Appeal  by  defendant  Guillermo  Cresencia  from the judgment of  the Court of First Instance  of Manila in its civil  case No. 19890, sentencing appellant,  jointly and severally  with  his co-defendant  Brigido Avorque, to pay plaintiffs  Emerencia M.  Vda. de Medina  and her minor children damages in the total amount of P56,000, P5,000 attorneys' fees, and  costs.

It  appears  that  on May  31,  1953, passenger  jeepney bearing plate No. TPU-2232 (Manila),  driven by  Brigido Avorque,   smashed  into  a  Meralco post on Azcarraga Street, resulting in the death of  Vicente Medina, one of its passengers.   A criminal case for homicide through  reckless imprudence was filed against Avorque (criminal case No. 22775  of the Court of First Instance  of Manila), to which lie pleaded guilty on September 9, 1953.   The heirs of the deceased,  however, reserved their  right to file a separate action  fbr  damages,  and  on June  16,  1953, brought  suit  against  the driver  Brigido Avorque and appellant Guillermo Cresencia, the registered owner and operator of the jeepney in question.  Defendant  Brigido Avorque did not file any  answer; while  defendant Cresencia  answered,  disclaiming liability on the ground that he had sold the jeepney in question on October 14, 1950 to one Maria A. Cudiamat; that the jeepney  had been repeatedly  sold by  one buyer  after  another,  until  the vehicle was purchased  on January  29,  1953  by  Rosario Avorque, the absolute  owner thereof at the time of the accident.  In view  of  Cresencia's answer, plaintiffs filed leave, and  was allowed, to amend their complaint  making Rosario Avorque a co-defendant; and the  latter,  by way of answer,  admitted having purchased the  aforesaid jeepney on May 31, 1953, but alleged in defense that she was never the public  utility operator thereof.  The  case then proceeded to trial,  during which, after the plaintiffs had presented their evidence,  defendants Guillermo  Cresencia and Rosario Avorque made manifestations admitting' that the former was still the registered operator of the  jeepney in question in the  records of  the Motor  Vehicles  Office and the Public Service  Commission, while the latter was the owner  thereof at the time of the accident; and submitted the  case for the decision on the  question  of who, as between the two, should be held liable to plaintiffs  for damages.   The lower court, by  Judge Jose Zulueta, held that as far as the public  is concerned, defendant  Cresencia, in the eyes of the law, continued to be  the legal owner of  the jeepney  in question;  and  rendered  judgment against him, jointly and severally with the driver  Brigido Avorque, for P6,000 compensatory damages, P30,000 moral damages, P10,000 exemplary  damages,  P10,000 nominal damages, P5,000 attorneys fees, and costs, while defendant Rosario Avorque was absolved from liability.  From this judgment, defendant Cresencia appealed.

We have already held  in the case of Montoya vs. Ignacio, 94  Phil.,  182  (December 29, 1953), which the court below cited, that  the law (section 20 [g], C. A. No.  146 as amended)  requires the approval of the Public Service Commission in order that a franchise,  or any  privilege pertaining thereto, may be  sold  or leased without  infringing the certificate issued to the grantee; and  that if property covered by the  franchise is transferred or leased without this requisite approval, the  transfer is not binding against the public or the Service Commission;  and in contemplation  of  law, the grantee of record continues to be responsible under the franchise in relation to the Commission and to the public. There we gave the reason for this rule  to be as follows: 

"* * * Since  a franchise is personal  in nature any transfer or lease thereof should  be notified to the Public Service Commission so that the latter may  take proper  safeguards to protect the interest of the public In fact, the law requires that, before  the approval is granted,  there should be  a public  hearing, with notice to all interested parties, in order that  the Commission  may determine if there are good  and  reasonable grounds justifying the transfer or lease of the property  covered by the franchise,  or if the sale or lease is detrimental  to public interest.  * * *"

The above ruling was  later reiterated  in the  cases of Timbol vs. Osias,  L-7547, April  30, 1955 and Roque  vs. Malibay Transit Inc., L-8561, November 18, 1955.

As the sale  of the jeepney here in question was admittedly without the approval of the Public Service Commission,  appellant herein,  Guillermo  Cresencia,  who  is  the registered owner and operator thereof, continued  to be liable to  the  Commission and the  public  for  the consequences incident to its operation.  Wherefore, the lower court did not  err in holding him, and not the buyer  Rosario Avorque, responsible for the damages sustained by plaintiff by reason of the death of Vicente Medina resulting from the reckless negligence  of the  jeepney's  driver, Brigido Avorque.

Appellant also argues that the basis of plaintiffs' action being the employer's subsidiary liability under the Revised Penal Code for damages arising from his, employee's criminal acts, it is defendant Rosario Avorque  who  should answer subsidiarily for  the  damages sustained by plaintiffs, since she admits that  she, and not appellant, is  the employer of the negligent driver  Brigido  Avorque.  The argument is untenable/because plaintiffs' action for damages  is independent of  the criminal case  filed  against Brigido Avorque, and based, not  on  the employer's subsidiary liability under the Revised Penal Code, but on a breach of the  carrier's contractual obligation to carry  his passengers safely to their destination (culpa contractual). And it is also for this  reason that there is no need of first proving the insolvency  of the  driver Brigido Avorque before damages can be recovered from the carrier, for in culpa contractual, the liability of the carrier  is not merely subsidiary  or  secondary, but direct and immediate (Articles 1755, 1756,  and 1759, New Civil  Code).

The propriety  of the  damages  awarded has not been questioned.  Nevertheless, it is patent  upon the  record that the  award of P10,000 by way of nominal damages is untenable as a matter of law, since nominal damages  can not co-exist with  compensatory damages.  The purpose of nominal  damages is to vindicate or recognize a right that has  been violated,  in order to preclude further contest thereon;  "and not  for the  purpose of indemnifying  the plaintiff  for any loss suffered  by him"  (Articles  2221, 2223, new Civil Code.)   Since the  court below has already awarded compensatory  and  exemplary damages  that  are in themselves  a judicial recognition that plaintiff's right was violated,  the award of nominal damages is  unnecessary and improper."  Anyway, ten  thousand pesos can not, in common sense, be  deemed "nominal".

With the modification that the award of P10,000 nominal damages" be eliminated, the decision appealed from id affirmed. Costs against appellant. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A,, Bautista Angelo,  Labrador,  Concepcion, and Endencia, JJ., concur.