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[PETRA BELTRAN v. ARSENIO ESCUDERO](https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c33a7?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
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[ GR No. L-7983, Jul 31, 1956 ]

PETRA BELTRAN v. ARSENIO ESCUDERO +

DECISION

99 Phil. 643

[ G.R. No. L-7983, July 31, 1956 ]

PETRA BELTRAN, ET ALS., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. ARSENIO ESCUDERO, ET ALS., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

D E C I S I O N

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

There is  no  dispute as to the following facts.   In the year  1877 Simeona de Mesa married  Regino Beltran in San  Pablo,   Laguna.  They have three children  named Mariano,  Eulalio, and Romualda, all  surnamed Beltran. In 1902 Regino left his wife Simeona, lived  somewhere else and  until his  death  on March  20,  1925,  never  returned  to the conjugal home.  On July  13,  1912, during the lifetime  of  Regino  and  while living  separately from  him,  Simeona bought a parcel of land  now become  a commercial  lot in San  Pablo  City under tax declaration No.  17047.  After the acquisition of the property,  Simeona and sometimes her son Mariano managed it  until the  two sold the same on October 11, 1939 to Arsenio Escudero and his wife Rosario Adap.  Romualda  Beltran, one of the three children of Simeona and Regino  married Ponciano Flores and bore him 9 children.  She died on July 30, 1941, and two years later her mother Simeona died.  On May 9, 1949, the children of Romualda and Ponciano brought an action (civil case No. 9269)  in the Court of First  Instance  of Laguna against Escudero and Adap to recover 1/6 of the parcel  in  question on  the  theory that  the parcel  having been bought by Simeona during her  marriage, it was conjugal property; that 1/2 of it belonged to her husband Regino, and that at the latter's death  said 1/2 was inherited by the 3 children, one of them being Romualda, mother  of Ponciano's children.  After hearing,  and on the basis  of the stipulation of the parties or their admissions the trial court found the facts  as above related, and holding that Romualda as one  of the three  children of the marriage inherited 1/3 of the 1/2 corresponding to her father Regino, declared that the sale of said 1/6 of the parcel was null and void and ordered the defendants to transfer the said portion to the plaintiffs and to pay back rentals from October 11, 1939, up to the time of delivery of said portion.   On appeal to the Supreme Court, in a decision promulgated on March 11, 1953, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification as to the amount of back rentals to be paid.

On the  basis of the decision  of the trial court in that civil case No. 9269, the 5 children of Eulalio Beltran (one of the 3 children of the marriage of Simeona and  Regino and who died in 1941) filed the present action (civil case No. 9298) on Angust 1, 1949, against the same defendants in the first case, Arsenio Escudero  and his wife  Rosario Adap,  claiming an equal portion of 1/6 of the parcel  in question, on the same theory maintained by the plaintiffs in the first case, namely, that their father Eulalio inherited from his  father  Regino 1/6  of  the  said parcel which  is of the 1/3 of the 1/2 corresponding to Regino of the conjugal property.   In  support of  their action,  plaintiffs, after establishing that they were the legitimate children of Eulalio contended that the. trial court had no  jurisdiction to consider any other question of  fact  and  should  adopt and admit  the findings of fact  made  in the  decision of  the trial  court in  civil  case No.  9269,  and  then offered in evidence a  copy of said decision,  complaint, stipulation  of the  parties, printed  record  on appeal, motion  for  reconsideration  and  correction  of  the stipulation,   and  several  other  pleadings  and  orders filed in said case.   However, the trial court in the present case  received  evidence  presented  by  the  defendants, and on the basis of all the evidence  presented by both parties, rendered judgment on December  27, 1951, finding the same facts already related by us, and in addition, the following.  In the  year  1904 or  1905  Simeona  de Mesa gave to her daugther Eduarda (Romualda) 3 parcels of  land as  her  advance inheritance.  In  1908 she also gave to her son Eulalio Beltran as inheritance another parcel which she had acquired, and she caused  the document of acquisition to be made in the name of Eulalio in  order that he could vote. In  order to effect  a  fair distribution among her 3 children, Simeona on July 11, 1928, donated the lot in question in San Pablo City to her son Mariano Beltran together with another parcel of coconut land. Eulalio Beltran,  father  of the  present  plaintiffs, agreed to this donation by signing as a witness to the corresponding deed.   On November 12, 1936, Mariano  as owner of the lot in question mortgaged the same to  Eulalio for the sum of P700. In accepting the  mortgage, Eulalio in effect, recognized Mariano as the owner of the parcel. On November 10, 1939, Eulalio brought  an action against Mariano to  foreclose the mortgage and included as defendants his mother Simeona and the purchasers of the parcel, Arsenio Escudero and his wife Rosario Adap, but on February 11,1941, Simeona and her children Eulalio and Mariano reached an agreement  and settled the case amicably.  The agreement was reduced to writing and Eulalio  not only  signed the  same but expressly stated therein his  consent to the sale of the lot to Arsenio Escudero and Rosario Adap.

On the basis of its findings the trial court through Judge Arguelles rendered  judgment on December 27, 1951, dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence and merit.  The trial  court  also found that the plaintiffs prosecuted the case with malice  and intention to suppress vital  evidence throwing light in this case, and condemned plaintiffs  to pay the defendants the sum of P500 as  damages for attorney's fees  contained  in  defendant's  counterclaim,  plus costs.

Plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial an$ reconsideration of the judgment on February 8, 1952.  Before action could be taken on this motion, plaintiffs on March 18, 1953, filed a  pleading  entitled  "Additional  Ground for Motion for New Trial" and attached in support of said pleading a copy of our decision in G. R.  No. L-5302 affirming with modification the decision of the trial court in  civil case No. 9269.

In the meantime,  Judge  Jose  M.   Mendoza  came  to preside over  the  trial court, and  on  June 22, 1953, he granted  the  motion for reconsideration  and  new  trial. After holding the new trial, Judge Mendoza reviewed all the  evidence,  including that presented at  the  new trial, and arrived at the same conclusion as  to the facts found by  Judge Arguelles  and holding that the plaintiffs were estopped from questioning  the validity of the sale to defendants of Yn of the parcel in question for the reason that their own father Eulalio had  expressly consented  to the same, Judge Mendoza accepted and adopted the decision previously rendered by Judge Arguelles and dismissed the complaint for lack  of  evidence  and merit,  quoting the dispositive part of  said  decision as follows: 

"* * *. The piaintiffs' complaint is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of evidence  and  merit,  and defendants are  absolved  there from by virtue of their alleged defenses, which have been duly substantiated, condemning the plaintiffs to pay the  defendants  the nominal sum  of P500  as  damages for  attorney's  fees under  the defendant's counter-claim,  and  the costs of this action."

Plaintiffs are  now  appealing from the said decision  to this  court  considering the issues  involved  to be purely questions of law.  Appellants made the following assignment of  errors: 

  1. That  the lower court  finally erred in  not  holding that  the defendants-appellees are estopped from alleging that the plaintiffs-appellants  are not the exclusive  owners  of the  one-sixth  (1/6) portion of the property in litigation.   
     
  2. That the lower court erred in allowing the defendants-appellees to present evidence to prove facts  which have  already been  resolved in civil case No.  9269 and affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court in G. R. No. L-5302. 
  3.  
  4. That  the lower court  erred  in completely  disregarding  and in not giving any weight whatsoever  to the decision  of the Supreme Court in civil case No. 9269-G. R. No. L-5302, affirming the decision of the trial court in said civil case No. 9269.

It is the  contention of appellants that  the parties in the present case are  the  same parties involved in civil case No. 9269; that the same property is involved; that plaintiffs in the first case and the  plaintiffs  in the  present case derived their  title  from the  same  source,  namely, their grandfather Regino  and  therefore are privies to him; that the parties in the first case entered into a stipulation of facts which stipulation was made the basis of the findings of the trial court and of  this Tribunal in its decision affirming with modification that of the trial  court in civil case No.  9269, and  that consequently, the defendants in the present case should  not have been  allowed to present any  evidence other than that  presented and  considered in the first case,  and that defendants are  now in estoppel by record and judgment; in other words,  they are bound by the final judgment in the civil case No. 9269.

We cannot agree to this contention.   In  the first place, the parties in  the two cases are not the same.  They are different.  It is true that Arsenio Escudero  and his wife Rosario Adap  are defendants  in both cases, but it is also a fact that neither  Eulalio  nor  his children, the present plaintiffs, were parties in the first case.  True,  there was a stipulation of facts in  the first case  but  the stipulation did not include the present plaintiffs or their predecessor-in-interest Eulalio Beltran.  The parties in civil case No. 9269 stipulated as to the conveyance of the parcel in question only by Simeona and her son Mariano.   They could not have included Eulalio or his children, because the latter's right or interest in the parcel, if any, was not involved.  On the basis of said stipulation in the first case alone, without any other evidences, it is  possible to conclude  that  since the parcel,in question was conjugal property, and  Eulalio  as one of the 3 heirs, had a right to 1/6 of it and since  he did not intervence in the conveyance of said parcel to the defendants, he  or  his  heirs could now claim that  1/6 portion.   However, as shown by the  eyidence presented  by the defendants in the  present   case,  Eulalio had agreed to the donation of  the  parcel by his mother Simeona to his brother Mariano.   Later,  Eulalio recognized the  title  of Mariano over said parcel by  accepting it in a mortgage  to secure a loan to Mariano.   Still later, he signed a document agreeing to and ratifying the  conveyance of the said parcel to the defendants.  There can be no clearer and more explicit renunciation and waiver of  a  right to a property now claimed as an inheritance.

The rule or doctrine of estoppel  by record only applies as between the same parties or their privies and can neither be  used  against  strangers.   The  present  plaintiffs and their father and predecessor-in-interest Eulalio were strangers to the transaction and  proceedings held in civil case No. 9269 and so  not  only are not bound by it but may not take advantage of the said transaction or proceedings. 

"Estoppels by record,  to the extent that  they bind  parties, will also  bind their  privies;  but they can exist only as  between  the same  parties or those in legal privity with  them, and  can be used neither by nor against strangers."  (31  C. J. S. 195). 

"The rule  of  estoppel  by  record  bars a  second action  between the same  parties on an  issue necessarily  raised and decided  in the first  action;  so,  an  issue of ownership of property  and  its incidents thus adjudicated cannot be relitigated in a second action between the same parties. * * *"  (Ibid.

"An  estoppel operates on the parties to the transaction  out of which it arises -and  their  privies.  Conversely, a  stranger to a transaction is neither bound by, nor in position to take advantage of, an estoppel arising therefrom.   The  reason for the latter rule is that mutuality is an essential element of an estoppel; an estoppel must bind both parties or neither is bound."  (19 Am. Jur. 809.)

In  view of the foregoing, finding the decision appealed from to be  in accordance with law, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Paras,  C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,  Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.


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