This is a petition for  review of a resolution of  the Court of  Tax Appeals entered on January 29, 1955 holding that it has  jurisdiction to hear and decide the original case of mandamus then pending between the parties in the Court  of First Instance  of Manila under section 22 of Republic Act No. 1125.

It appears that original case of mandamus was pending in the Court of First Instance  of Manila where it was originally filed when Republic Act No. 1125 creating the Court of Tax Appeals was enacted into law (July 16, 1954).  On  September 29,  1954, the Court of First Instance of Manila, upon a verbal motion of the Solicitor General and after the parties were  given an opportunity to be heard, issued an order remanding the case to  the Court of  Tax Appeals for final disposition pursuant to section 22 of said Act.

On December  10, 1954, petitioner filed a motion before the Court of  Tax Appeals praying that the case be  ordered returned to the Court of First Instance of Manila for trial  and  final disposition on the ground that it  involves primarily the issue of unfair competition and  not a  disputed assessment of the Collector of Internal Revenue  and  therefore it does not come under said section of Republic Act No. 1125.  Respondents Vicente I. Cruz, Yam  Nan, and  New World Printing Press  filed a written opposition to said motion stating,  among other things, that the question  of unfair competition  raised  by  petitioner is but an incident of the  main issue which is  the authority  of  the Collector of Internal Revenue and  the Secretary of Finance to approve and recommend for use by merchants  any  simplified  set of bookkeeping records that comply with the requirements  of the  law and regulations pursuant to section 334 in relation to section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code.  And since this is a matter that arises under the National Internal Revenue Code, they contend that the Court of Tax Appeals  has jurisdiction to try and decide the case.   This contention having been upheld, petitioner interposed the present petition for review.

The question to be determined is whether  the case of mandamus which was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila by petitioner against respondents is one which should be remanded  to the  Court of Tax Appeals under section 22 of Republic Act  No. 1125.  Said section provides: 

"Sec. 22. Pending  eases to be  remanded to Court. All cases involving disputed  assessment of Internal Revenue taxes or customs duties  pending determination before the Court of First Instance shall be certified and remanded  by the respective Clerk of Court to the Court of Tax Appeals for final disposition thereof."

In the amended petition filed by petitioner in the Court of First Instance of  Manila, he alleged that through his intellectual effort and at  great  expense and  sacrifice of time,  effort and money, he had devised a simplified book-keeping set; that scarcely had he placed said simplified bookkeeping set in the market when respondents Vicente I. Cruz,  Sabina  R, Soriano, New World Printing  Press and Yam Nan flooded the market with their alleged simplified bookkeeping sets which they claim to be their own individual "devices" when, in truth and in fact, such  sets were  mere copies and reproductions of  the instructions, forms and  proorma  financial  statements contained in Revenue Regulations No. V 13; that the Secretary of Finance, Undersecretary of  Finance, and the  Collector of Internal  Revenue, abetted  and  encouraged  the  unfair competition indulged in by  their  co-respondents in that, despite their knowledge that the bookkeeping  sets of said co-respondents are virtual reproduction of the instructions, forms and  pro-forma  financial  statements contained in said Internal  Revenue Regulations, the aforesaid officials gave  permission,  approval,  and  authority to  their co-respondents to print, publish, and sell to the  public their bookkeeping sets; and that  the above acts of respondents constitute unfair competition and a violation of existing law  for  which reason  petitioner seeks relief by  asking the court to enjoin said government officials  from allowing the sale of the alleged fraudulent bookkeeping sets and to award him  the damages he has  suffered on account of the unfair  competition  resorted to by respondents.

In  holding that it has jurisdiction  to  hear this  case of mandamus under section 22 of Republic Act No. 1125, the Court of Tax Appeals intimated that,  while said section apparently only  refers to cases "involving disputed assessment of Internal Revenue  taxes  or  customs duties pending  determination before the  Court of  First  Instance", and the  present case admittedly does not involve any  assessment of the Collector of Internal  Revenue, it cannot be said  that it is excluded from its operation and scope  it  appearing that the  main issue involved arises under the National  Internal  Revenue Code.  In  other words, the Court of  Tax Appeals has adopted the view that said section 22 should not be interpreted  alone but in connection with  section  7 of the  same  Act  which, among other things, provides that the  Court  of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction to review by appeal "other matters arising under  the National  Internal  Revenue Code  or other law or part of  law administered by the Bureau  of Internal  Revenue."  And after stating that  in framing section 22 Congress  must have  committed an oversight in not including therein those cases specified in section 7, the Court of Tax Appeals made this  remark: "The omission as pointed out above is clearly  an oversight on the part of Congress and the deficiency  should be supplied if we are to accomplish the purpose and intention of Congress  in the creation of this court.  Moreover,  section 22 of Republic  Act No.  1125, should  be interpreted  in such manner as would make it harmonize with section 7 of the same Act  in order to avoid confusion and  absurd consequences."

We agree  with  the view  that section 22 of  Republic Act No. 1125 should be interpreted in  such a manner as to make it harmonize with section 7 of the same Act  and that  the primordial purpose behind the approval of said Act by Congress is to give to the  Court of Tax Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction "over all tax, customs,  and real  estate assessment  cases throughout the  Philippines and to hear and decide them as soon as possible", but we disagree with the conclusion that the present case comes within the purview of the  clause  "other matters arising under the  National Internal Revenue  Code  or other  law or  part  of law administered by  the Bureau  of  Internal Revenue"  appearing in  section  7,  paragraph  1, of  Republic Act No. 1125.

Section  7 of Republic  Act No.  1125  provides: 

"Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review  by appeal, as herein  provided,  

"(1) Decisions  of the Collector of Internal  Revenue in cases involving disputed  assessments, refunds  of internal  revenue  taxes, fees  or other  charges, penalties imposed in  relation thereto, or other  matters arising under the National Internal Revenue  Code or other law or part  of law administered  by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. 

"(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs  duties, fees  or other money charges; seizure, detention or release of property affected;  fines, forfeitures or other penalties imposed  in relation thereto; or other matters arising under the  Customs Law or other law  or part of  law administered by the  Bureau  of Customs; and 

"(3) Decisions of provincial or city Boards of Assessment Appeals in cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property or other matters arising under the Assessment Law, including rules and regulations relative thereto."

Note that the law gives to the Court  of  Tax  Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Collector of Internal  Revenue,  the  Commissioner of Customs, and the provincial or city  Boards of Assessment Appeals.   Note also that in  defining the cases that may be  reviewed  the law begins by  enumerating them  and then adds  a  general  clause pertaining to  other  matters that may arise under the National Internal  Revenue Code, the  Customs Law and the Assessment Law.   This  shows that the  "other matters" that may come under the general clause  should be of the same nature as  those  that have preceded them  applying the  rule of construction known as ejusdem generis.  In other words, in order,that a matter  may come  under the general clause,  it  is necessary that it belongs to the same kind or class therein specifically enumerated.   Otherwise, it should be deemed foreign or extraneous and is not included. 

"It is a general rule of statutory construction  that where general  words follow  an  enumeration of  persons or things,  by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general  words are not to he construed in their widest extent, but  are to be held as applying only to persons  or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. 

"This rule is commonly called the 'ejusdem generis' rule because it teaches us that broad and comprehensive  expressions in  an act, such as 'and all others,' or 'any others,' are usually to be restricted to persons or things 'of the same  kind' or class with those specially named in the preceding words. It is of very frequent use and application  in the interpretation of statutes. 

"Illustrations and Applications 

"The  rule  of 'ejusdem generis'  is  properly applied  to  a statute exempting from taxation certain enumerated kinds of  property and 'other articles,'  the general term being strictly confined to the similitude of  those  specifically named."  (Black  on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd ed.,  203; See also Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd.  vs. Register of Deeds  of Davao,  G.  R. No.  L-7084,  promulgated October  27, 1954.) 

"Where general words follow  the designation of particular things, or classes of persons or  subjects, the general  words  will usually be construed to include only those persons or things of the same class or general nature as those specifically enumerated.  For example,  where a law prohibits the exclusion of any persons on account of their color from 'barber shops, eating houses, or other places of public  resort,' the latter phrase will be restricted to places of the same general character of those specifically enumerated.  This is the rule known  as  'ejusdem  generis',  and it  is founded upon the  idea that if  the legislature intended  the general words to be used in an unrestricted sense, the particular  classes  would not have been mentioned."  (Crawford, The Construction of Statutes pp. 326-327.)

The question involved in the mandamus case  does not cover any disputed  assessment or  refund of any internal  revenue  tax,  fee, charge or penalty imposed in relation thereto.   Rather, involves unfair competition arising  from the use of simplified set of bookkeeping records required by section 334 of the National Internal  Revenue  Code.  This has nothing to do  with  any assessment or  refund of any tax, fee or penalty.  It cannot be pretended that for any violation of the Internal Revenue Law, Customs Law, or Assessment Law,  the case may be  appealed  to the Court  of Tax Appeals, for  if such were  the case,  then the latter court would also have jurisdiction to review  cases involving penal provisions such  as those  embodied in Title XI of the National Internal Revenue Code.  Undoubtedly, such court does not have criminal jurisdiction.

Wherefore, the resolution  appealed  from is  reversed. The Court orders.  that  the original  case of mandamus (Civil Case No. 21227)  be returned to  the Court of First Instance of Manila  for trial and final disposition, without pronouncement  as to costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes A., Labrador,  Concepcion, Reyes,  J. B. L.,  and Endencia, JJ., concur.