amado V. Hernandez was found guilty and sentenced to suffer  life  imprisonment from which judgment and  sentence  he appealed.  The  appeal is pending  in this  Court.

Upon  the ground  that there is no complex crime  of rebellion with murder, the penalty provided for to be imposed upon persons found guilty of rebellion being prision mayor and a fine not  to exceed P20,000 only,^[1] the  majority grants the petition for bail filed by  the appellant. Section 1, paragraph 16, Article III, of the Constitution provides:

All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except  those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong.  Excessive bail shall not be required.  (Italics supplied.)

The pertinent sections of Rule 110 provide: 

Sec.  3. Offenses less  than  capital  before conviction by the Court of  First  Instance. After judgment  by a justice of  the peace and before conviction by the Court of First Instance, the defendant shaftl  be admitted to bail as  of  right. 

Sec.  4. Noncapital  offenses  after conviction by the Court  of First Instance. After  conviction  by the Court of First Instance defendant  may,  upon  application,  be bailed  at  the discretion  of the  court. 

Sec. 5. Capital offenses defined,  A capital  offense,  as the term is  used  in this rule,  is an offense which,  under  the  law  existing at the time  of its commission, and at the  time  of  the  application to be admitted to  bail, may be punished by  death. 

Sec. 6. Capital offenses not bailable. No person in  custody for the commission of  a capital offense shall be  admitted to  bail if the evidence  of Jiis guilt is strong. 

Sec. 7. Capital offenses burden  of proof. On the hearing  of an  application for admission to bail made  by  any  person who is  in custody  for the  commission of a  capital offense, the burden of  showing that evidence of guilt is strong is on the  prosecution. Sec. 13. Bail on  appeal. Bail upon  appeal Hnust conform in  all respects  as provided for in other cases of bail.

According to this Rule, a defendant in a criminal case after  a judgment  of conviction by the  Justice  of the Peace Court and before  conviction by the  Court of First Instance is entitled to bail.,  After conviction by the Court of First Instance he, upon application, may still be bailed in non-capital offenses but at the  discretion of the court. When the information charges a  capital offense the  defendant  is not  entitled  to  bail  if  the  evidence  of  his guilt  is strong.  Of course  this means before  conviction. After conviction for a capital offense,  the  defendant has absolutely no right to  bail,  because even  before conviction a  defendant charged with capital offense  is not  entitled to bail if  the evidence of guilt  is strong.  So  that should a defendant charged with a  capital offense apply for bail before conviction, the prosecution must establish and  show that  the evidence of the defendant's guilt  is  strong if  the application for bail be objected to.  After  conviction of a defendant charged with  a capital offense  there is no  stronger  evidence of his guilt than the judgment rendered by the trial court.  The judgment is entitled to full faith and  credit.   Until  after the. evidence  shall  have been reviewed and  the reviewing court shall  have  found  that the  trial court committed error  in convicting the defendant of the crime charged, the judgment and sentence of the trial court in such  criminal case must be taken  at its face value and be  given full faith and credit by this Court.

Without a review of the evidence presented  in the case, the majority has taken up and  discussed the  question whether, under and pursuant to the provisions of article 135  of  the  Revised  Penal  Code,  the  complex crime of rebellion with murder may arise or exist or be committed and  has reached the  conclusion that murder  as an incident  to rebellion is integrated, imbibed, incorporated,  or  absorbed  in, or  part and  parcel of, the last mentioned crime.  For that reason it is of the opinion that, as the information  filed against Amado V. Hernandez does not  charge a  capital offense, he may be admitted to bail  at  the discretion of the Court.

Even, if the majority  opinion  that  the crime  charged in the information is rebellion only a non-capital offense be correct,  still the  granting  of bail  after conviction  is  discretionary, and I  see no plausible  reason  for  the  reversal of this Court's previous stand, because the security  of the State is at stake.

For these reasons  I dissent.

---

DISSENTING

 

MONTEMAYOR, J.,

Unable to agree to the resolution  of  the  majority, am constrained to dissent therefrom,  not so much from  the part thereof granting  the  motion for  bail, as where it holds not  only that there  can be  no  complex crime of rebellion with multiple  murder, robbery,  arson,  etc., but that these crimes when committed during and on the occasion of a rebellion, are absorbed  by the latter.  The new doctrine now being laid down besides being, to my mind,  quite radical and in open  and clear contravention of public policy, is  fundamental and of far-reaching consequences, and I feel  it my duty not  only to voice my dissent but also to state the reasons in support  thereof.

The resolution cites and  quotes Article  135  of  the Revised Penal Code to support its theory that the five acts enumerated therein particularly those of engaging in war against the forces  of the  government,  destroying property and committing serious violence,  cover all the murders, robberies, arsons, etc., committed on the occasion of or  during a rebellion;  and  it proceeds to  assert that the expressions used in  said article, such  as engaging in war against  the  forces of the government and  committing serious violence imply everything  that war connotes such  as physical injuries  and loss of life.  In this connection, it is of profit and even necessary  to refer to Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code defining  and describing how the crime of rebellion is committed. 

"Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection How committed. The crime of rebellion  or insurrection is committed by rising  publicly and taking1  arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws,  the territory of the Pihlippine Islands  or  any  part  thereof,  of any  body of land,  naval  or other  armed  forces,  or of  depriving the  Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers  or  prerogatives."

According  to.the above article, rebellion is  committed by rising publicly  and taking arms  against the government  for the  purpose or  purposes  enumerated  in said article.  In other words, the  commission  of rebellion is complete and consummated if  a group of  persons for the purposes  enumerated in the  article,  rise  publicly,  take up arms and assemble.  It is not necessary for  its consummation  that anybody  be  injured or killed,  be  it  a government soldier  or civilian, or  that  innocent  persons be forcibly  deprived of their properties by  means of robbery or that their stores and houses  be  looted and  then burned to the  ground.  Stated differently,  murders, robberies, arsons,  etc.,  are not necessary or  indispensable in the commission  of  rebellion and,  consequently,  are  not ingredients  or elements of the latter.

Article 48 of the Revised  Penal  Code  providing for "Penalty for complex crimes" reads thus: 

"ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single  act constitutes two  or more  grave or less grave felonies,  or  when an offense is  a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most  serious crime shall be imposed, the same  to be applied in its maximum  period."  (As  amended by Act No.  4000.)

For better understanding, I deem  it advisable to ascertain  and explain the meaning of  the phrase  "necessary means" used  in Article 48.  "Necessary  means" as interpreted  by criminologists, jurists  and  legal commentators, does not  mean indispensable means, because  if  it did,  then the offense as a  "necessary means" to  commit another would be an indispensable  element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof.  That  would  be true in the offense  of trespass to dwelling to commit  robbery in an inhabited house,  or the infliction of physical injuries to commit homicide  or murder.  The phrase "necessary means"  used in Article  48,  merely signifies that for instanse, a crime such  as simple estafa  can  be  and ordinarily  is  committed in  the manner  defined  and described in the  Penal Code;  but, if the "estafador" resorts to or employs  falsification, merely  to facilitate  and insure his committing the estafa, then he is guilty of the complex crime of  estafa thru  falsification.   So, if one desiring to  rape a certain woman, instead  of waiting for an opportunity where she  could  be alone  or helpless, in the  fields  or some  isolated place,  abducts  her  by  force and takes her to a forest  to ravish her;  or  he  enters her  home  through a window at night and rapes her in' her  room, then  he is guilty of the complex crime  of abduction with  rape  or  rape  with  tresspass  to  dwelling. The reason is that the  commission of abduction of tress pass  to dwelling  are not indispensable  means  or  ingredients  of  the crime of rape.  They  are but means selected by the  culprit to facilitate  and carry  out perhaps more  quickly  his evil.  designs on  his victim.   Says the eminent  Spanish  commentator,  Groizard, on this  point:

"Una cosa anologa acontece respecto  de los delitos conexionados con una relacidn de medio a fin.  Tambien en ellos la unklad de acto moral, que da vida  al delito,  hace logica la  imposicion de una  sola  pena* Preciso es, sin embargo,  distinguir el  caso en que el delito medio  sea medio necesario  de realizar el delito fin, del caso en que  sea puramente medio, pero no medio indispensable. En aquel,  el delito  medio  no es,  en  realidad, sino  una condicion precisa, una circumstancia  sine  qua non, un  elemento  integral de la accion  punible. concebida  como fin.  Sin pasar por uno, seria imposible  llegar al  otro.   La voluntad, libre  e  inteligente, tiene entonces por unico objeto  llegar al delito  fin.  Si  al recorrer su camino  ha  de pasar, indispensablemente, por la  comisi6n  de otro hecho  punible, no  dos, sino un delito  habra que  castigar,  toda vez que uno  fue  el mal Kbremente  querido, no siendolo  el otro por si, sino en tanto que era necesario para obtener la realizaciqn del mal proposito concebido."

* * *

"Asi, hay que reconocer que es plausible que,  cuando un delitoes medio  de realizar otro,  se imponga  al culpable la pena  correspondiente al mayor en su grado  maximo;  pero que no los es  si resulta que ha  sido medio necesario.   Por lo contrario, para que sea justo el aumento  de pena,  con  arreglo a la, doctrina general acerca del delito y las  circunstancia agravantes, es preciso que existan y no  se aprovechen otros procedimientos, otros recursos, mas  o menos faciles para consumar el delito.  Entonces la responsibilidad se hace mayor eligiendo un medio que sea un delito en si.  El que puede, haciendo  uso de  su libertad y  de  su  inteligencia, escoger entre varios procedimientos  para llegar a  un  fin,  y se  decide por uno que por  si solo  constituye delito,  de este  delito  no necessario para la realizacidn del  proyectado como fin, debe responder tambien."

* * *

"Ejemplo:  el allanamiento de  domicilio como  medio  de Hegar al delito  de  violacidn. No es condicidn necesaria, para  que la violacidn  pueda realizarse, el entrar en la  morada ajena  contra la voluntad de su dueno.  Sin esa circunstancia, el delito puede existir. Ahora bien; si el criminal acepta como medio de Hegar a la violacidn el allanamiento de domicitfo, este delito y el de violacidn  dejben ser castigados observandose en la aplicacion  del castigo una unidad  de penalidad que guarde cierta  analogia con la unidad de pensamiento que Ilev6 en  culpable a la  realization de amboa delitos. Para ostos y analogos casos, la raz6n aprueba la imposici6n de la mas grave de las penas en su grado maxirao." (Groizard, El Codigo Penal de  1870,  Tomo II, pp.  49&-496.)

Applying the above observations to the crime of rebellion as  definied  in Article  134,  the same may  be  committed by merely  rising  publicly  and  taking arms against the government,  such as was done on several occassions as alleged  in  the information  for rebellion in the present case  where  a group  of  Hukbalahaps,  entered  towns, overpowered the  guards  at  the  Presidencia  confiscated nreams  and the  contents of the  municipal  treasurer's safe, exacted contributions  in the form of money, food stuffs and  clothing from the residents and  maintained virtual  control of the town  for  a  few hours.  That  is simple but consummated rebellion.  Murder, robbery, arson,  etc., are not necessary or indispensable to consummate the crime of rebellion.

But in other cases, this group  or other groups  of dissidents  in  order  to facilitate achieving their objective  to overthrow  the government,  according to the findings  of the trial  courts in  several cases  of rebellion, resorted to looting  and robberies  to raise funds  to finance their movement, sometimes killing civilians who refused to contribute  or  to be recruited to augment the forces  of  the rebels or who were suspected  of  giving  information  to the government  forces of  the movements of  the  dissidents.   Sometimes, homes of town and  barrio  residents are set on  fire  and burned  to the ground in  reprisal  or in order to strike  terror into the hearts of the  inhabitants,  so that they would be more  amenable to the rule and the demands of the rebels.  At other times, civilians were  kidnapped for purposes of ransom, and some hostages killed when the ransom was  not paid  or was not forthcoming.  In the raid on Camp Macabulos in Tarlac, besides shooting down  soldiers and  officers,  buildings were  set on fire, including  the hospital, as  a  result of which, patients including a Red Cross  nurse  were killed. In another case, a  passenger bus containing  about forty civilian passengers  in Sta.  Cruz, Zambales, was held up by  these armed dissidents;  the passengers were robbed of their money and jewelry and fourteen of them were shot to death.  The party of Mrs. Aurora  Quezon  while on its  way  to the town of Baler, was ambushed in Bongabong,  Nueva Ecija  by  the dissidents  and  several members of  the party,  including herself, her  daughter, her son-in-law,  Mayor  Bernardo of  Quezon City,  and others were killed,  and their persons despoiled  of jewelries and belongings.  It  is  clear that all these  acts of murder, vandalism,  banditry and pillage  cannot be regarded as ingredients1 and indispensable elements of the crime  of rebellion.   The aforecited acts  and cases, the enumeration of which is far from complete, are not based on mere suspicion or hearsay.  They are  alleged as facts in the  numerous counts contained in complaints or informations for rebellion with multiple  murder,  robbery, arson, kidnapping, etc.  in several  separate  cases in the Courts of  First  Instance, some still pending  trial but quite a number already  decided and now pending appeal before us.   There must  be much truth to these  charges and  counts  because in  the  case  against  Huk  Supremo Luis Taruc, William  Pomeroy et al.,  (criminal case No. 19166  C.F.I., Manila)  Pomeroy  pleaded guilty to all the thirty  counts against him; so  did Taruc   after seven counts had been eliminated from the thirty  contained in the information.   Among the  twenty three counts remaining to which Taruc pleaded guilty were  the  holding up  of forty civilians  in a passenger bus in Sta. Cruz,  Zambales,  and the night raid on Camp Macabulos where hospital  patients and a Red Cross nurse were killed.

Since  the  above mentioned crimes  of multiple  murder, robbery, kidnapping, etc., are not ingredients of rebellion nor  indispensable to  its commission  but  only means  selected and employed by  the offenders to commit  rebellion  and  achieve their  goal, a complex crime is committed under Article  48 of the Revised Penal Code.

Going back  to the  theory of the majority  in the  resolution that the phrase engaging in  war  and committing serious violence used  in Article 134, covers the crimes of murder, robbery, arson, etc., committed  during a  rebellion,  I  emphatically disagree.  Engaging  in war  and levying war, against the government, are general  terms employed in the United States statutes to  define  rebellion and  treason.  They are used interchangeably  and  have the same  meaning  in our  law on rebellion  and  treason, (Articles 114, 134, 135, Revised Penal Code) which are  based on Act 292 of  American origin.  They do  not  necessarily  mean  actual  killing of government  troops, much less  of innocent civilians. 

"Levying  War. The  assembling  of  a  body  of  men for  the purpose of  effecting  by force a treasonable object; and all who perform any part, however, minute,  or however remote  from the scene of  action, and who are  leagued  in  the general conspiracy, are considered as engaged in levying war, within the meaning of the constitution."   (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. 2,  p. 1938.)

This Tribunal  defines "levying war"  in  the  case of U. S. vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil., 478-9, thus:

"Whatever  differences  there  may  have  been  among  the early judges as to whether an armed resistance to the  enforcement of a public law (see Act No. 292, section  5, 1)  constituted  a levying of war or  not,  and  was or was not treason,  yet  they were all  unanimous  in  holding that acts  of violence  committed  by an  armed body of men with the purpose of overthrowing the Governmerit was "levying war  against the United States,"  and was therefore treason, whether it was done by ten men or ten thousand. (See United States vs. Han way, 2 Wall., jr., 139; 26 Fed. Cases, 105.)

* * *

"As the act  of, engaging in a rebellion  is levying  war, and therefore  treason, the same act seems to be punished by  both sections and  in  different  ways."  (U. S. vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil., 46-9)

Just as  a citizen can commit treason by adhering to the enemy and  committing  treasonable  overt acts such as pointing out and helping arrest guerrillas,  accompanying enemy soldiers on patrol and giving valuable information to  the enemy,  without himself killing anyone of his countrymen, this although Article 114 uses the phrase levying war to define treason,  so,  although  Article 135 iises  the  phrase  "engaging  in  war",  a group  of individuals may also commit rebellion by merely rising publicly and taking arms against the government  without firing a single shot or inflicting a single wound.

But the majority says that serious violence mentioned in  Article  134 may include murder.   To me, this view is untenable.  From  serious violence to the capital  offense of  murder,  certainly, is  a  far cry.  Besides,  serious violence can  also be on things.  In my opinion, the different  acts mentioned in  Article  135,   among them, destroying property, committing serious violence,  exacting contributions or diverting public funds, instead of giving license and unlimited leave to rebels and dissidents to engage in mass murder, looting and wholesale destruction of property, on the contrary, serve to limit and restrict the violations  of law that may be included  in  and absorbed by rebellion.   Article 135 mentions those acts which generally accompany a public armed uprising.   When rebels raid a town or barrio,  manhandling of civilians  who obstruct their movements or fail  to carry out their orders such as to lend their carabaos and carts for transportation purposes, or to contribute food, clothes, medicines, money etc., may be expected.  The  rebels may employ force to disarm the policeman guarding the Presidencia  and if he offers resistance beat him up or, once inside, break down the door  of  the treasurer's office, blow  up his safe and carry away  the money contents thereof.  All  these acts involve  violence,  even serious violence  on persons and things, including diversion of public funds.  But knowing that these law violations, relatively not serious,  are generally unavoidable  in public  armed  uprisings  involving hastily assembled  persons and groups  with little  discipline' the law tolerates  them, considering them as part of  the rebellion.  But when rebels rob innocent civilians, kidnap them for purposes  of ransom,  even kill them merely because they fail  to  pay the  ransom, and civilian houses are put to the torch, endangering the lives of the inmates; when civilians  are killed for refusing to  contribute, or on mere suspicion of their giving information to the  government, I cannot believe that these brutal  act are condoned by the law and are to be included in the crime of rebellion.

The majority leans heavily  on our decisions in several treason  cases wherein we refused  or failed to  convict of the complex  crime of treason with multiple murder.  To me, those cases are neither controlling nor applicable  for several reasons.   Almost invariably,  indictment in  those treason  cases alleged the killings committed  by  the  indictees as ingredients and elements of treason.   They  are mentioned as the overt acts to  establish and prove treason. Naturally, the court held that being ingredients of  the crime of  treason  they cannot be  considered  as  distinct and separate offenses for the purpose of applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.  Another reason is that, treason being a capital offense, this court did not see any immediate necessity for  considering  and  applying  the theory of complex  crime because the result would in many cases be  practically  the same. In other words,  treason might yet be said to absjorb the crime of homicide, even of murder, because as  regards the penalty, they are of the same category.  Still another reason, not an unimportant one is that at that time, opinion among the members of this Tribunal on the question of complex crime of treason with  homicide,  sedition with  murder and  rebellion with murder,  arson,  robbery, etc., had not yet crystalized, one way or the other.   So, we preferred to avoid ruling on the issue,  specially since  by considering the  commission of murder, robbery, etc.,  in treason as aggravating the crime, we  would achieve the same result  as regards the penalty to  be imposed.

But in the case of People vs. Perfecto Labra, G. R. No. 1240, May 12, 1949, this court  through Mr.  Justice Bengzon, accepted the view of the Solicitor General that under Article 48  of the Revised Penal Code, Labra was guilty of the complex crime of treason with murder, as shown by the dispositive part of our decision in that case, which is quoted below: 

"Wherefore, the verdict of  guilt  must be  affirmed. Article 48, 114 and 248 of the Revised  Penal Code are applicable to  the offense of treason with murder.  However,  for lack  of sufficient votes to impose the  extreme penalty,  the  appellant  will  be  sentenced to life imprisonment."

The only reason why  the  death penalty was not imposed in said case was because  of lack of sufficient votes but evidently, the Justices were agreed as  to  the  application of Article 48 of the Penal Code regarding complex crimes.

Then in the treason case of People  vs.  Barrameda, 85 Phil., 789,  47 Off. Gaz., 5082, on the  strength of our decision in the case of Labra, the Solicitor General recommended that tearrameda be also convicted  of the complex crime  of treason with multiple murder and sentenced to death.  This  Tribunal  accepted the  Solicitor  General's recommendation and  imposed  the  death penalty in the following language: 

"We  entertain not  the least doubt as to  the guilt of the appellant.  His very counsel de  oficio who made an  analysis of the testimonies of the witnesses for the  prosecution and painstakingly stated them  in  detail  in his brief, agrees that his client is  guilty although he prays  that the sentence of life imprisonment  be  affirmed.  The Solicitor General, however, recommends that the penalty of death be imposed upon  the  appellant.  Considering  that the treason committed by  the appellant was accompanied not only by /the apprehension of Americans (U. S. citizens) and  their  delivery to the Japanese forces which evidently later executed them, h/ut also by killing with his own hands not only one but  several y'Filipinos, his own  countrymen, and that in addition to this, he took  part  in  the  mass  killing  and  slaughter  of many  other Filipinos, we are constrained to  agree to said recommendation. However, unpleasant,  even  painful is the compliance  with our duty,  we hereby impose upon  the appellant  Teodoro  Barrameda the penalty of  death which will  be carried out  on  a day to be fixed by the trial court within thirty (30) days after the  return of the record  of the case to said  court."

With the two  aforecited cases, it may not be said that the Supreme Court has always held that there can be  no complex  crime of treason  with murder.

The theory of the majority is that the crime of rebellion with the  maximum penalty   of  twelve  years  and fine, absorbs the other crimes of murder,  robbery, arson, kidnapping, etc.,  as long as the  latter are committed in the course  and  in furtherance  of the  former.  The  idea  of one  crime absorbing a  more serious one with  a  more severe  penalty does not  readily appeal to the reasonable and  logical mind  which  can only  comprehend   a  thing absorbing another smaller  or less than itself in  volume, in importance, in value or in category.  That is why Judge Montesa in the three cases, People vs. Hernandez, People vs. Espiritu, and  People vs. Medina, criminal cases Nos. 15481,  15479 and 1411 respectively, of the Court of First Instance,  Manila, in his decision  convicting the  accused therein, in disposing of the theory  of absorption,  urged upon him  by counsel for the defense to the effect that the crime of rebellion  absorbs the crime  of murder,  robbery, arson,  etc.,  made the  following observations: 

"The theory of absorption tenaciously adhered to by the defense to the effect that rebellion absorbs all these moire serious offenses is preposterous to  say the least, considering that it is both physically and metaphysically imposible for a smaller unit or entity to absorb a bigger one."   (Montesa, J., People vs. Hernandez G. R. No. 15481, p. 78.)

We need  not go into an  academic  discussion  of  this , question because as a matter of law,  my opinion, criminal jurisprudence, expounding the criminal law namely the Penal Code  and the Penal  Code  of Spain, on which it  is based, expressly and clearly declare that the common crimes of murder, robbery,  arson, etc.,  committed in the course or by reason  of rebellion, are  separate crimes,  not to be merged in or absorbed by rebellion and should be prosecuted separately.  Article 259 of the Penal  Code  of  Spain,  of 1870  on which our Penal Code promulgated in 1887,  was based, provides as follow: 

"Los delitos  particulares cometidos  en una rebellion o  sedicion 6 con  motivo  de ellas, serin castigados  respectivamente, segun fefek disposiciones de este Codigo.

"Cuando no puedan descubrirse sus  autores, ser&a penados  como tales Ios  jefes principales  de  la rebelion 6  sedicion."  (Groizaixl, El Codigo Penal de 1870,  Tomo III,  Articulo 259, p.  649.)

In commenting on Article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code, Viada says:

" 'La disposicion del primer parrafo  de este articulo no puede ser mas justa;  con  arreglo  a ella, Ios  delitos particulares  o comunes cometidos en una rebellion o sedicion no  deberan  reputarse como accidentes inherentes a estas, sino como delitos  especiales  a dicha rebellion y  sedicion  ajenos, Ios que  deberan ser  respectivamente castigados con las penas que en este  Codigo se. les senalan.  Pero que delitos deber&n considerarse como comunes, y cualles como constitutivos de la propia rebelion o  sedicion?  En cuanto a  la rebeli6n, no ofrece este cuestion dificultad alguna, pues todo hecho que no este comprendido en uno u otro de  Ios objetos especificados en Ios seis ntimeros del Articulo 243  sera  extraiio  a la rebelion,  y si  se. hallere definido  en algun otro  articulo  del  Codigo, con arreglo  a este debera  ser castigado como delito particular' "   (Viada, Codigo Penal, Tomo II, 198-199.)

Pena, another commentator, referring to Article 259 of the Spanish  Penal Code,  has the following to say:

"La  disposicion de este articulo es sobradamente justa, pero cuando se entendera  que el  hecho es  independiente de la insurgencia? 

Tratandose de la rebelion no hay problema, pues todos los fines que se indican en el Articulo 214 se distinguen facilmente de uri asesinato, un  robo,  una  violacidn,  etc.  El  problema  puede  surgir  con  la sedicion, en cuyos tres ultimos numeros, dice un autor,  se tipifican conductas que  muy bien pueden  ser subsimidas en  otros  lugares del Codigo.   El T.S. parece que  sigue  este principio general:  las infracciones graves  se considerdn como delitos independientes, en cambio  los hechos de menor gravedad puedan ser considerados como accidentes de  la  rebelion.  En este sentido, el T. S. ha declarado que  son accidentes  de la rebelion,  los  desacatos y  lesiones a  la autoridad y otros delitos contra el orden publieo, asi  como la  resistencia o acometiendo a la fuerza publica (23 Mayo 1890). El  abuso de  superioridad  tambien  es  inherente  el  alzamiento  tumultuario (19 noviembre 1906.)"  (Peixa Deredes  Penal, Tomo  II pp. 89-90.)

Another  commentator, A.  Quintano  Ripolles, says  of Article 259 of the Spanish  Penal  Code,  counterpart of Article 244 of  our old  Penal Code: 

"La concurrencia de delitos consignada en este articulo no puede ser mds justa, bien que la dificultad persista siempre para determinar  cuales han de  ser los  particulares accidentales y cuales los integrantes de la propia subversion.   Una  doctrina demasiado simplista,  que ha sido a  menudo seguida por  la Jurisprudencia,  es  la de estimar que, absorbiendo el delUo  mds grave al que lo es menos, todo el  que por debajo del'de rebelion o sedicion sera anulado por este.  Para  los de la  misma  naturaleza, la cosa es  iricuestionable, pero no para los que la tengan diversa,  entendiendo por la estrana e imprecisa expresion de (particulares)  a las infracciones comunes o no politicas.",  (A. Quintano Ripolles, Comentarios al Codigo  Penal Vol. II, pp.  101-102;  cursivas con nuestras.)

Another  distinguished legal commentator gives his  view on the same Article 259: 

"Se establece  aqui que en una  rebelion o sedicion, o  con motivo de ellas, comente otros delitos  (v. g., roba, mata o  lesioha), seca responsable de estos ademas de los delitos de rebelion o sedicion.  La dificultad consiste en  estos casos  en separar los accidentes  de  la rebelion o sedicion de los delitos  independientes de  estas,  y como las leyes  no  contienen en  este punto precepto  alguno aplicable,  su solucion ha quedado encomendada a los tribunales.   La jurisprudencia  que  estos han sentado  considera  como accidentes  de  la rebelion o sedicion cuya criminalidad  queda  embebida en  la  de estos delitos, y, por tanto,  no son  punibles especialmente los hechos de escasa gravedad  (v:g.,  atentados,  desacatos, lesiones  menos graves); por el contrario, las infracciones graves, como el asesinato o las lesiones graves,  se consideran como delitos  independientes de la rebelion o de la sedicion."  (Cuello Calon, Vol. 2 Derecho Penal p. 110.)

Finally, Groizard, another  eminent commentator of the Penal  code of Spain, in commenting on  the  same Article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870,  says the following: 

"No necesita ninguno el parrafo primero de  este articulo.  Aunque no se hubiera escrito en el Codigo, harian los  Tribunates lo que dice. Seria necesario para que asi no sucediera el que fuera la rebelion un motivo de exencion de responsabilidad criminal para las demas clases de delitos."   (Groizard  Tomo  3, 650.)

It will be seen that Spanish jurists and legal commentators are, with reference  to  Article  259 of the  Spanish Penal  Code of 1870, unanimous in the opinion that this provision of the  Criminal Law is just  and fair because one should  not take advantage of his committing the crime of rebellion by committing other more  serious crime such as murder, robbery, arson, etc., with impunity.  The above much  commented Article  259 of the Spanish Penal Code has its counterpart in Article 244 of  our  old Penal Code in practically the  same wording and  phraseology: 

"Art. 24. AM other crimes committed in the  course of a rebellion of seditious  movement, or on  occasion  thereof, shall be punished in accordance with the rules of this Code. 

"If  the perpetrators of such crimes can  not be discovered, the principal leaders of the rebellion  or  sedition shall be punished therefore as principals."

In  this jurisdiction,  we have faithfully observed and applied this penal  provision.  In  the  cases  of U.  S. vs. Cabrera, et al., 43  Phil., page 64 and page 82 for sedition and multiple murder respectively, wherein members of the Philippine  constabulary  attacked and killed several  policemen  in  the City  of  Manila,  this  Court convicted  said soldiers,  first, of sedition and later, of  multiple  murder, clear proof that the murders committed in the course of and by reason of  the sedition  were not included in and absorbed by sedition, this despite the fact that  our law on sedition then, section 5 of Act No. 292,, uses the Words rise publicly and tumultuously, in order to attain by force or outside  of legal methods any of the  following  objects are  guilty  of sedition.   In  the  multiple  murder case, the sergeants and corporals of the constabulary, who took part in the killing of  the  city  policemen,  were sentenced to death.  This court in that  case  said: 

"It is merely stating the obvious to say that sedition is not the same offense as murder.  Sedition is  a crime against public order; murder  is a  crime against persons.   Sedition  is a  crime  directed against the existence  of the State, the authority of the government, and the general public tranquility; murder is a crime directed against the  lives  of  individuals.   (U. S. vs. Abad (1902)  1  Phil.  437.) Sedition in its more general sense  is the raising of  commotions or disturbances in the  state; murder at  common law is where  a person  of  sound mind and discretion unlawfully kills any human being, in  the  peace  of  the  sovereign, with  malice  aforethought, express  or implied. 

"The offenses charged in the two  informations for  sedition  and murder are perfectly  distinct  in point of law, however, nearly they may  be connected  in point of  fact.  Not  alone are  the  offenses "eo  nomine" different, but  the  allegations in the body of the informations are different.  The gist of the  information for  sedition is the public and tumultuous  uprising of the constabulary in  order to attain by force and outside of  legal methods the object of inflicting an act of  hate and revenge upon the  persons of the police  force of the city of Manila by firing at them in several places in the city of Manila; the gist  of  the  information  in the murder case  is  that the constabulary, conspiring together, illegally and criminally killed eight persons  and  gravely wounded  three  others.  The  crimes  of murder and  serious physical injuries  were not  necessarily  included in the information  for sedition;  and the defendants could not have been convicted of these crimes under  the first information."  (Phil. Vol.  43, pages 99-100.)

There is an insinuation  made in the majority resolution, that the  American  Law  on  sedition  and rebellion,  the origin of our present  law on the subject,  is more  benign and  liberal than its counterpart in the  Spanish Penal Code, defining  and  penalizing sedition and rebellion,  and  that under  American jurisprudence,  rebellion and sedition  include crimes like murder, robbery,  arson,  etc.,  committed in the course thereof.  But it will be noticed that of the nine Justices who signed the decision in the case of People vs. Cabrera for multiple murder, five, including Mr. Justice Malcolm, who penned the decision, were Americans, supposed to be steeped in American Law and the common law, and yet they all held that sedition where force is expected to be  used, did  not include murder.  It is  evident that the insinuation made  in the majority resolution is not exactly borne out by the Cabrera case.

The majority  asks why in the past,  especially up  to 1932,  when our  Revised  Penal Code  was  promulgated no one had  ever been  prosecuted, much  less convicted  of rebellion or sedition complexed with  murder,  robbery, etc., if it is true that there is  such a complex crime of rebellion with murder.  For that matter, one may even ask why the constabulary  soldiers in the Cabrera case  were not charged with the complex crime of sedition with murder. The  reason and the answer are obvious.   Until  1932, the year of the promulgation of our Revised Penal  Code, our old Penal Code included Article  244, the counterpart  of Article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code, to the effect that common crimes  like murder, robbery,  arson, committed on the occasion or by reason of a rebellion or sedition, are to be  prosecuted separately.  That  was  why insurgents who committed rebellion or insurrection with homicide  or murder during the first  days of the American regime  in the Philippines,  could not  be charged with the complex crime  of rebellion with  murder; and that explains why Cabrera and his co-accused could  not be  charged with the complex crime of sedition with  multiple murder, but were prosecuted separately for multiple  murder.

The majority also  asks why the insurgents in the year 1901 and 1902 were charged only with rebellion  but never with murder despite the fact that there was proof that they also had committed  murder in the course of the rebellion or insurrection.  The reason to my mind was that, shortly thereafter,  came  the  proclamation  of  amnesty issued by President McKinley of the United States, which amnesty covered not  only the crime of rebellion but also other violations of the law committed in the course of the rebellion.

Then came our Revised Penal Code promulgated in 1932. It is a revision  of our old  Penal Code of 1887.  One of the purposes of the revision was simplification, and elimination of unnecessary  provisions.  In  proof of this,  while our Penal Code of 1887 contained 611 articles, our Revised Penal Code contains only 367 articles.   Among the articles of the old Penal Code not included in  the Revised Penal Code, is Article 244.  Does the omission  or  elimination of  Article  244  mean  that now,  common  crimes  like murder, robbery, arson,  etc., committed in the  course of a rebellion or sedition are absorbed by rebellion or sedition? Hardly.  It cannot be that the committee on revision and our legislators abandoned the idea and the theory contained in said Article 244, because as I have  already explained, all the  Spanish commentators and  jurists  commenting on this  particular provision of the Spanish Penal  Code .are agreed that it  is a just and reasonable provision,  so that sedition and rebellion  may  not  be utilized as a cloak of immunity in the commission of other serious crimes.  To me,  the reason  for  the omission  is that it  was really unnecessary.  As Groizard said in his commentary already reproduced, even if that provision  were not embodied in the penal code, the court would still apply said provision: 

"No necesita ninguno el parrafo primero de este articulo.  Aunque no se kubiera escrito en el  Codigo, harian los Tribunates lo  que dice.' Seria necesario para que  asi no  sucediera el que fuera la rebelion  un motivo de exencion de responsabilidad criminal para las demas clases de delitos."  (Groizard Tomo 3, p. 650.)

The members  of the committee on revision of our old Penal Code  who must have been familiar with the opinion and comments of eminent Spanish jurists, particularly the above comment of Groizard undoubtedly, deemed the provision  of  Article 244 superfluous  and  unnecessary,  and so omitted it in the  revision.  However, this omission  of Article 244 of our Penal Code in the new, has an important effect.   No longer shall we be obliged to prosecute murder, robbery, arson, kidnapping, etc.,  committed in the course of and by reason of a sedition or a  rebellion, separately. The prosecution is now  free to combine these common crimes with the crimes of sedition or rebellion  and charge a complex crime.  And that is  what has been dsone in the prosecution  of the  numerous cases of rebellion.

This  idea, this  theory of complex crime of  rebellion with mutiple murder, etc., is not such a strange, extravagant or fantastic proposition or  idea.   We are not the only ones  holding this view.  Out of seven separate cases, all involving the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and etc., decided in the  Court of First  Instance, not  long  ago,  cases No. 14070 People  vs.  Lava; No. 15841 People vs. Hernandez; No. 2878 People vs. Capadocia;  No. 10400 People vs. Salvador No. 2704 People vs.  Nava; No. 19166 People vs. Pomeroy and the same case 19166 People vs. Taruc,  only one judge, Hon.  Gregorio Narvasa, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, held that there is no  complex  crime of rebellion  with murder, and his holding was based mainly if not entirely on the decisions of this Tribunal in the treason cases which as I have already explained, are  not controlling or applicable.  In  the other cases, five  judges of Courts of First Instance,  Judges Ocampo, Castelo, Barcelona,  Gatmaitan, and Montesa, held that there is  such a complex crime of rebellion with murder and actually convicted the accused of said complex crime.   Again, in  the case of People vs. Umali, et al., criminal case No.  11037 of the Court of  First Instance of Quezon Province,  Judge Gustavo  Victoriano, convicted  the accused  of the complex crime  of rebellion with multiple murder, etc.  Recently, in  several criminal cases pending in Pangasinan, involving the complex crimes of rebellion with multiple murder,  etc.,  Judge Morfe of the Court of First  Instance of that province  acting  upon motions to quash the informations on the ground that there was no such complex crime of rebellion with murder and consequently, the  informations were  not in  accordance with law,  for  charging  more  than one offense, in a well reasoned and considered order,  denied  the same and held that there is a  complex crime  of rebellion with murder. Of course, these opinions of judges of the  lower courts are not binding on this tribunal but surely,  they are persuasive and can not be ignored.  At  least,  they  show  that there are others, learned in the law, who subscribe to the theory of complex crime  of rebellion  with  murder, arson,  etc.

Our decision in  the case of  People vs. Umali,  (96 Phil., 185),  promulgated  on  November 29,  1954,  is another proof that murders committed in the course of sedition or rebellion  are not  absorbed by  the  latter.  In said case, this court in a  unanimous decision  found the defendants therein guilty of  sedition, multiple murder,  arson,  frustrated murder  and physical injuries and sentenced  them accordingly.  The question may again be asked, if there is such a complex crime  of  sedition with  murder,  arson, etc.,  why  were Umali  and his  co-accused not  convicted of this complex  crime?  The answer is found in a portion of our decision  in that  case which we quote: 

"The last point  to be determined is the nature of the offense or offenses committed.  Appellants were charged with and convicted of the complex crime of  rebellion with multiple  murder, frustrated murder, arson and  robbery.  Is there such  a  complex crime  of rebellion with multiple murder, etc? While the Solicitor General in his brief claims that appellants  are guilty of  said complex crime and  in  support of  his stand 'asks  for leave  to  incorporate by reference his previous  arguments  in opposing Umali's petition for bail, counsel for appellants  considered it unnecessary to discuss the existence or non-existence of such complex crime, saying that the nature of the crime committed is of no moment to herein appellants because they  had absolutely no part in it  whatsoever'.  For the present, and with respect to this particular case, we deem it unnecessary to decide this  important and controversial question, deferring its consideration and determination to another case or occasion more opportune, when  it is more directly and  squarely raised and both parties given an opportunity to discuss and argue the question more adequately  and exhaustively. Considering that, assuming  for the moment that there is no such complex crime of rebellion with murder, etc., and that  consequently appellants  could not have  been legally charged with it, much less convicted  of said complex crime, and the information should therefore, be regarded  as  having  charged more than one  offense, contrary to Rule 106, section 12 and Rule 113, section  2(e)t of the Rules of  Court, but that appellants  having interposed no objection thereto, they were properly tried for and lawfully convicted  if  guilty of  the  several and separate  crimes charged therein, we have decided and  we rule  that the  appellants may properly  be  convicted of  said several  and separate crimes, as hereinafter specified.  We feel particularly supported and justified in this stand that we take, by the result of the case, namely, that the prison sentence we impose does  not exceed, except perhaps in actual duration, that meted out  by the court below, which is life imprisonment."

The majority resolution invokes and applies the principle of the  so  called pro reo in  connection with  Article 48 of our Revised  Penal Code on  complex crimes,  to the effect that said article should  not  be applied when the resulting penalty exceeds  the sum total of  the several crimes committed  constituting the  complex crime.  According to the majority,  the theory  of pro reo  is that  the principle of complex crime was adopted for the benefit of the accused and not to his prejudice; so, it  is to be applied when the maximum of the  penalty for the more serious crime is less in  severity or duration of imprisonment than the sum total of the several crimes committed, but not  otherwise. This is a novel theory in this jurisdiction.  To my knowledge it  has never been advanced before.  All  along and during  all these  years, the  courts  of this  country not excluding this august tribunal had been applying the provisions of Article  48 of  the  Revised  Penal Code, and its source,  Article 89 of  our Penal Code of  1887,  regardless of whether or not the  resulting  penalty was prejudicial to the accused.   As a matter of  fact,  in  most cases the resulting penalty imposed by this tribunal in complex crimes was much more  severe and of longer duration (imprisonment)  than the sum total of the two or more crimes committed.  In the numerous cases decided by this court involving the complex crime of estafa through falsification, the maximum of the penalty for the  more serious  crime of falsification was imposed although it exceeded the total of the penalties for estafa and for falsification.  In cases of rape with physical injuries the maximum of the penalty  for the crime of rape was imposed although it exceeded  in duration and  severity the total of the  penalty for rape  and  that  for the relatively light penalty for physical injuries.  In the case of People vs. Parulan (88 Phil., 615),  involving the complex crime of kidnapping with murder,  this  tribunal applied the provision of Article 48  of  the  Revised Penal Code and would have sentenced the accused  to death,  were it not for one dissenting vote based not on  the applicability of Article 48, but on the question of jurisdiction.   Said this  court: 

"La pena que debe imponerse al acusado Parulan es la del delito mas grave de secuestro  en su grado maximo, o sea, pena capital. Pero  el Magistrado Sr. Tuason, consecuente con  su opinion disidente en Parulan contra Rodas, supra, no puede confirmar la pena capital impuesta por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila que segun el  no tenia jurisdiccion sobre la presente causa. En vista de  este voto disidente, el presidente del tribunal Sr. Paras y tres magistrados aunque  creen que el acusado Parulan, por las pruebas presentadas, merece  pena capital, con todo no pueden votar  por la confirmacion porque  el delito se  cometio antes de la aprobacion de la Ley de  la ' Republica No. 296,  que so1o exige ocho votos para la imposicion  de la  pena capital. Automaticamente,  por  ministerio  de la ley  debe imponerse a Parulan la pena inmediatamente  inferior a la de muerte, : que es  la de reclusion perpetua con las accesorias."   (88 Phil., p. 624.)

Then in the case of People vs. Guillen* 47 Off.  Gaz., 3433, involving the complex crime of murder  and multiple attempted murder committed by the accused with a  single  act of hurling a hand grenade at President  Roxas, this tribunal in a per curiam decision, ignoring the aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the crime,  applied the maximum of the penalty for  the more serious  crime of murder in accordance  with  Article  48  of the Revised Penal  Code  and  sentenced the  accused to death. Other instances and cases may be cited ad  libitum to show that in this jurisdiction and in this tribunal, the  principle of pro reo was never  entertained,  much less accepted.

Origin of  pro reo principle

Up  to the  year 1908, the Spanish Penal Code had the following  provisions for  complex crimes:

"Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no  son aplicables  en el caso de que  un solo hecho constituya  dos o mas deflitos, o cuando el uno  de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el  otro.

"En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al  delito mas grave,  aplicandola en su grado maximo."

The above  provisions were copied in  our Penal Code of 1887  under Article  89 which reads thus:

"The provisions of the next preceding article are not  applicable to  cases in  which a single act constitutes two or more  crimes, or when one offense is a necessary means for committing the  other. 

"In  these  cases, only the penalty  of the more serious crime shall be imposed,  the same to be applied in its maximum degree."

On January 3, 1908,  the Spanish  Penal Code  was amended, particularly paragraph 2 of  Article 90 thereof so as to  add  to said paragraph  the  following clause: 

"Hasta el  limite que represente la suma de las dos que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente ambbs delitos."

so that since  January 1908, Article 90 of the Spanish Penal Code reads: 

"Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no  son aplicables  en el caso de que  un solo hecho constituya dos o mas  delitos, o cuando el  uno de ellos sea medio  necesario  para cometer el otro. 

"En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al  delito mas grave,  aplicandola  en su grado maximo hasta el  limite que represente la suma  de  las dos que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente  ambos delitos."

The amendment is the provision for  the so  called pro reo rule.   But  we never accepted much  less followed said innovation in the Philippines.  We did not amend Article 89 of our old Penal  Code particularly  paragraph  2 thereof so as to add the clause: 

"Hasta el limite que represente la suma de las dos que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente ambos delitos."

inserted by the amending Spanish Law of January 3, 1908 to the second paragraph of Article 90 of the Spanish Pent] Code.  Furthermore, when we drafted and promulgated our Revised Penal Code in 1932 (Article No. 3815) we ignored and did not accept the amendment  to the  Spanish Penal Code that favored one accused  of  a complex crime as regards the penalty, so that now our law on the subject is contained in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which as amended by Act No.  4000, reads as  follows: 

"Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When  a single act constitutes two or more grave or  less felonies,  or when an  offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied  in its maximum  period.  (As amended  by Act  No. 4000.)

The majority resolution makes a more  or less extensive dissertation and citation  of authorities on the law  of extradition, intended to show that common crimes such as murder, etc., committed on the occasion of or in  the course of the commission of political  crimes like sedition  and rebellion,  are not  subject to extradition.   We believe that these citations and these arguments  are  neither relevant nor applicable.   All we can say is that a murder  committed in the course of a rebellion or sedition may be  considered a  political crime in contemplation of the extradition law and that a person accused of said murder  is not subject to extradition.  But a crime may be considered political from the  standpoint of the extradition law and yet may be regarded by the country where committed as  a common crime separate and distinct from the rebellion or sedition in the course of which it was committed, and, consequently, subject to  prosecution. Moreover, the fact that a murder committed in the course  of a sedition or rebellion  is excluded from the scope of the extradition agreement between nations, is proof  and argument that were  it not for its exclusion, the member nations of the extradition agreement, where murders are committed in the course of a rebellion or sedition may and  would extradite the offenders, on the theory  that said murders  are separate from and are not absorbed by the rebellion or sedition;  otherwise, there would be no need for excluding  such crimes of murder,  arson, etc., committed during a  rebellion  or  sedition, from the scope of the extradition  law.  And among such  nations which consider these common crimes of murder,  etc, as separate from rebellion or  sedition during which they were committed,  are Spain, as shown by  Article  259 of  its Penal Code, and the  Philippines as illustrated in the cases of U.S. vs.  Cabrera and People vs. Umali, supra.  Groizard lists down  several countries that consider common crimes committed  during a rebellion  or sedition  as  subject to prosecution: 

"Codigo  del  Canton de Zurich.    

S.  75.   Si con motivo  de la sedicio'n o como consecuencia fueren cometidos  otros delitos, £stos seran castigados conforme a las disposiciones penales para los mismos fijadas. "Codigo de Peru.   

Art. 145. Los reos de rebelion, sedicion  motin 6 asonada son  responsables de los  delitos especiales  que cometen, observandose lo dispuesto  en el Articulo 45.   

Art. 146. Si  no pudiese averiguarse quien de los sublevados  cometio el delito especial, se hara responsable  a los autores  del tumulto.

"Codigo  de Chile.

Art. 131. Los delitos  particulares  cometidos en un sublevacion 6 con motivo  de ella, seran castigados respectivamente con las  penas  designadas  para ellos, no obstante le dispuesto en el articulo  129. Si  no  pueden descubrirse los autores,  seran  considerados y penados como  complices  de tales delitos los jefes  principales 6 subalternos de Qos sublevados que hallandose en la posibilidad de impedirlos no lo hubieren hecho. 

"Codigo del Paraguay. 

Art. 380. Los delitos particulares cometidos en  la  sedicion 6 con motivo de ella, serin castigados con la pena que les  corresponda por  las l«yes respectivas.

"Codigo de la Republica Argentina. 

Art. 231. Los que cometen delitos connmes con motdvo de la rebelion motin 6 asonada 6 con ocasion de  ella, seran ,  castigados con la pena que correeponde a esos delitos. 

"Codigo de Honduras. 

Art. 224.  (Como el nuestro.) 

(Grolzard, El Codigo Penal de 1870, Vol. 3, Artfculo 259, p. 650.)

In justice to the defendants-appellants  in the present case, I wish to explain and make clear that in mentioning and describing  the serious  crimes  of murder,  robbery, arson, kidnapping, etc., alleged to have  been committed in the course of the rebellion or  by reason thereof,  I  am not referring particularly to the charge or charges and counts alleged against them. Their case is now pending appeal in this tribunal and their guilt or innocence of said charges or counts  will be decided in due  time.  And  so, I am not  imputing or attributing  to  them the serious violations of law I have mentioned in this opinion.   Rather, I am making general reference to the  informations filed in other cases, especially in the informations against Luis Taruc and William Pomeroy which case  is not only decided but also  is closed.

In conclusion,  I hold  that under  the  law and under general  principles  rebellion  punished  with  a maximum penalty  of twelve  (12)  years  and  fine cannot possibly absorb a much more serious crimes like  murder or kidnapping which are capital offenses  and carry the maximum penalty of death.   It is hard for the mind to grasp the idea that a person committing one lone murder  may be headed for the electric chair; but if perpetrates several  murders, kidnappings, arsons, and robberies and during their perpetration, was still committing another  crime, that of trying to overthrow his own government by force, then all he gets is twelve years and fine.  Since, the  serious crimes  like multiple  murder,  robbery,  arson,  kidnapping,  etc., committed during the rebellion are not ingredients of, nor are they indispensable to the  commission of rebellion, and were but means freely selected  by the rebels to facilitate their commission of rebellion or to achieve and  speed up their realization of their object, which was to overthrow the government and implant their own system said to be of communistic ideology, then  under  Article 48  of  the Revised Penal Code, the complex crime of rebellion with murder, etc., was committed.

Judging by  the  numerous acts of  atrocity  contained in the  several informations filed against the rebels in different cases, not only government soldiers  and officers, but  innocent civilians by the hundreds  were murdered. Stores and homes were  looted;  not  only public buildings, like presidendas and government hospitals, but also private buildings and homes were burned to the ground.   And as a result  of these acts of terrorism,  entire barrios were abandoned and landowners,  especially owners of landed estates, evacuated to the provincial capitals or  to the cities for  personal security.   And it  seems  that these  acts of banditry  and pillage still continue though on  a  smaller scale.

Settled public policy  or the  policy of the  Government as regards rebellion and the crimes against  persons  and property  committed by  the rebels  is  clear.  With their taxes,  the citizens  are  maintaining a  large army to put down  the rebellion.  Substantial rewards ranging from P500 to P100.000 are offered for the apprehension of the rebels, specially the leaders.   A rebel leader with a P100,000 price on his head,  after a  campaign of several years by the army, and  after the loss of  lives of many soldiers and civilian guides, is finally captured.  The government pays down the P100,000 to those responsible  for the capture and charges  him with  the  complex crime of rebellion with multiple  murder,  kidnapping,   etc., a   capital  offense. Pending trial,  he asks to be released  on bail and under the  doctrine being laid  down by us, he is set at liberty, free to go back to the hills to resume his dissident activities where he left off, by merely  posting a bond corresponding to a maximum imprisonment of twelve years (P12,000) and a fine the amount  of which is left  to  the discretion of the trial court.  If he jumps his bail and assuming that the full amount of the  bond is confiscated,  still, the Government which paid P100,000 for his capture is the loser. It will have to wage  another campaign to  recapture him and perhaps offer another reward for  his apprehension. This would illustrate the wide divergence between the policy of the Government and the present  ruling of  the  Court. That is not as it should be.  The three departments of the Government, the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial Department,  though  independent  of each  other,  should function as a team, harmoniously, and in cooperation, all for the public  welfare.  They cannot work at cross purposes. All three should be guided by the settled public policy of the state and  this applies to the courts.  In  the case of Rubi vs. provincial board of  Mindoro, 39 Phil., pp. 718-19, this court  speaking about the  relation  between  interpretation of the law by the courts and public policy, said: 

"As a point which has been left for the  end of this  decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid, is the attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled policy  of the Government.  In a late decision with which we  are in  full  accord,  Gamble vs.  Vanderbilt  University (200 Southwestern Reporter 510) the Chief of  Justice  of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes: 

'We can see no objection to the application  of  public  policy as a ratio decidendi.  Every really new question that comes before the courts is, in the last  analysis, determined  on the theory,  when not determined by differentiation of  the  principle of  a  prior case or line of cases, or  by the  aid of analogies  furnished  by such prior cases.   In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or  principle.'

"Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which  he is justly famous, said that "constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to  take some chances.  (Blinn vs. Nelson  [1911] 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final decision of the many grave questions which this case presents, the court must take "a  chance," it should bo,  with a view to upholding the law,  with  a view to the effectuation  of the  general governmental policy, and with a view to the court's performing its duty in no narrow and bigotted sense, but with that broad conception which will make the courts as progressive and effective a force as are the other departments of the Government."

Now, by the majority resolution, this Court would spread the mantle of immunity over all these serious crimes against persons and property on the theory that they are all covered by, included in, and absorbed by the crime of rebellion.  Under this protective mantle extended by us, instead of curbing and discouraging the  commission of  these common serious crimes  in accordance with public policy, the commission of said crimes would be encouraged.  No longer would evilinded  men, outlaws, bandits,  hesitate to kill and rob and kidnap, because by  pretending to be rebels or to be engaged in rebellion,  their acts of atrocity would be covered by  rebellion, for which they, would get, at most, twelve  (12) years and fine.  No longer would the spectre of  the  death penalty  and the electric  chair hang sword of  Damocles-like  over the heads of would be kidnappers, murderers and arsonists  because by merely claiming to have committed another additional crime, rebellion, under the doctrine laid down by the majority resolution, capital punishment for all  capital crimes they have committed or  may  commit, is automatically reduced to twelve  (12) years and fine.  It is evident that the effect of the interpretation by this Court of the law on complex crimes, in relation  to rebellion and the common serious crimes committed during and in the course thereof, runs counter to the settled public  policy  on the subject.

Sad, indeed, is the role being played  by this Tribunal in laying  down a  doctrine of such far reaching consequences and in my opinion of such baneful not to  say disastrous effects on peace and order and personal security, diametrically and utterly opposed to  settled public policy, when after all, we have now the opportunity and the choice of accepting and adopting another view,  another interpretation of the law on complex crimes, to me more reasonable, more logical and certainly, more in accordance with public policy,  and more in  keeping with peace and order,  personal security and the public welfare.

For the foregoing reasons, I  dissent.

Endencia, JJ., concurs.

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* 85 Phil., 307.

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LABRADOR, J,,

I fully agree with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Montexnayor  in so far as he holds that the complex crime of rebellion with  murder exists under our law.  I  also concur with the opinion of  Mr. Justice Padilla in so far as he holds that the petition for bail should be denied because  of the  danger  that the  release of  the petitioner-appellant may cause to the security of the State.   As the appellant  has, been convicted by  the Courtj of First Instance, he may be admitted to bail in the sound discretion of the court.  In  the interest of security  the  discretion should not be exercised in favor of  the granting of  bail.