The respondents and appellees, Candida San Jose et al., filed in  the municipal court  of Manila against the petitioners-appellants separate complaints for unlawful detainer (Civil Cases Nos 27142, 27144, 27156, 27157, 27158, 27170, 27171 and 27172).   After a joint trial the court rendered a  decision on  October 19, 1953,  ordering the  appellants to vacate their respective lots and to  pay to the appellees their respective unpaid back rentals, copy of which decision was received by attorney  for appellants on  October 22, 1953.  Instead of appealing, the appellants filed on November 5, 1953, or one day before the expiration of the period for appeal, a petition  for certiorari in the Court of First Instance of Manila  (Civil Case No. 21118), which was summarily dismissed on the same date  on the  ground that appellants'  remedy was appeal.   Notice of the order  of dismissal was received by attorney for appellants on November 7, 1953,  when the  period for appeal  had  already expired.   On December 3, 1953, the appellants filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for relief from the decision of the Municipal Court in the detainer cases (Civil Case No. 21332),  alleging that  said appellants were prevented  from taking an appeal by  accident, mistake  or excusable negligence.  On January 4, 1954, the  court dismissed said petition for relief on the ground that appellants' failure to perfect an appeal on time was unexcusable negligence, pure and  simple.  The petitioners  have appealed.

Counsel  for appellants contends that he is a new practitioner and his mistake in instituting a petition for certiorari,  instead of appealing  from the decision  of the municipal  court in  the detainer cases, may be considered excusable,  considering that immediately upon knowing that certiorari was not the proper remedy  he filed the petition for relief, and especially in view of the fact that this case involves a big social problem the ejectment  of about 160 persons living in the houses respectively occupied by the appellants.

While we sympathize with appellants' situation, we cannot depart from the rule  that "relief will in no case  be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of a judgment which he claims has been obtained against him through fraud,  where the loss of the remedy at law was due to said party's own negligence or fault  or that of his counsel"  (Echarri vs. Belen  Velasco, 55 Phil., 570, 573), and "the  erroneous interpretation  or application of a law is not an excusable error giving the right to remedy afforded by section  113 of the Code of  Civil Procedure" (Catala vs. Monteverde,  63 Phil., 503, 509).  It is needless to state that  we have to apply the law  and the Rules of Court with uniformity, unaffected by the class of litigants.

It is to be noted that when the appellants, through their counsel, filed  in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for certiorari on November 5, 1953, there was still one day within which to perfect an appeal from the decision of the municipal court in the detainer cases;  and yet although counsel for  appellants  received notice of the dismissal of their petition for certiorari on November 7, 1953, no step was taken by  said counsel until  December 3, 1953, when he filed  in the Court of First Instance of Manila the present petition for relief.   Some earnestness would have urged counsel to perfect an appeal in the detainer cases on the  same day when he received notice  of the dismissal of his petition for certiorari, or even one day thereafter; and he could have  reasonably contended that the period for  appeal was  suspended  during the  pendency of the petition for certiorari in the Court of  First  Instance of Manila.   We  advert to these facts merely in further support of the ruling  of the  court  a quo  that appellants' failure to appeal in  the  detainer cases was unexcusable.

Although already  superfluous, it may be pointed out that the alleged ownership by the appellants of their respective lots finds  sufficient  refutation  in the  conclusion  of  fact of the Municipal Court that they were mere lessees under the  evidence; and the contention that the Municipal Court had no jurisdiction over the  detainer  cases  involving a period  of more than one  year,  is likewise  contrary to what was proved during the trial, namely,  that the notices to vacate were received by the appellants only on May 31 and June 1, 1953, or much less than one year before the complaints for unlawful detainer were filed in the Municipal Court on July 27 and 28, 1953. 

"The fact  that  it is alleged in the complaint  that defendants failed to pay the rents since after August 26, 1923, does not make unlawful  defendant's  withholding of  possession of  the property. Mere failure to pay rents does not ipso  facto make unlawful tenant's possession  of  the  premises.  It is the owner's demand for  tenant to vacate the premises, when the tenant has failed to pay the rents on  time,  and tenant's refusal  or  failure to vacate,, which make unlawful withholding of possession.  There is no legal obstacle for the owner to allow a defaulting  tenant  to remain  in the  rented property one month, one year, several years, or even decadtes. That consent, no matter how long  it may  last, makes lawful tenant's possession.  Only when that consent is withdrawn and  the owner demands  tenant  to leave the  property is  the  owner's  right  of possession  asserted and the tenant's  refusal or failure to move out makes his possession  unlawful, because it  is  violative  of the owner's preferential  right  of  possession." (Canaynay,  et  al. vs. Sarmiento, 45 Off. Gaz., No. 1, p. 252.)

Wherefore,  the appealed order is affirmed, with costs against the appellants,

Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.