In a complaint  dated 3  February  1955 filed  with the Wage Administration Service of the Department of Labor, Felix Garcia sought  to recover from his father Francisco Garcia  unpaid  wages for services rendered as  mechanic from 1  June 1947 to May 1952 at the rate of P5.00 a day, with free board and lodging, and for overtime service rendered in  excess of eight hours daily including Sundays and  legal holidays from 6:00  o'clock in  the morning to 10:00 o'clock in the evening (Case No. C-2866).  After investigation, on 14 January 1956 the investigator rendered his "Finding and  Recommendations" "that  complainant was employed by the respondent and that he was  not paid for his salary and overtime pay during the whole period of his employment," and "that respondent be required to  deposit with this Office within five  (5) days from receipt  hereof, the amount of fourteen thousand TWENTY THREE PESOS AND 20/100  (P14,023.20) With which to satisfy the claims of the complainant." On 21 August 1956 the claimant filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila praying  for the issuance of a writ to execute the "Finding and Recommendations" of the investigator of the Regional Office No. 1 of the Wage Administration Service, Department of Labor, that  had ordered the  respondent to pay him the sum of P14,023.20 with interest thereon at the legal rate from 3 February 1955 to  the date of full payment, and reasonable attorney's fee.

On 7 September 1956 the Court entered an  order commanding the Sheriff of the City of  Manila to levy upon execution on the goods and chattels of  the respondent to satisfy the "decision" or "judgment" of the Wage Administration Service in favor of the petitioner against the respondent in the  sum of P14,023.20, interest thereon at the rate of 6%  per  annum from 3 February 1955 to the date of  full payment and the Sheriff's fees.

On 14 September 1956 the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration  of the last mentioned order,  and on 17 September 1956 "additional arguments" in support of his motion for reconsideration.

On 18 September 1956 the petitioner filed a "manifestation" stating that the respondent's motion for reconsideration "does  not adduce any plausible arguments which will warrant the filing of an opposition," and praying that it be denied.

On 19 September 1956 the Court granted the respondent's motion for reconsideration and  set aside the order of execution  dated 7 September 1956.  The  petitioner moved for reconsideration  of the order in open court.

On 22 September 1956 the  respondent filed a "supplementary memorandum" "in answer to whatever arguments counsel for the  plaintiff may submit  in the hearing this morning with respect to the order of execution already recalled and set aside" by the Court.

On 11 October  1956 the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the Court dated 19 September 1956 setting  aside the order of execution dated 7 September 1956. On 23 October  1956 the, respondent filed a "memorandum" opposing the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

On 3 December 1956 the petitioner filed  a reply to  the respondent's opposition, and on 5 December a supplemental reply.

On 5 December 1956 the Court denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The petitioner has appealed.

May a "decision" or "judgment" of the Wage Administration Service ordering the appellee to pay the appellant the sum of P14,023.20 for unpaid wages and overtime pay, be ordered executed by the Court of First Instance without the prevailing party commencing an action in  court against the losing party for the recovery thereof, is  the issue in  this case.  In Potente vs. Saulog Transit, Inc., (105 Phil., 525), this Court resolved a similar issue in the  negative and  said:

Neither the  lower court, nor the appellee has  cited any legal provision  sanctioning the procedure followed in  this case by  the lower court.  What is more, the law creating the WAS indicates clearly that an "action" must be brought, "in any competent court", for the recovery of unpaid wages which the employer fails or refuses to satisfy.  *  *  *.

"An action," pursuant to Rule 2, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, "means an ordinary suit in a Court of Justice, by which  one party prosecutes another for the enforcement  or protection  of a right, or the prevention or redress of a  wrong." (Italics ours.)   It is apparent that the authority  to bring "an action,"  for  the recovery of wages due to an employee or laborer, would not have been explicitly vested in  the WAS, if it had the power to render a "cession" sentencing the employer to pay  the amount  found to  be due said employee or laborer, and  judicial intervention were necessary only to execute such "decision", inasmuch as a  petition, before a court of justice, for the execution of said "decision" would  not be  "an action,"  as adverted  to  above.

The rules  and regulations  promulgated by the WAS,  on January 20, 1953, to implement the Minimum Wage Law pertinent  provisions of which are reproduced  at  the  footnote lead  to  the same conclusions.  Pursuant to said rules, when a claim for unpaid wages, due,  either to non-payment,  or to  underpayment  thereof, is  filed, the WAS shall call the  parties  to a  conference, at which the claims investigator or claims attorney of the WAS shall resort to mediation, by endeavoring "to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the  claim  by  amicable  agreement."  However, "if  no  amicable agreement is  arrived at between the parties", said investigator or attorney "shall immediately ask the  parties whether they are willing to arbitrate or submit the case to arbitration by the Service", and, "in the event that mediation fails and  the  parties are  not willing to arbitrate the claim "shall immediately be assigned  to  a claims attorney",  who  will  conduct an investigation, "to  find out whether said claim  is  meritorious or not.  If meritorious the attorney shall prepare the corresponding complaint *   *    *  for court action * *  *." In other words,  the WAS may  cause the employer to  satisfy the unpaid wages  through mediation, arbitration, or court action, and by no other  means.  It has no authority to render a  "decision" in the sense in which this term is  used in legal parlance on  the claim for wages,  except insofar  as it has to determine  whether, in its opinion, the claim  is  meritorious, as a condition precedent to the institution, before "any  competent court", of an ordinary "action" for the  recovery of  the sum  of money it considers  due to the claimant.  But, then, no writ of execution shall issue, except when the  judgment rendered  by said court after due  notice  and hearing, as demanded by the tenets of due process and  provided in the Rules of Court shall have become final and executory.^[1]

The  appellant  and the  appellee did not enter into a written agreement  to submit their dispute to the Wage Administration Service for arbitration, pursuant to section 9, article 7(C), Chapter III, of the Code of Rules and Procedure  promulgated on 20 January 1953 by the Secretary of Labor to implement the provisions of the Minimum Wage Law.  Hence  whatever  "decision"  or "judgment" the Wage Administration Service may have rendered in the  case  is not binding upon  the  parties,^[2] and a writ of execution issued  by  the  Court  of First Instance  to  en force it is unauthorized and illegal.

The order appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Paras,  C. J.,  Bengzon,  Montemayor, Bautista Angela, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.  B.  L., Endencia, Barrera, and  Gutierrez David, JJ.,  concur.

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^[1] See also Santos vs. Perez Vela, de Caparas, 105 Phil., 992; and Figueroa vs. Saulog, 105 Phil., 1012.

^[2] Cebrero  vs. Talaman, 103 Phil.,  687; Winch vs. Kienner, 104 Phil., 735.