Plaintiff is the owner of a  Studebaker car  with Plate No. 3414 while defendant is an operator of a fleet of taxicabs.   As  such  operator,  defendant has  in its employ a driver by  the name of  Quirino Ramos y Codier.  Sometime  in 1947 a collision  took place between  the taxicab driven by  Ramos and the  car belonging to the  plaintiff, as a result of which a criminal  action  was instituted against Ramos  charging him with having driven his car in a reckless  and  imprudent manner.  Ramos entered  a  plea of guilty and, accordingly,  was  sentenced to  indemnify the offended party in the sum of P2,318.40.  A writ of execution was issued for the satisfaction of  the imdemnity but it was returned unsatisfied for lack of property belonging to Ramos which  could be levied  upon.

Having been unable to recover the indemnity awarded in his favor,  plaintiff commenced the present action in the Court of First Instance  of  Manila against defendant seeking to collect the amount of P2,318.40 based  on the latter's subsidiary liability under the provisions  of the Revised Penal Code.  Defendant,  in its answer, admitted that Quirino Ramos y Codier was in its employ as a taxicab  driver but denied all other  allegations,  particularly with regard to the indemnity,  on the ground that it had no knowledge or  information sufficient to form a belief as to  the  truth  thereof.  Considering that  this answer does not  categorically deny the  principal allegations of the complaint, plaintiff filed  a motion for  summary judgment supported by an affidavit  attaching thereto certified copies of  the decision rendered in the criminal case, the writ of execution and the sheriff's  return of the  writ. Defendant filed a written opposition  contending that its answer was sufficient in form to  raise issues of material facts,  and the court  after  considering the  motion  and the opposition thereto, issued an order denying the same.

When the case  was called for  hearing, plaintiff again raised the point that the case could be submitted for decision without  the necessity  of  cross-examination  of the plaintiff by defendant regarding  his  claim for damages. The court, over the objection of  defendant,  declared the case submitted for decision and  rendered judgment ordering defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of P2,318.40, with legal interest thereon from November,  1947  and to  pay the  costs.  From this  decision,  defendant  has appealed.

The main issue raised by defendant is that the lower court  erred in allowing the case to be  submitted for decision without  giving  said  defendant  an  opportunity to  cross-examine  the plaintiff  regarding his  claim for damages because  such claim was never admitted as in fact it was denied when in its answer  it stated  that  it did not have sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth thereof.  In other words, defendant contends that in so alleging that it  did not have sufficient knowledge  or information to form a belief as to the claim for damages, it tendered an issue of fact which takes this case out of the rule relative to summary judgment.

It is true  that under  section 7, Rule 9 "Where the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint,  he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial", but "mere denials, unaccompanied  by any facts  which  would  be admissable  in  evidence at a hearing, are not  sufficient to raise  genuine issue of fact sufficient to defeat a motion  for  summary judgment" (Piantadosi vs.  Loew's Inc., 7 Fed. Rules Service, 786, June 2, 1943).   It  was also held  that  "Summary judgment is proper where there is no  genuine  issue of fact, even though an issue may be raised  formally by the pleadings"  (Fletche vs. Krise,  4  Fed. Rules  Service, 765, March 3,  1941).   (Italics supplied.)  And that "Where all  the  facts are within the judicial knowledge  of the court, summary judgment may  be granted as a matter of law" (Fletcher vs. Evening Newspaper Co. 3 Fed. Rules Service, 530, June 28,  1940).

The question that now arise is: Is the  issue tendered by defendant in its answer a genuine one?

We do not, believe so for it merely refers to the amount of damages the defendant is made subsidiarily liable  by the Revised Penal Code which already appears in the decision rendered against its employee in the criminal case. That decision  is  binding and conclusive upon defendant not only with regard  to  its civil liability  but also with regard to its amount because the liability of an employer cannot be  separated but follows that  of his employee. That is why the  law says that his liability is subsidiary (Article 103, Revised Penal Code).   To allow an employer to  dispute the  civil liability  fixed in the  criminal  case would be  to amend, nullify  or  defeat  a final  judgment rendered by  a competent court.   This cannot be  done  as may be implied  from the following comment of this Court: 

"The important question  is  whether a  judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant to pay an indemnity is  conclusive in  an action against his employer for the  enforcement of the latter's subsidiary liability under  articles  102  and 103 of the  Revised Penal Code.  The  appealed  decision makes reference to two  earlier decisions of this Court,  namely, City  of  Manila va.  Manila  Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586, holding  that such judgment of conviction  is not admissible, and Arambulo  vs. Manila Electric  Co., 55  Phil.,  75, in effect holding that it is merely prima facie evidence, and to the prevailing view in the  United States to the effect that the person subsidiarily liable  is bound by the judgment if the former had notice of the  criminal case and could have defended it had he seen fit to do so,  and that otherwise such judgment is only prima facie evidence. 

"After  very  careful  reflection, we have  arrived at the opinion that the judgment of conviction,  in the absence of any collusion between the defendant and the offended party  should bind the person  subsidiarily liable. The stigma of a  criminal conviction surpasses  in  effect   and  implications  mere  civil liability.  Common sense dictates that a finding of guilt  in a  criminal  case  in  which proof  beyond reasonable doubt is  necessary,  should not  be nullified  in  a subsequent  civil  action requiring  only preponderance  of evidence to  support  a judgment,  unless  those  who  support the contrary rule should  also  hold  that an absolution in  a  civil case will operate to automatically set   aside the  verdict  against  the defendant in the criminal case.  It is anomalous, to say the least, to suppose that the driver, excelling 'Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde', could be guilty of reckless  negligence in  so far as his obligation  to pay indemnity is concerned, and at the  same time could be free from any blame when said indemnity is  sought to be  collected from his employer, although the  right to the  indemnity  arose  from and was based on one and  the same act  of the  driver.

"The employer  cannot be said to  have been  deprived of  his day in court,  because  the  situation  before  us  is not  one wherein the employer is sued  for  a primary liability under article  1903 of the Civil Code, but one in which enforcement is  sought of a subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his driver's criminal negligence which  is  a  proper  issue to be tried and decided only in a criminal action.  In other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsdiarily liable  upon his driver's  conviction  and upon  proof  of the tetter's  insolvency, in the same  way  that  acquittal wipes out not only the  employee's  primary  civil  liability but also  his employer's subsidiary liability for such  criminal negligence." (Martinez vs. Barredo, 45 Off. Gaz., No. 11, 4922.)

It is true that an  employer, strictly speaking, is  not a  party to  the  criminal case instituted against  his  employee  but in substance and  in effect he is considering the subsdiary liability imposed  upon  him  by law.  It  is his concern, as well as of his employee, to see to it that his interest be protected in the criminal case by taking virtual participation in the defense of his employee.  He cannot leave him to his own  fate because his failure is also  his. And if because  of  his indifference or inaction the  employee is  convicted and damages are awarded against him, he cannot later be heard to complain, if brought to .court for the enforcement of his subsidiary liability, that he was not given his day in court.  It was not without  purpose that this Court  sounded the following stern warning: 

"It is high time that the employer  exercised the greatest  care in selecting his employees, taking  real and deep interest in their welfare; intervening in any criminal action  brought against them by reason  of or as a result of the performance  of their' duties, if. only in the way of giving them the benefit  of counsel; and consequently doing away with the practices of leaving them to their fates. If these be done, the American rule requiring notice  on the part of the employer shall have been satisfied.'"  (Martinez  vs. Barredo, supra.)

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Paras,  C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor,  Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ.,  concur.