This is a  petition for certiorari and  prohibition with preliminary injunction by Teotimo  S.  Saavedra, Carolina Layague and Filemon  Lucasan,  to annul amended order of the Court of First  Instance of Zamboanga, dated  August 23, 1957, and to enjoin said court from placing respondent Siari Valley  Estates, Inc.,  in  possession of Lot No. 8  of Parcel No. 11 and of Parcel No. 9, mentioned in said order. In Civil Case No. 134 of the Court of First Instance  of Zamboanga del Norte,  entitled Siari Valley Estates, Inc., vs. Filemon Lucasan, a decision was rendered on June 30, 1952, the dispositive  part of which reads as follows:

". . . adjudicating to the Siari Valley  Estates all the cattle that may be found in the cattle ranch of Filemon Lucasan, specially the 321 heads that had been  entrusted to  his care . . . ordering the defendant  to deliver to  the  plaintiff  (respondent herein)  all said cattle or their value amounting to P40,000.00, .to pay damages to the Siari Valley Estates for the  400 heads of cattle. .  . at the rate  of P100.00 per head or P40,000,  plus interest  at the rate of 6% from the date of the trial of  this  case in January, 1951, and to pay the costs of the proceeding."

To satisfy the judgment, levy was made on twelve  parcels of land,  among them Lot  8 of  Parcel 11 and Parcel  9, involved in the parcel petition, which twelve parcels were later sold at public auction on January 14, 1956, to Siari Estates, being the highest bidder.  Two  days before the sale, petitioners  Saavedra and Layague  filed with  the Sheriff their third party claims to Lot No. 8, Parcel 11 and Parcel 9,  respectively.   Other third  party claimants filed their claims to the other  parcels levied upon,  and subsequently, they filed the corresponding suits for annulment of the execution sale, against the Siari Estates  and the  Sheriff, which cases are now pending in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del  Norte.

After the expiration of one year from the date  of the sale, a  final deed of safe covering the twelve parcels was executed  by the  Sheriff, in  favor of the  Siari Estates. Thereafter, the Siari Estates tried to obtain possession of the properties bought by it, but it was opposed by defendant  Lucasan, claiming that the parcels sold at the  execution sale were  owned and possessed by third party claimants, the same persons who had  filed their third  party claims with the Sheriff and had brought the corresponding actions in court against the Siari Estates to annul  the execution sale.   Despite  said opposition, however, the trial court, through Judge Ortega, issued an order dated February  13,  1957, supplemented  by  a  writ of possession, directing the Provincial Sheriff to deliver  to the Siari Estates all the  properties covered by the final deed of sale. Said order,  however, was refused compliance by defendant Lucasan; and the failure of the Sheriff to execute the order and  the writ of possession prompted the Siari Estates to ask  that said writ be implemented and to pray that  the Sheriff  be directed to deliver all properties covered  by the deed of sale, to it.   Defendant Lucasan, as well as the third party claimants, opposed the motion,  alleging that since they (third party claimants)  were in  actual possession of the properties, they could not be deprived thereof, pending determination of their claims  of ownership, nor could they be summarily ousted therefrom without due process.  The trial court heard the motion and the oppositions thereto, and  after receiving  evidence,  it  found  that  parcels  % 3; 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 were  covered either by homestead  or free patents  in  favor of third party claimants,  and  it issued  an  order  dated  April  30,  1957,  directing the Sheriff to

***"place the plaintiff in possession of parcels Nos. 1, 9, Lot 8 in parcel No. 11 and parcel 12 and of all other parcels mentioned in the Certificate of Sale issued  by the Provincial Sheriff  in favor of the plaintiff."

On motion  of  the defendant and the third party claimants, the trial court on August 7, 1957, amended its order of April 30, 1957, by striking therefrom parcel 12, and the phrase "and  of  all other parcels, etc.", so  as to read:

"Wherefore, premises considered the Provincial Sheriff is hereby ordered to place the plaintiff in possession of Parcel Nos.  1, 9 and Lot No. 8 in Parcel No. 11 as mentioned and  described in the Sheriff sale issued  by  the provincial sheriff in  favor of  the plaintiff." ( Annex J, Petition, p. 47, Record)

Dissatisfied with the last order, defendant  and the third party claimants  moved to reconsider the same, attacking ihe validity of the execution sale.  Acting on said motion, the trial court sustained defendant's  claim as to  Parcel No. 1, holding that the sale of  said parcel was invalid, for the reason that it turned out later that it was registered property, covered by a certificate of title,  the Provincial Fiscal having failed to make reference to the  number  of said certificate and the volume and page of the registration book where said certificate was entered.   But as to parcel 3 and lot 8 of parcel 11, the  court observed that defendant . Lucasan did not act in  good faith in transferring them to third parties,  said transfers  having  been made  in fraud  of creditors.  The trial  court  found that  Parcel 9  originally belonged to  Filemon Lucasan,  but was later sold to his own son, Lorenzo  Lucasan, on  June 4,  1955, who in turn  sold it on January 10, 1956, to third party claimant Carolina Layague, second cousin  of Natividad Castellano, wife of Filemon Lucasan himself; while Lot 8 of Parcel 11, originally belonging to  Filemon  Lucasan, was sold by him to his own daughter Bruna on September 24, 1954, who in turn sold it on November 19, 1955, to third party claimant Teotimo  Saavedra.  The  trial court also said that  Parcel  9  and Lot 8 of Parcel 11,  were not specifically described  in the notice of sale made  by the Sheriff.  Without  prejudice to determining the question of ownership and possession raised by the petitioner in their complaint to annul execution sale, the lower court ordered the Sheriff to give to the Siari Estates possession of Lot No. 8 of Parcel  11 and Parcel 9.  The dispositive part of said order,  dated August 23, 1957,  (now subject of this petition)  reads:

"Wherefore, premises considered, the Provincial Sheriff is ordered to give to the plaintiff the possession of Lot  No. 8 parcel 11 and parcel 9, as mentioned and  described in the Sheriff's sale issued by the Provincial Sheriff in favor of the plaintiff."

Not satisfied with the above order, third party claimants filed the present petition.   Petitioners Saavedra and Layague contend that the lower court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction for  the reason that they were not parties in the original case and, therefore,  may not be bound by the judgment; that inasmuch as they were in actual possession of the property,  adverse to the debtor, they may not be ordered ejected; that there was no valid levy and in the notice of sale, the parcels  involved were not  specifically described; and lastly, that they were not given their  day in court.

Where a parcel levied upon on execution is occupied by a party  other  than a judgment  debtor, the procedure is for the court to order a hearing to determine  the  nature of said  adverse possession.  In  the case  of Omaña vs. Gatulayao (73 Phil.,  66, 68),  this  Tribunal said:

"* * * Judgment rendered in actions in personam, as the instant case, are enforcible only between the parties  and their successors in interests, but not against strangers thereto.  (Sec. 306, par. 2, of Act No. 190, now Rule 39, sec. 44 (b), Rules of Court.)  There may be cases when the actual possessor may be claimed to be a privy to any of the parties to the action, or  his bona-fide possession may be disputed, or  where it is alleged, as in the instant case, that such possession has been taken in connivance with the defeated litigant with a view  to frustrating the judgment.   In any of these  events, the  proper procedure would be to order a hearing on the matter of such possession and to deny or accede to the  enforcement of a writ of possession as  the finding shall warrant. * * *"

The  reason for this hearing wherein the adverse possessors are given an opportunity to present their evidence and justify their  possession, is given by the Court in the case of Gozon vs.  De  la Rosa  (77 Phil., 919, 922),  thus:

"es necesario este  procedimiento sumario para evitar que algunas personas, para frustrar los verdaderos fines de la ley, invoquen sin razon alguna la teoria de sentencia in personam:  que  no han sido demandadas; que la orden de ejecucion no va contra ellas.   Entonces habria que demandar a todas las personas que dependen del demandado o que ocupan la casa por consentimiento solo del demandado. Una persona cualquiera podria ponerse en combinacion con el ejecutado y, entrando en la casa, invocar la defensa de que no ha sido parte de la causa contra  la orden de ejecucion."

And in the case  of  Santiago  vs.  Sheriff  of Manila  (77 Phil., 740, 743-44), this Court said:

"La sentencia dictada en el presente asuiito es in personam, y como tal solo es obligatoria para las partes y no para extranos.   (Art. 44. par.  (b), Regla 39.)  Si el recurrente Anacleto  Santiago, que no fue parte en la  causa por desahucio, era poseedor de buena  fe  de la finca  en cuestion,  la sentencia dictada en  dicha causa no  podia ejecutarse  vaiidamente contra  el. Se puede  insistir, sin embargo, en la ejecucion  de la sentencia si  se  prueba que el  poseedor  es simplemente un causahabierite, o un huesped, o un  agente del ejecutado en  el  proposito fraudulento  de  frustrar  la  sentencia; en tal caso, debe haber un  procedimiento en  el Juzgado  de Primera Instancia que expidio la orden  de  ejecucion para la  dilucidacion del caracter  de  la posesion del  ocupante extraiio."

*     *     *     *      * 

" .  . .Si en tal procedimiento el juzgado encuentra que el extraño no es mas que un mero causahabiente o agente a huesped del ejecutado, entonces  se  seguira la orden  de  ejecucion contra el.  Esto no es obice, sin embargo, para que el ocupante pueda valerse de cualquier  otro remedio legal  para la determinaci6n definitiva  del titulo o la posesion  sobre la propiedad."

It will be observed that after the hearing, the trial court made  the finding that petitioners were presumably party to the scheme to defraud the judgment creditor, being the assigness or transferees of the  parcels in question after judgment had been rendered  against  defendant  Filemon Lucasan,  their/predecessor in interest.   Consequently, the court did not err in  ordering the Sheriff to deliver possession to the creditor, Siari Valley Estates.  Besides,  petitioners herein still have their remedy in court by prosecuting the actions filed by them to vindicate their claims to the properties in question.  In the case of Madrigal, vs. Planas, 94  Phil.,  754, 759), we said:

"Anent the order of  respondent Judge dated Feb.,2, 1953,  which directs that Jose Isla, Carlos Neri, Jose T. Jose, Juan Planas and the San Miguel Brewery, Inc. vacate the land of plaintiff pursuant to the judgment of  the court in the ejectment case, which  order, is now attacked as illegal because they were not parties to that  case; the record shows that before issuing said order, the court  conducted summary hearing to determine the nature of the possession of the property claimed by Juan Planas and  other occupants, and that at that hearing respondent judge  summoned  all of them to appear to show cause why they should not be ejected from the premises. And after the hearing was over, respondent Judge found that Juan Planas and the other occupants were  mere transferees or possessors pendente lite  of the property in question. Respondent judge found that if they had any right at all to occupy the property that right is merely  subsidiary to that of defendant  Concepcion L. Planas.
As such, they are bound by the judgment rendered against the latter in consonance with the doctrine laid  down in the cases of Brodett vs. De la  Rosa, 77 Phil., 752; 44 Off. Gaz., No, 3, pp.  874-875, and Gozon vs. De la Rosa,  77 Phil., 919;  44 Off. Gaz., pp. 1227-1228. Of course, there are questions of fact as to which there may be controversy, but the proper place where this  should be threshed out is not in this proceedings, but  in  an ordinary action.  For the present, we are satisfied that the respondent Judge has acted on the matter in the exercise of his sound discretion."

As regards the contention that there was no valid levy and notice of sale because the parcels were not specifically described, after examining the record, we are satisfied that the parcels in question  could have been easily identified from the description contained in the levy;  and as to the notice of sale, it was duly published in the newspaper Vanguard, published in Dumaguete City and of general circulation in Zamboanga  del  Norte, this, aside from the fact that petitioners had actual notice of said levy, otherwise, they would not have filed their third party claims before the execution sale.

In  view  of the foregoing,  the  petition  for  writ  of certiorari and prohibition is  hereby  denied,  with costs against petitioners.  The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is ordered dissolved.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angela, Labrador, Reyes, J. B.  L., Endencia, Barrera,  and  Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.