On August 24,1954, appellees Melanio Rosario and Maria Inovejas  filed  against  appellant  Teresa  Felix Vda.  de Rosario civil case No. 187 in the Justice of the Peace Court of Camiling, Tarlac,  for the collection of certain sums of money, to wit: P949.25 under the first cause  of action; P860.23 under the second cause of action; as a third cause of action, damages of  P1,000 for each of  the first  two causes of action; and P300  attorney's fees.

On September 6, 1954,  appellant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the amount of the demand under each cause  of action,  broken  down  as  follows:

	First cause of Action	Second cause of Action
Amount of demand.................................................	P949.25	P860.23
Consequential  damages..........................................	1,000.00	1,000.00
Amount of demand.................................................	P949.25	P860.23
	P2,099.25	P2,010.23

was beyond the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court.  The inferior court, in its order of September 14, 1954, held the motion to dismiss meritorious, but instead of  dismissing the complaint, ordered its amendment, 

"as plaintiffs have manifested in their written opposition that they would be willing to waive  the excess of the jurisdietional  amount deductible  from the  demand  for damages."

Appellant moved to reconsider the  order, claiming that as the Justice of the Peace  court did not have jurisdiction over the original complaint, it should not have allowed its amendment.  This motion to reconsider was  also denied, so  appellant sued out for a writ of certiorari in the Court of  First Instance of Tarlae.  The Court of First Instance, however, refused to issue the writ on the ground that the amount of each single cause of action was not in excess of P2,000, discounting consequential damages and attorney's fees; hence, the present appeal.

The  appeal must be sustained.

While some doubt had arisen in tW past as to whether the jurisdiction of a court depends, in cases where several claims  or causes of  action between the same  parties are embodied  in a single complaint, on  the amount  of  each single  claim or upon the totality of the demand in all the causes  of action, we have finally held in the cases of Soriano vs. Omila, 51 Off. Gaz.,  (No. 7), p. 3465, and Campos Rueda Corporation vs. Sta. Cruz Timber Co. Inc., 52 Off.  Gaz., (No. 3,) p. 1387, that the jurisdiction of the court  depends upon the  totality of the demand in all the causes of action irrespective of whether the plural causes constituting the total claim arose out of the same or different transactions. The only  exceptions to this rule are (1) Sphere the claims joined  under the same complaint are separately owed by, or due to, different  parties,  in which case each separate claim furnishes the jurisdictional test (Argonza, et al. vs. International  Colleges, 90 Phil., 470; Soriano y  Cia. vs. Jose, 47 Off.  Gaz., (12  Supp.,)  156;  and  (2) where not all  the causes of action joined are demands or claims for money.

The  original complaint filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Camiling, Tarlac sought to recover P949.25 under the first  cause of  action, P860.23 under the second cause of action,  P2,000 under the third cause of action, and attorney's fees in  the amount of P300, the totality of which exceeds P2,000, the limit of the jurisdiction of the inferior court.  The Court of First Instance held that consequential damages  and attorney's fees are not to be included in determining the jurisdictional amount.   This is error, because under Sec. 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, only interest and costs are excluded from the amount that determines  the  jurisdiction of  the  inferior courts.  Consequential  damages  and attorney's  fees when  properly claimed and recoverable as  an item of  damage, are not excluded from the jurisdictional amount (Suanes vs. Almeda-Lopez, 73 Phil., 573).

As the  Justice of the Peace of Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the original complaint, it did not have the power arid jurisdiction to order its amendment and admit the amended  complaint after the defendant had filed a motion to dismiss, "since it is elementary  that a court must first acquire jurisdiction over the case in order to act validly therein" (Rosario vs. Carandang, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 5, 2387). At any rate, even with the amended complaint, the Justice of the Peace court still did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action, because the totality of the amended demands (P4,OO0) is still in excess of the jurisdiction of the inferior court.

The orders of December 4 and December 15, 1954, of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in  its civil case No. 975 are reversed, and civil case No. 187  of the Justice of the Peace Court of Camiling, Tarlac dismissed, with costs against appellees Melanio Rosario  and  Maria Inovejas So ordered.

Paras, C. J.,  Bengzon, Padilla,  Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and Felix JJ., concur.