For and in  consideration  of  the sum of P800, the defendant-appellant  executed in favor  of  the  plaintiff-appellee a mortgage over a  parcel of land  situated in the municipality of San Fernando, Province of La Union, and for an  indefinite period after May 14,  1941.  On April 8, 1944, the appellant paid to the appellee in Japanese war notes the amount of the mortgage; but in the deed of release both the appellant and the  appellee  signed  a  note stating that "this is subject  to the provision of section 8, Article XI of  the Philippine Constitution."   The controversy  that arose between  the parties, and submitted to the Court of First Instance of La Union in this case commenced by the appellee against the appellant, was whether or not under the note appended to the  deed releasing the mortgage,  had the effect of subjecting the payment made in Japanese war notes on April 8, 1944 to any adjustment or  settlement  contemplated  in section  8  of Article  XI of the Constitution in force  during the  Japanese occupation which provided as follows: "All property rights "and privileges acquired by any person, entity,  or  corporation, since the  outbreak of the Great East Asia war shall be subject to adjustment and settlement upon the termination of the said war."  In its decision dated September 27, 1954, the court ruled that  the  reservation made  in  the footnote of the deed of release above  referred to, could not have been inserted by the parties without any purpose; and proceeded  to conclude that, in view of the fact that the redemption of the mortgage was made by the appellant on April 8, 1944, when the Japanese war notes were almost valueless, the parties  must have intended to adjust and settle appellant's mortgage obligation after the war.  And since this court,  although  considering payments  made during the Japanese occupation  as valid, applied the Ballantyne Scale to obligations  which could have  been paid during the Japanese occupation, the Court of First Instance of La Union sentenced the appellant to pay to the appellee the sum of P711.11 (representing the difference between the amount of the mortgage obligation, P800, and the value of the payment made by the appellant in Japanese war notes, P88.89), plus  legal interest  from the  date  of the filing of the complaint, and the costs of suit.   The defendant has appealed.

We agree  with  the appealed  decision.  If  the payment made by  the appellant on April 8,  1944 was meant to be absolute,  the footnote in question would  not have  been inserted in the deed releasing the mortgage; and considering  the very low value of the Japanese war notes at the time of said payment, it was undoubtedly intended as an indirect way on the part of the appellee to refuse the payment, in  which the  appellant readily acquiesced.  The situation  may be  likened to an obligation payable only after the war, which is perfectly  valid,  with the only difference that the payment  made on April 8, 1944 is, by express  agreement of the parties,  to  be  adjusted after the war.

The appellant argues that the insertion  of  the footnote was a surplusage  and unnecessary,  inasmuch, as the provision of section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution  in  force during the Japanese occupation was impliedly a part of every contract executed  during said period; and since said  Constitution  lost its  effectiveness in view of the result of the war, it cannot here be considered and the payment made  on  April 8, 1944, was  the same as any payment made during the Japanese occupation which had been  held valid by this Court. This contention  is of no moment, as  the reference to section 8 of Article XI  of the Constitution may be deemed as merely descriptive of a  condition therein expressed.

Wherefore, the appealed  decision is affirmed with costs against the appellant.  So  ordered.

Bengzon,  Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,  Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.