This is a petition for certiorari praying that the writ of execution issued  by respondent judge on July  29,  1955 be set aside on the ground that it was issued in  excess of his jurisdiction.

This  petition stems  from  a decision  rendered  by  the Court of  First Instance of Pangasinan,  presided over by his Honor  Emanuel M. Munoz, in two  civil cases which were  jointly tried upon agreement of the parties on  the ground  that they involve  the same parties  and  the  same subject  matter  (cases Nos. 10374  and 12672).   Case No. 10374 is  for  recovery  of  possession  of  a parcel of land occupied  by Pedro Cerezo while  case No.   12672 is  for unlawful  detainer of the  same land  brought against  the same  party.  The dispositive part of the decision reads as follows: 

"a. In  civil case  No. 10374,  declaring  the  plaintiffs  Cornelio Barnachea, Fernanda  Corpus,  Esteban  M.  Corpus and  Eusebio S. Sison as  owners  and entitled to the possession of the land described in the complaint in the proportion provided for in their agreement evidenced by  Exhibit 'C; 

"b. In  civil case No. 12672, the  defendant Pedro Cerezo is hereby ordered,  after this decision becomes final, to deliver the possession of  the land to the plaintiffs; 

"c. In  civil case No. 12672, defendant Pedro Cerezo is hereby ordered to  pay  the  rentals at the rate of PI 50 a  year until  possession shall have been delivered to the plaintiffs; 

"d. Also  in civil  case No.  12672, the Provincial Treasurer of Pangasinan is hereby ordered to  deliver to the plaintiffs  or their . attorney  of record, Jose G.  del Castillo,  the sum of Pl,050 deposited under  Official Receipt  No.  7534896, dated July  14, 1954; and 

"e. The defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the costs in both cases."

On July  23,  1955, the plaintiffs  in  both  cases  filed a motion  for execution of the judgment alleging,  among other grounds,  that  defendant has failed to  deposit with the clerk of court the rental of the land for the current year and, therefore, they are  entitled  to take  immediate possession of the property pursuant to  section 8, Rule 72, of the Rules of Court.  This motion was favorably provided for in an order issued on July 29, 1955, which was amended on August 16, 1955, by virtue of a clerical error inadvertently committed, with  regard to the beneficiaries of the judgment.  And when the court refused to reconsider these orders and to set aside the writ of execution, defendant interposed the present petition for certiorari.

It should be  noted that respondent  judge in granting the  motion for execution did not state any  particular reason for  allowing such execution pending appeal but simply stated that  the motion was "well taken and in accordance  with law."   Undoubtedly,  the court was referring to  paragraph c of the motion which states that "in view of the. failure of the defendant to deposit the rental for the current year,  execution  may issue to place the plaintiff in possession of the premises  pursuant to the  provisions of Rule 72,  Sections 8 and  9."  If such were the case,  the question that arises is: Was the court justified  in ordering the execution on that ground?   Petitioner contends that this case does not  came under Section 8, Rule 72, and  we believe that this position is well-taken.

Note that the judgment which is  sought to be executed fixes  a yearly  rental of  P150 which should be paid  by defendant until possession of the property is returned to the plaintiffs.   No damages were assessed against defendant because, with regard to the rentals  for  the previous years, which amount to P1,050, the same have already been deposited in court even before rendition  of the judgment. Not being  a monthly  rental what defendant is required to deposit in court, section 8, Rule 72 does not  apply, for, as this Court aptly said: "This rule contemplates payment of a monthly rental the failure of which would give rise to execution, and  not the payment of rental in any other manner.  In the  present  case, the  rental  fixed by the justice of the  peace court is not monthly but yearly, and this is understandable considering the fact that the property subject of lease is a fishpond.   *  *  *  As it now appears the rental fixed by the court is not yet due and, therefore, the order  of execution issued by the respondent judge  is premature." (Victor de la Cruz vs.  Honorable Ambrosio T.  Dollete, et al., 96  Phil.,  797).  Since the rental  which defendant has  allegedly failed to deposit  is for the "current year", it is evident that; based on this ground, the writ of  execution is premature.

It is true that under Section 2, Rule 39 the trial court may also order that "before  the expiration of the time to appeal", in the exercise of its discretion,  a writ of execution be issued "on motion of the prevailing party  with notice  to the adverse party upon good reasons to be stated in a special order",  and that,  even in that eventuality, execution may be stayed "upon the  approval by the court of a sufficient supersedeas bond filed by the appellant, conditioned  for the performance  of  the judgment or order appealed from",  but the  writ of execution in question cannot be justified even under the above  provision of the rules for the order of the court does not  state the "good reasons" that may justify such departure from the normal course of appeal.   While the reasons justifying such action may be gathered from other pleadings  appearing in the record, we fail to find any in this particular instance.   We are therefore persuaded to conclude that the respondent judge  has  acted in excess  of his  jurisdiction when  he granted the  writ of execution under the circumstances obtaining in this  case.

Wherefore,  petition is granted, with  costs against  respondents, other than respondent judge.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A. Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B.  L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.