This  is an appeal  through certiorari  from the order of December 21, 1954 of Judge Jose Bautista, now presiding  Judge of  the Court of  Industrial  Relations (CIR) dismissing the complaint filed against the Asia Printing and/or  Lu Ming  for unfair labor practices as  well as the resolution  of  the CIR  en bane  of January 20, 1955, denying the motion  for  reconsideration  of the  order of Judge Bautista.

Francisco  Dacanay was employed as pressman in  the printing establishment of the Asia  Printing managed by Lu Ming.  On August 23, 1953, he was dismissed  according to him,  because  of his union activities  with  the  National Union of Printing Workers, of which he was a member. Charges were filed by  petitioner against the  printing establishment and its manager with the CIR. Judge Bautista designated  Atty. M.  A. Ferrer,  acting prosecutor of  the  Court, to conduct  an investigation.  Finding  a prima facie case, Ferrer filed the corresponding complaint against the Asia Printing and its manager Lu Ming with the CIR and Judge Bautista  held hearings at which both parties, complainant and respondents adduced its evidence.

In his order Annex "F" dismissing the complaint, Judge Bautista found that Dacanay was not dismissed due to his union activities but was  separated  as claimed by the respondent because of inefficiency, incompetence, lack of interest ik his work and for being troublesome, having guarded with a number of his co-employees.   In his petition for  certiorari, Dacanay  raised  the following questions: 

"1st. That the trial court had no  jurisdiction  and abused its discretion  after  the "Charges" for  unfair labor practices were already proved by the  Union before  the CIR  Commissioner, and erred by  directing the Union to give  evidence again before  him, a procedure not sanctioned by any law; 

"2nd. That the trial  court erred in adopting  a procedure not provided for by Republic Act  875 by not itself directly hearing the complainant union's "charges"  instead of a so-called "perliminary investigation" by a CIR  Commissioner,  said procedure transforming the Court into an Inquisitor, Prosecutor and  Judge in one; instead of being a Court only; 

"3rd. That the records  of the investigating Commissioner, being public documents, exposed unnecessarily the evidence of the complainant union so that the employer respondent knew in advance the evidence of the complainant to the disadvantage of the complainant union; 

"4th. That the established  procedure  in  unfair labor practices as decreed in sections 5 and 6 of Republic Act 875 do not require  any so-called "preliminary investigation" unlike  in  criminal proceedings,  but an investigation by the Court  (or  duly  designated  Judge) who shall decide thereon the Court itself  or  issued  an  enjoining  order  if necessary to prevent  further  unfair  labor  practices."

In the instant proceeding, Dacanay advances the theory that assuming that the investigation conducted by Acting  Prosecutor,  Ferrer,  was proper and  legal, after  finding  that  respondents were  guilty  of  unfair  labor  practices for having dismissed  him for his  union activities,  then on the basis of said findings of the prosecutor, the CIR  should have rendered judgment  in  his favor, ordering respondents to reinstate him and to pay his backwages. It is obvious  that this contention  is  untenable.  In the first  place, according to the respondents, the investigation conducted by Ferer was "ex parte". Respondent were never given an opportunity  to be present and to take part in  said  investigation and present  their  side. That  may  be the reason why Ferrer found a prima facie case against them.  Furthermore, said finding that respondents were guilty of unfair  labor practice was only "prima facie",   and  made  only by  the  prosecutor  and not  by  the CIR itself. Consequently, it could not be made the basis  of a  decision or award.

Petitioner  also claims  that the  procedure  adopted  by the CIR  having  the  charges filed by  him  against the  respondent investigated by  its acting  prosecutor instead  of by the CIR itself, is not sanctioned by the  law because  Republic  Act No. 875  known as the Industrial Peace Act does  not require any preliminary investigation;  besides, said  procedure is disadvantageous  to  petitioner  in that it exposed  unnecessarily his evidence  to the  respondent who  then knew in advance what said evidence was. We see no objection to the so-called exposure of the evidence of  the petition unless he wanted  to  spring  a surprise on  the respondents.  In  civil  cases, the plaintiff always presents  his  evidence first,  thereby giving  the defendant time  and opportunity not only to present its own evidence but to  repute that already  presented  by  plaintiff.  In criminal  cases,  the  offended  party or  complainant invariably  submits his evidence first, to establish a prima facie case to justify the charges, and  in serious offense, preliminary investigation  is conducted to establish probable  cause  before the offender is required to  stand trial and to present his own evidence. For  better understanding of the procedure provided for by Republic Act No. 875 in unfair labor practice cases, we reproduce section 5(b)  of the same: 

"Sec. 5 Unfair Labor Practice.  

"(b) The  Court shall  observe the  following procedure without resort to mediation  and conciliation as provided in  section four  of Commonwealth Act  Numbered One hundred and three, as amended, or to  any pre-trial procedure.  Whenever it  is charged by an of fended party or  his representative that any person  has engaged or  is  engaging in  any such  unfair labor practice, the  court  or any agency or  agent designated by the  Court must investigate such charge and shall have  the power to issue and cause  to be served upon  such person a complaint stating  the charges  in that  respect and containing a notice of hearing  before the Court or a member thereof, or before  a  designated Hearing Examiner  at  the  time and place fixed therein not less than five nor more than ten days after  serving the said complaint."

From the above quoted legal provision, it is, to us, clear that the Court  (CIR) must  first investigate the charges filed and that said  investigation may  be conducted either by the Court itself or  a member  thereof  or any. agent, like the acting  prosecutor or a  commissioner. Such  investigation,  is mandatory,  because  the  law  uses the word "must". Now,  whether or  not a  regular complaint is to be filed by him depends  upon the result of said investigation.  It is when  a regular complaint based on  the said investigation is filed that the CIR intervenes by requiring respondent to answer the complaint and then both parties are heard to receive the evidence to be adduced by them. The investigation is really necessary not  only for  the protection of the respondent but also for the  benefit of the CIR itself so  that the  respondent may  not be  required to depend itself against frivolous and unfounded charges, and the valuable time of the CIR dissipated and unnecessarily  spent in hearing charges without  any basis.

Interpreting a  similar provision of the National Labor Relation Acts, the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals in the Case of National Labor Relations Board vs. Barrett Co.,  et al., 120 F. 2nd. 583 referring to the National Labor Relations Board, the counterpart of our CIR, said: 

*  *   *.  Its powers and  its  duties  are closely related.  Its duty to investigate  before it  exercise  its  power to file a complaint seems to us clear.   In fact, its exercise of power  without investigation  may  be  justifiably questioned  and  legitimately criticized." "Certainly few would deny the wisdom of such a course. There may be criticisms which arise out of making the investigator, also, the trier  of the fact.  But that  criticism, whatever  its  merits, is in no way involved in our inquiry, which is to ascertain  whether the Act required the Board,  as appellants contend, to act,  that is, to issue  the  complaint,  and then  investigate the  facts or, as the Government urges, required the Board  to investigate the facts set forth in the charge of the employee and issue its complaint only if it finds merit  in the charge.  In other words, if it appears that reasonable grounds  exist for  believing the allegation of  the employee  to be true, and  that the employer is engaged in interstate commerce and has been  guilty  of unfair labor practice condemned by the Act, the  Board should  act, but not until its investigation established  or tended to establish such facts. 

"It would seem  highly desirable that  the  Board's position be upheld, for,  if not, the  employer would be in the unhappy  position of being called  upon to defend against false charges preferred by  malicious or irresponsible  parties. Somewhat comparable to such a situation would be the case of a prosecuting attorney who started  criminal  proceedings first  and investigated  afterwards. 

"Specifically the questions are: (1) Does section 10(6) give the power to investigate? and (2) if so, are the powers  to investigate and to  issue  subpoenas  therefor, restricted by these  sections to cases which have reached the  stage  where  a complaint against the  employer has been issued by the  Board?. 

"* * *.   The power of the Board  to  issue complaints, to conduct hearings,  and to  make findings, does not, expressly or  impliedly, exclude the investigatory powers.  On  the other hand, the investigatory powers are complementary to the powers  expressly granted to the Board." 

"Section  10  (b) does not require the Board to issue a complaint. It expressly provides that the Board  "shall  have  power to issue and cause to  be served * * *  a complaint  stating the charges in that  respect "* *.*'  "Power to  issue" is different from  "shall issue."  The difference  is important.  In one the Board's duty is mandatory.  It has no  discretion. In the other, the Board  has a discretion it acts judicially.  It is in the exercise of  this  discretionary power, that investigation becomes necessary.  The  power to investigate is a necessary power,  which is incidental to the exercise of  the power to  issue a complaint.  It is an implied power, quite as clearly granted as any  express power enumerated in said section 10(b.)."

We are,  therefore, satisfied  that the CIR acted  correctly in exercising its investigatory power by designating its  acting prosecutor  to  conduct  an investigation of the charges filed by the petitioner, and later having the  complaint filed on  the  basis of  the  result of said investigation and requiring the respondent to file his  answer and then hearing both parties.

As to  the  reasons  for  the  dismissal  of Dacanay, the CIR through  Judge  Bautista,  found that he could not have been dismissed for his union activities in the National Union  of Printing  Workers, for the reason that at the time of his dismissal on August 23, 1953, said union was not yet in existence. On the other hand, the CIR found from the evidence submitted by respondents, Asia Printing and/or its manager, Lu Ming, that Dacanay had been guilty of  a series of  act  of inefficiency, incompetence,  lack of interest in his work, disobedience, and as a trouble-maker, ranging from disobeying instructions given to him by the manager of the printing.establishment, to vexing, seriously annoying and quarreling with women employees of the establishment. On several instances, the manager asked Dacanay to place the numbering machine in a can of gas after the mold was finished. This was necessary in order to prevent the  machine  from becoming rusty.  Dacanay never obeyed said instructions saying that, that was for the compositor to do. In other instances, after being given cans of ink  to  be used in the  printing, Dacanay would remove the; labels thereby  leaving the ink cans  without any  identification as to the color and the  kind of ink  in them,  thereby confusing the other employees.   At one time, Dacanay quarreled with Isabelo de la Paz, designated by the management  to  distribute jobs to the workers because Dacanay  wanted the position for himself.  Then, at another time, Dacanay  with  a drawn knife about  5 inches long,  challenged Roberto  Bernardo  to  fight.  Roberto, evidently felt that he  could not ignore the  challenge, and so he took the big  knife used in cutting paper and addressed Dacanay thus:

"What is in your mind?

If you like, whatever you like, I am ready."

Fortunately,  the other employees were able to separate them.  As to seriously  annoying and quarreling with women  employees and co-workers,  particularly Elena del Rosario, for  reasons of decency we refrain from relating the  incident; but it is described  in the order of Judge, Bautista as related  by the woman employee herself, who happened to be married.   We reproduce a pertinent portion of the order of Judge Bautista about the charge of inefficiency, incompetence and  of being troublesome against Dacanay. 

"* * *. As  to  the imputation  of inefficiency  and disobedience, Dacanay did  not  even deny it. He merely stated that, tact Mr. Ming found anything not proper in my behavior,  during the last 18  and one half years, he would not have given me the wage of P9.80 a day.  It is a  fact, however, that from  1946 to 1949, the company granted to all its employees increases of  wages and consequently  Dacanay received them; and the last general increase was given in 1949 by virtue of a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations. 

"With respect to the charge of being troublesome,  in  the said five altercations, only the case  of  Roberto Bernardo was  denied by  Dacanay.  The rest remained uncontradicted."

In view of the foregoing, the order of  Judge Bautista of  December 21,  1954,  dismissing  Francisco  Dacanay's complaint, and  the resolution of the CIR en banc  dated January 20,  1955, denying  Dacanay's motion for  reconsideration, are hereby affirmed, with costs.

Paras, C. J.,  Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.