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[AGUSTIN LIBORO v. WILLIAM P. ROGERS](https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c338a?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
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[ GR No. L-11046, Oct 30, 1959 ]

AGUSTIN LIBORO v. WILLIAM P. ROGERS +

DECISION

106 Phil. 404

[ G. R. No. L-11046, October 30, 1959 ]

AGUSTIN LIBORO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. WILLIAM P. ROGERS, ETC., DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, INTERVENOR AND APPELLEE.

D E C I S I O N

PARAS, J.:

On April 22, 1947,  the Philippines Alien Property Administrator vested  for the  benefit  of the United  States Government  six parcels of  land,  together  with  their  improvements, located in Kansas Street, Malate, Manila, and covered by transfer certificates of title  Nos. 64862, 64863 (for two lots), 64864,  64865 and 64566 in the name of the Philippine Cotton Growing Association, and on January 12, 1948, took title and possession of the personal properties found  therein  under  Vesting Order No. P-123  (Supplemental).  Agustin Liboro filed a claim for the recovery of the properties which was denied by said Administrator; whereupon the present suit was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the same purpose by Agustin Liboro, in which the Republic of the Philippines intervened.  On June 30, 1956, the complaint was dismissed without costs. Plaintiff Agustin Liboro has appealed.

It appears that the appellant, the original owner of the properties  in controversy, sold the same on March 2, 1942, to the Philippine Cotton Growing Association, a corporation organized under the laws of Japan, for P112,000.00. He received in cash only P12,000.00, as the vendee assumed the responsibility of paying his outstanding obligations to the Bank of the Philippine Islands, the Agricultural and Industrial  Bank and the  Philippine Bank of Commerce amounting to  P100,000.00.  Consequently,  corresponding transfer certificates of title  were issued in favor of the vendee.

The appellant is  repudiating the validity of  the sale to the Japanese  corporation, on the  ground of  duress and upon the allegation  that he  had already repurchased the properties  although the corporation had failed to execute the necessary deed.

On the  matter of duress,  the  appellant  in substance testified  that  in January, 1942, two Japanese  civilians, introducing themselves as Mashiba and Imamura, general manager and assistant manager, respectively, of the.Philippine  Cotton Growing  Association, inspected and offered to buy his  house; that as he refused, the two left; that he subsequently received  a letter  directing  him to, as  he did, see a certain Kempetai officer at the Finance Building; that on this occasion the same offer was made, only again to be turned down by him; that he was later summoned by said officer twice, and in the last meeting he was warned that, should he refused to cooperate, he might be considered an enemy;  that  Hashiba was present  in  all  said interviews  and the officer cautioned him not to tell anybody about their conversations; that, fearing that he might be brought to  and tortured  in Fort  Santiago, like some of his friends and relatives, he agreed to sell.

This Court has, in many cases, already ruled that "collective"  or  "general" duress allegedly  exercised by the Japanese military forces will not nullify certain contractual acts.  In Fernandez vs. McGrath, 96 Phil., 411; it was held:
"As a final argument in  annulling the deed  of  sale in question, the lower court held that the transaction being between the military occupant and an inhabitant of the occupied territory, over a property that was  a war necessity, duress may be presumed and no evidence of a particular coercive act is necessary.  In numerous cases decided before this, particularly  Philippine Trust Co. vs. Luis Araneta, 83 Phil., 132; 46  Off. Gaz., 4254;  People vs. Bangalamis, 78 Phil., 174; 44 Off. Gaz., 2655; and People vs. Quilloy, 88 Phil.,  53,  this Court has already, rejected the theory of 'collective'  or  'general' duress allegedly  exercised  by the  Japanese  military  occupant over  the inhabitants of this country as ground to invalidate acts  that would otherwise be valid and voluntary if done in times of peace."
Assuming, therefore,  that the appellant was compelled to execute the  disputed deed of sale, the duress invoked was no more than the general feeling of fear on the part of the Filipinos brought about  by the excessive show of might by their miltiary occupants and,  we reiterate, insufficient to render an otherwise valid contract  a nullity.  What is more, appellant's outstanding obligations amounting to P100,000.00 had been paid out of the purchase price, with the result that, even disregarding the statement of Seiichi Tagawa, a mutual friend of Hashiba and Imamura, that the  appellant  was  constrained to sell  his house  because  of financial difficulties (Exh. C), the fact remains that he  actually  reaped the benefit of the transactions. As this  Court had said:  "A party that is able to carry out an act redounding to its exclusive benefit simultaneously with the assailed contract, cannot successfully  claim in the  latter case  to have  acted mechanically  under the influence of violence or intimidation (Reyes  vs. Zaballero, 89 Phil., 39; Martinez  vs. Hongkong & Shanghai  Bank, 15 Phil., 252; Vales vs. Villa, 35 Phil., 769)."  And in the case of Fernandez vs.  Brownell, supra, the pronouncement was laid  down that "Even if  we  concede that the sale  was  executed through  threat  and intimidation  by Mori, the  action for  annulment was   waived and the contract ratified,by the plaintiff's action in depositing the check for the purchase  price and withdrawing the money from time to time."

We have gone over  appellant's evidence and found no reason to  disturb the lower court's conclusion that he had failed to prove a valid repurchase of the property in question.  Supposing that in January, 1945.  appellant's daughter made the necessary payment to  Imamura, there is no showing that the latter, as assistant  general manager, was empowered or authorized  to receive  such payment for the corporation or that the latter had ever ratified Imamura's act.   The powers of a general manager are not unlimited. His  province or function is only to supervise and conduct the ordinary business of his principal, and whether an act falls within his implied powers depends  on  whether or not it is within the  ordinary business entrusted to his management (Vol. 2,  Fletcher's  Cyclopedia Corporations, Perm. Ed., p. 607, citing Carroll-Cross Coal Co. vs. Abrams Creek Coal & Coke Co.,  83 W. Va. 205, 98 SE 148).  And contracts entered into by officers or managers of a corporation beyond the authority granted them  do  not bind the corporation unless  ratified by it (See Deen vs.  Pacific Commercial, 42 Phil., 758).

Wherefore, the  decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.  So ordered.

Bengzon, Montemayor,  Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ.,  concur.

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