Petitioners  have presented this original  special   civil action of  certiorari seeking the annulment  of  (1)  the order for  issuance of alias  writ of execution dated September  7,  1953  (as well  as the alias writ itself dated September 11, 1953);   (2)   the  order  dated September 11, 1953 setting aside a previous  order of August 1, 1958; and  (3) the order of September 30, 1958  denying: petitioners  motion  for reconsideration,  all  issued,  allegedly without or  in excess of jurisdiction  or with grave abuse of discretion, by the respondent Court of First  Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No.  694 concerning  the foreclosure, of a mortgage executed by  petitioners in favor of respondent Miguel  Campos.

The foreclosure suit,  it  appear  went to trial  after defendants  (herein petitioners)  have been duly  declared in default for failure to appear and answer the complaint. On January 12, 1953, judgment was rendered sentencing the  defendants jointly  and  severally  to  pay  plaintiff (herein respondent Campos),  within ninety (90)  days from notice of the decision, the sum of  P25,000.00 with the stipulated interest, and  a sum equivalent to 15% of the total amount  due,  as attorney's  fees, and the costs. The usual order to sell the mortgaged properties at public auction  in case of default,  and  the application  of the proceeds thereof to the payment of the judgment appears in the dispositive  part of the decision.

The  defendants-petitioners having  failed  to  pay  the amount  adjudged, the mortgaged properties  were  sold in public auction to respondent  Campos himself, who was the lone  bidder,  for the amount of P10,000.00.   On July 3, 1953  the respondent court confirmed the auction sale. On August 25,  1953, respondent Campos  filed  an ex-parte motion-in the following tenor:

"1.  That on  12 January 1953  judgment was  rendered against defendants,  jointly  and severally, to  pay plaintiff the  sum of P25,000.00 with interest at the  rate of twelve  (12%)  per  cent per annum from 3 July 1952 until fully paid, and the sum equivalent to  fifteen (15%)  per  cent of the total amount due as attorney's fees and the costs;

"2.  That on 22 June 1953 said judgment was partially executed when  the Provincial  Sheriff  of  Bulacan sold to plaintiff, as the highest bidder the mortgaged properties of  defendants for the  sum of P10.000.00;

"3. That  as  of 22 June 1953  the total amount of the judgment against defendants was in the sum of P32,375.21 consisting of the following:

Capital	P25,000.00
Interest at 12%	2,824.70
Attorney's fees at 15%.	4,173.71
Publication	300.00
Sheriff's fee	6.80
Costs	70.00
	__________
Total	P32,375.21

"4. That out of the total amount of the judgment in the sum of P32,375.21, only the sum of P10,000.00 has been satisfied by the sale of the mortgaged properties  to the plaintiff, leaving unpaid the sum of P22,375.21;

"5. That plaintiff  has  discovered properties registered  in  defendants names and situated in the Province of Rizal, which properties may properly answer for  the balance of the judgment in the said sum of P22,375.21 against the defendants. "Wherefore, pursuant  to Rule  70, Section  6,  of  the  Rules  of Court, it is respectfully prayed that a first alias writ of execution be issued  against the  defendants  and that  said  alias writ  of execution be  addressed to  the  Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for  the proper enforcement of the terms thereof."

On September  7, 1953,  respondent court  granted the petition, stating:

"Considering as well founded the ex parte motion dated August 25, 1953 filed by the plaintiff  through  counsel, let alias  writ  of execution be  issued  in  this case directed to the Provincial  Sheriff of Rizal."

Accordingly, an alias writ  was issued on September 11, 1953.

On June 21, 1958, that is, more than 4 years  after the issuance of  the said alias writ of execution, the petitioners filed a motion to set aside the aforementioned order of the respondent court (of September 7, 1953)  for the issuance of the alias writ of execution and all proceedings taken thereunder alleging  that the said order had no basis, there being no deficiency judgment, and the respondent court had, therefore, no jurisdiction to issue the same.  On July 7, 1958, respondent Campos opposed the motion stating that the same was filed out of time and did not conform, in form or substance, to a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.  

On August  1, 1958, the respondent court issued an order, setting aside the alias writ of execution issued on September 11, 1953, to wit:

"Considering the motion to set aside the order for issuance of alias writ of execution and all proceedings taken thereunder filed by the defendants thru their counsel and the  opposition thereto and it appearing that the alias writ of execution was issued without any basis at all for no deficiency judgment has been rendered pursuant to the provisions  of  Sec.  6, Rule 70 of the Rules  of Court;

"AS PRAYED FOR, the alias writ of execution dated September 11, 1953 is hereby set aside as  it has no leg upon which to stand."

On August 18, 1958, respondent Campos asked for  new trial and/or reconsideration of this last order, contending that the court had lost its jurisdiction over the case, as the proceedings, thereunder were "definitively closed in October 1953", when the full amount of the judgment in his favor was satisfied and, therefore, the aforementioned order of August 1, 1958 was issued by the respondent court without or in excess of its jurisdiction; and that there was in fact  a  deficiency Judgment in his favor as shown in the respondent  court's order of  September  7, 1953.  An opposition to the said motion was filed by the petitioners on August 25,  1958.  On August 30, 1958, respondent Campos submitted a memorandum in amplification of oral argument contending that since the judgment rendered on January 12, 1953 against the petitioners was by default, said petitioners had no standing whatsoever before the  court  and,  therefore, all pleadings that they had filed should be stricken from the record.  In a reply to the said memorandum, dated September 5, 1958, the petitioners claimed that the respondent Campos  had waived the petitioners' alleged default.  On September 11,  1958, the respondent  court issued an order, setting aside its order of August 1,  1958, as follows:

"Acting upon the 'motion for new trial and/or reconsideration' filed by the plaintiff  (respondent Campos herein) and the opposition thereto, and  it  appearing that the herein defendants  (petitioners herein)  have no standing whatsoever  before this  court as the  judgment rendered in this  case on January  12, 1953 against them was  by default;

"AS prayed FOR, the order of the Court  dated August" 1, 1958, is  hereby reconsidered and  set aside." On  September 17, 1958, the  petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration  which  was denied on September 30, 1958.  Hence, this  petition for certiorari.  The two legal  issues to be determined in this  case are (1)  whether the respondent court acted  without  or in excess of its  jurisdiction in issuing, in the first place, its order  dated September 7, 1953 granting an  alias writ of execution; and (2) whether the  respondent  court also acted with grave abuse of discretion in reversing its order of August 1, 1958 (which in turn set aside the alias writ of Execution dated September 11, 1953), on the ground that the petitioners had no standing in court as they had been previously declared in default.

As  to  the  first issue,  the  petitioners claim that  there was no basis  for the order of September 7, 1953  granting the  issuance  of the  alias writ of execution, because no deficiency judgment had been rendered in the  foreclosure suit, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

"SEC. 6. Judgment for balance after sale of property. Upon the sale  of any real property, under  an order for a sale to satisfy a mortgage  or other incumbrance  thereon, if  there be  a balance due  to the plaintiff after applying the proceeds of the sale, the court, upon motion, shall  render judgment  against the  defendant for any such balance for which, by the record of the case, he may be  personally liable  to the plaintiff, upon which  execution  may issue immediately if  the balance is all due at the time of the rendition of the judgment; otherwise  the plaintiff shall  be entitled to execution at  such time as  the balance remaining would have become due by,the terms of the original contract, which time shall be stated in the judgment."

Respondent Campos, on the other hand, contends that the order  in  question, considered  in  conjunction with his ex parte motion dated August 25, 1953, "constitutes a deficiency  judgment"  within  the meaning of the aforequoted  provisions of the Rules of  Court.  We  agree substantially with respondent.  It will be observed that in his said ex parte motion,  he alleged  that "out of the total amount of the judgment in the sum of P32.375.21, only the sum of P10,000.00 has been satisfied  by the sales of the mortgaged properties" to him, "leaving  unpaid  the sum of P22,375.21"; that he "has discovered properties" registered in the petitioners' name, situated in  the province of Rizal, "which properties may properly answer for the balance of the judgment in the said sum of P22,375.21" against  the petitioners.  He, therefore, prayed "that a first alias writ of execution be issued" against the petitioners pursuant to Section 6, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.  Acting upon the said motion, the respondent court issued the order in question, granting the alias writ of execution prayed  for.  Although  the said order failed to declare that the petitioners were  deficient  in regard to the payment of their mortgage indebtedness and the exact amount of the  deficiency, or that the petitioners were personally liable to the respondent Campos for the said amount, as shown by the record of the case, it was for all legal purposes, substantially a deficiency  judgment within the meaning of Section 6, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court aforequoted.  The issuance of the said writ was, precisely, for the purpose of satisfying the  deficiency claimed by the respondent Campos.  Indeed, there would have been no reason for its issuance, if the alleged deficiency had  not existed, in the opinion of the court.  

For all the foregoing, we find and so hold that, in issuing the writ in question, the respondent court did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction.

In respect to the second issue, it appears that the respondent court, on September 11, 1958, set aside its  order of August 1, 1958 (which in turn set aside the alias writ of execution dated  September 11,  19E3), upon being apprised that petitioners had no standing in court, having been declared in default on  November 26, 1952 for failure to appear or file their answer  to the foreclosure complaint; and that the judgment rendered against them on January 12, 1953 was likewise, by default.  The lejal consequences of a default order were succinctly explained by  this Court in  the case of Lim  Toco vs.  Go Fay  (80 Phil.,  166).  It was held therein that

"A defendant  in  default loses his  standing in,  or is considered out of, court and  consequently  can  not appear in court, adduce evidence, and be heard, and for that reason he is not entitled to notice.  If he is not entitled to notice of the proceedings in the case and to be heard, he  can  not appeal from the judgment rendered by the court  on the merits, because  he can not file a notice of appeal, for approval by the court.  The only exception provided by law is when the  defendant in default files a motion to set aside the order of default on the grounds stated in Rule 38 in which event he is  entitled to notice of all further proceedings.' That a defendant in default can not be heard in the suit, not only in the trial court but  also in the final hearing, that is, on appeal which is a part of the proceedings in a suit, is the  ruling laid down for guidance of court,  and practitioners  by this  Court  in the case of Velez vs. Rambs, 40 Phil. 787, * * *.

"The  reason why the  defaulting  defendant  is  not  entitled  to notice  is because it would  be useless or of no purpose to do so, since the defendant can not appear  and be  heard in  the suit  in any way * *  *.  There is absolutely  no  reason for denying  a defaulted  defendant  the  right to  be  heard  before, and  granting him that right after, the judgment on the merits.  If he is out of or has no standing in court  before judgment  on the merits, he can not be considered as no longer in default after said judgment.

"There is, therefore;  no reason in law or equity for permitting a defaulting defendant, after judgment on the merits, to appear and be heard either in the trial court or on appeal.. *  * ."  , (Italics supplied.)

It is contended, however, by  the petitioners that respondent Campos, by filing an opposition  to  petitioners' motion dated June 21, 1958 to set aside the alias writ issued on September-11,1953, and other pleadings in answer to petitioners' subsequent pleadings, had, in effect, waived the effects of petitioners' default, such that they thereby regained  their  standing in  court.  Granting,  arguendo that the respondent Campos had waived the effects of the said default, the petitioners could no longer  benefit by said waiver because at the time petitioners filed their  motion dated June 21,  1958, the judgment rendered in the  foreclosure suit had already been fully satisfied since October, 1953, thereby depriving the respondent court of its jurisdiction over the case;  Moreover, the aforementioned  motion of June 21, 1958 could not  be considered as a petition for relief under Rule 38  of the Rules of Court, because it was filed 4 years and 9 months after the issuance  of the order of September 7, 1953.   Where a defendant was declared in default and later  a judgment on the merits was rendered against him, and without praying  for the revocation  of the order of default  he filed  a motion for the annulment of the judgment rendered, it has been held that he has no standing in court and he has no  right to appeal.  (Isaac vs. Mendoza, 89 Phil., 279.)   In the same case, this Court said that even  granting, for the sake of  argument that the plaintiff's motion for annulment  included  the order of default, his motion cannot be sustained, it having been filed too late, beyond the six months period within which applications for relief under Rule 38 may be entertained.

Neither could the petitioners invoke Section 5 (g),  Rule 124 of the Rules of Court,  relative  to  the inherent power of the court "to. amend and control its process and orders so as  to make them comformable  to  law and justice' to justify the setting aside of the alias writ in question, as the said provision is applicable only where the court has  not yet lost  its jurisdiction over  the case.   (Veluz vs. Justice of the Peace of Sariaya, 42 Phil.,  557.) ^[1] It is elementary that final orders and decisions of courts of competent jurisdiction may not be set aside, except in accordance with  the express  statutory  provisions, and upon grounds stated therein and within the time provided therefore.  (Perez vs. Sweeney, 8 Phil., 157; Pacific Importing &  Exporting  Co. vs. Tinio, et al., 85 Phil.,  239;  47 Off.  Gaz., 2910.)

In conclusion, we are of the opinion and so hold that the  respondent court,  in issuing the  order dated  September 7, 1953 granting an  alias writ of execution and its  subsequent order of September 11, 1958 (reversing its order of August 1, 1958) as well as the denial (September 30, 1958) of petitioners' motion for reconsideration did not act with grave abuse of discretion, as to warrant the  issuance of a writ of certiorari prayed for by the petitioners.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby dismissed without costs. It is so  ordered.

Paras, C.  J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

---

^[1] See also Beltran vs. Cabrera,73 Phil., 666; Arnedo vs. Llorante, 18  Phil., 257; Fiesta vs. Llorente, 25 Phil., 554; Lim vs. Singian 37 Phil., 817; and Anuran vs. Aquino, 38 Phil., 29.