This is an appeal  from  the order of the Court of  First Instance of Manila  presided by Judge E. Soriano  dated February  12,  1955,  granting  the motion  to dismiss filed by  the  defendant Leonardo Castro  and   dismissing  the complaint of the plaintiff Eduardo Brillantes.  For a  statement of the facts  of the case we adopt that made by the trial court  which we reproduce below: 

It appears that on December  1, 1953,  the plaintiff filed a complaint  against the   defendant  before  the  Wage  Administration Service  for  the  recovery of  alleged unpaid salary  and overtime pay,  the said  case  bearing No. C-1046;  that   on  February  15, 1954; the plaintiff and  the  defendant entered into an arbitration agreement whereby  they  agreed  "1. That  they  submit  their case to the Wage  Administration  Service for investigation"; and "2. That they bind themselves to abide  by whatever  decision this  Office may render on the case and  that they recognize  said decision to be final and conclusive";  that in  accordance with the said agreement,  the parties,  assisted by their respective counsel, adduced evidence before the  Wage Administrative  Service; that on May 31, 1954, the latter rendered a decision  containing its findings and  the  following dispositive  parts "wherefore, considering the  evidence presented, the claim for overtime and underpayment is hereby dismissed but the respondent is adjudged  to pay to the claimant the amount of fifty pesos  and  eighty-eight centavos  (P50.88)  corresponding  to his salary for services rendered in the month of November, 1953 and to deposit the same  within five  (5)  days  from receipt thereof"; that no appeal was taken from the said decision, and that on November 10, 1954, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant with this Court over the same subject-matter and cause of action litigated between  them  before, and decided by,  the  Wage  Administration  Service,  (pp. 22-23,  Record on Appeal.)

In support of its order of dismissal, the trial court made the following observation and conclusions which we quote with favor: 

It is evident  that the  aforesaid  decision rendered by the Hearing Officer of the  Wage  Administration  Service  was  pursuant to" the authority granted to the Secretary of Labor to "delegate any or all  of his powers in the  administration  or enforcement of the Minimum Wage Law to  the Chief of the WAS, who may act personally  or through  duly authorized  representative"  Republic Act No.  602,  The  Minimum Wage  Law,  section  12 (e).  Section 7  of the same Act also pertinently provides that "Any  person  aggrieved by an order  of the Secretary of Labor  issued under this Act may obtain a review of such order  in  the Supreme Court by  filing in such court within  fifteen (15) days after the entry and publication of  such  order  a written petition  praying that the order of the Secretary  of Labor  be  modified  or set  aside   in  whole  or  in part  * *.*." The jurisdiction  of the  Wage Administration Service to render  the aforesaid decision, as well  as the remedy  of the aggrieved party against such a decision,  is impliedly recognized by the Supreme  Court in Gonzales vs. Hon. Secretary  of Labor, et als., ' G. R. No.  L-6409, wherein it was said:  "The  point raised by the Solicitor  General on behalf of the respondent  Secretary  of  Labor that petitioner's remedy  is to appeal to the President of the Philippines is  not  well  taken.  Section  7 of the law  creating the  WAS (Rep. Act  No.  602)  expressly authorized any person aggrieved  by an  order of  the Secretary of Labor to obtain a review of such order in  the  Supreme Court."  In view of the failure of the  herein plaintiff to avail himself of the remedy marked out by said Section 7 of  Republic  Act No.  602 within the  time  therein specified, the aforesaid decision  of the Wage1 Administration Service became final   . and  conclusive, not only by clear  implication but also by express agreement  of the  parties "That they bind themselves to  abide  by whatever decision  this Office (WAS)  may render  on the  case, and that they recognize  said decision to be  final and conclusive".  To permit the herein  plaintiff to institute the present case before this Court, atfer  the  same  had been  finally aad  conclusively decided by the Wage Administration  Service,  is  therefore to allow him to go back on his own solemn agreement, to set at naught the provisions of Republic Act No. 602; and to encourage duplication  of  work, if not  conflicting judgments,  by  authorizing a party first to file his case with  the  Wage  Administration  Service and thereafter, in case of an  adverse  decision, to refile the  same case  with  the Court of First  Instance.  This could not have been the legislator's intention in the enactment of  Republic Act No. 602.  (pp. 23-24, Record on  Appeal.)

Attorney Manuel Y.  Macias counsel for appellant in his brief concedes that the decision rendered by the hearing officer of the  WAS is an order "issued pursuant to Section 7, above-quoted, of the Minimum Wage Law in relation to Section 12 (a) which authorizes delegation by the Secretary of Labor of his powers in the administration or  enforcement of the Minimum Wage Law to the Chief of the Wage Administrative Service."  He, however, contends  that the right  to  go  to the Supreme Court for review  of  said order granted by Section  7 of  the Minimum Wage Law is not exclusive,  because  according to  him, under  said Section 7 the review, by this Tribunal is limited to questions of law and  that the  findings  of  fact  contained in  the appealed decision must be accepted.   This is not entirely correct.   The findings of fact made by  the Secretary of Labor or his delegate are accepted and are  conclusive only if supported by substantial evidence.  So that plaintiff could well have appealed from the decision of the WAS to this Tribunal,  even on question of  fact, if he was  prepared and in a position to show that the findings of fact of the WAS  were not supported by substantial  evidence. Then counsel for appellant, referring to the hearing officer of the WAS and his decision, says the following: 

Appellant cannot accept the findings of fact in the 'decision' of the Hearing Officer of the  Wage Administration Service because they are not merely contrary to the facts but a scandalous distortion of them with no other end in  view but  to favor appellee, the  respondent employer.  The Hearing  Officer, to promote this' end, callously  ignored  appellant's evidence.  His  so called 'decision'  is  a mockery of justice, and absolute nullity for which no fair minded citizen can have any respect,  (p. 5, Appellant's Brief.) 

And of  Judge  Soriano  who dismissed plaintiff's complaint, the same counsel comments thus: 

The court a  quo  refused to perform the functions  of  a trial court  and rendered the foregoing ruling  without any  evidence having been  first presented pro or con.   It decided an issue in favor of one party and against the  other upon the mere representations of the favored party and refused absolutely to hear the other.  The court a quo's act in so doing is a plain violation of the right to due process p. 8,.Appellant's Brief.)

The above is couched in strong and disrespectful language unbecoming a lawyer who is an  officer of the court, and highly improper in referring to an administrative  official authorized to render decisions and especially to  a Judge of the Court of First Instance.  If plaintiff-appellant and his counsel were  dissatisfied  with the findings  of the hearing  officer of the  WAS;  if  they believed  that the findings  were a distortion  of  the  facts as contained in the evidence, they should have appealed  from  said  decision to this Tribunal.  And if  they were really convinced that said hearing officer of the WAS delibeartely distorted the facts to favor the employer,  they should have  prepared charges of partiality  and malfeasance and lodged the same with  the proper  authorities  for investigation.   Now  is neither the time nor the  occasion to  air  said  grievance, assuming for  the moment  that it  is real and well founded. And as to the reference to the trial court, said court merely acted upon the motion to  dismiss.  It  considered the complaint and the  motion to  dismiss.   That  was  enough. There was no need for the presentation of  any evidence. So, the action of the trial court was proper and warranted; which cannot be  said  of  the comment  and observations of counsel above reproduced.   Said counsel  is hereby admonished to  use more temperate and  respectful language and observe more proper conduct in the future.

We fully agree  with the trial court  in its order dismissing the complaint on the  ground that the action is barred by  prior judgment.  There is  no question that the complaint filed by plaintiff-appellant  with the  WAS may be regarded as a suit by one party against another to enforce a right;  that  the WAS  in  entertaining said suit,  hearing the parties and deciding the case acted as a quasi-judicial body and the proceedings before it were quasi-judicial proceedings, and conducted  in accordance with law, and so was the decision rendered.   Not only this, but the parties before  the commencement  of  the proceedings  signed  an agreement whereby they submitted their case to the WAS, binding themselves by whatever  decision the WAS  may render  on the  same, and that they recognized the decision to be final and conclusive.  After signing that agreement or pledge, plaintiff-appellant may not now be  heard to say that the decision reridered  by the WAS has  no legal effect on him. Besides,  even  assuming  that despite  the agreement the decision did  not automatically become final, still plaintiff's failure to appeal therefrom to the Supreme Court as  provided by the Minimum Wage Law  (Rep., Act 602) rendered it final  and conclusive and served as a bar to another action between the  same parties  involving  the same  subject  matter  and  cause of action and the  same issues.

In the  case  of Penalosa vs.  Tuason, 22 Phil. 303,  314, we held: 

"*  *  *  'a judgment rendered  *  *  *  by  a court of  competent jurisdiction  on the .merits,  is  a bar to any future  suit between the same parties or their privies  upon the same cause  of action so  long as it  remains unreserved;' or in the language  of Mr. Justice Field in the opinion just cited: 

"It is a  finality as  to  the  claim  or  demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as  to every matter which was offered and received to  sustain or defeat the claim  or demand,  but as to any other admissible matter which migh have been offered for that purpose."'

And in the case  of  Tejedor vs. Palet, 61  Phil. 494, 502-503,  we equally held: 

"'The rule is often stated in general terms that a judgment  is conclusive  not only upon the  questions  actually  contested  and determined, but  upon all  matters  which might have been litgated and  decided  in  that suit;  and  this  is  undoubtedly true of  all matters properly belonging  to  the subject of the controversy and within the scope of the  issues.  *  *   *' "  (citing 34  C.  J., pp. 909-911.)

The authorities above cited on  res adjucata refer to decisions rendered by  the courts.  Are they applicable to decisions of a quasi-judicial body like the Wage Administration Service (WAS) ?  The answer is in the affirmative, as may be seen from the following authorities: 

"The rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent  authority applies as well to the judicial and  quasi-judicial  acts  of  public, executive,  or  administrative officers  and  boards acting within  their  jurisdiction  as  to  the judgments  of courts having general  judicial powers.  This rule has been recognized as applying to the decisions of road or highway commissioners, commissioners of  motor transportation,  boards  of audit,  county  boards, tax commissioners,  boards,  or officers, the federal trade  commission, school commissioners, police commissioners, sewers commissioners,  land commissioners or officers, collector of customs, referees in bankruptcy' court commissioners, boards or other tribunals administering workmen's  compensation acts, and other like officers and boards.  However, a particular decision or determination may not be conclusive,  as where it  was not a judicial, as distinguished from a legislative, executive,  or ministerial, determination, or the matter was not within the jurisdiction  of the officer or board.
 *  *  *" (50 C. J. S., Judgments, Sec. 690, pp. 148-149).
   
 * * * There are, however, cases in which the doctrine of res judicata has been held applicable to judicial acts of public, executive, or administrative officers and boards. in this connection, it has been declared that whenever a final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiori, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata." (30 Am. jur., Judgments, Sec. 164, p. 910). (Italics Supplied). 

In view of  the foregoing,  the  order appealed  from is affirmed.  No  costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.