This is  a petition for  certiorari filed by Eugenio de  la Cruz  against respondents Judges Juan Bocar and  Emilio Rilloraza of the Court of  First Instance of  Rizal, Pasay City Branch, and Rufina and Company.   The facts in this case as disclosed by the  pleadings and their annexes may be briefly stated  as follows.

On or about May 21,  1954, Rufina  and Company filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the Justice of the Peace Court later referred to as the  Peace Court, of Malabon, Rizal, Civil Case  No. 1176,  against Eugenio de  la Cruz regarding a parcel of land in the municipality of Malabon with an area of 1,337  square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 33343 of the office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal province, said to have been bought by her from  Balbino Ignacio, et al.  Defendant-Petitioner  Cruz filed a motion to dismiss  the complaint on the ground that the Peace Court had no jurisdiction  over the case because it involved question of title  or ownership of the land in litigation and in support  of his motion, he filed his application for purchase with the Bureau of Lands  (Miscellaneous Sales  Application No. V-25569).  The  motion to dismiss was denied by the Peace  Court on July 1, 1954, and so was the motion for reconsideration on July 19, 1954, after which the Peace Court set the  case for hearing.

To  stop the proceedings in the  Peace Court  Cruz filed Civil Case No. 2819 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for prohibition against the Justice of  the Peace.  Acting upon  a motion to dismiss the petition respondent Judge Rilloraza in an order dated August 21, 1954, dismissed the petition for  prohibition, holding  that mere defense  of ownership does not divest the Justice of the Peace Court of jurisdiction over an unlawful detainer  case.  Cruz did not appeal from this order of dismissal.  Thereafter, the Peace Court  proceeded with  the hearing of the  detainer case,  after which it rendered judgment on  October 14, 1954,  ordering Cruz to  vacate the  premises  and to pay costs.   Cruz appealed to  the Court of First Instance,  Civil Case  No. 3110, and he filed a  motion to  dismiss the complaint. Said motion  was denied by Judge Rilloraza in an order  dated February 13, 1955.

In the meantime, plaintiff  Rufina and  Company in the appealed case,  filed  a  motion for  the issuance  of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.   Over the objection of Cruz, Judge Rilloraza in an order dated January 7,  1955, granted the motion upon the  filing of a bond in the sum of P500,  and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was actually issued on  February 14, 1955.

To annul the orders denying his motion  to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. 3110  of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and the order granting the petition for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the same civil case, the present petition for certiorari was filed.

As regards  the order  denying  defendant-petitioner's motion  to  dismiss the complaint  in the  appealed  case (Civil Case No. 3110), we agree with the respondent Judge that a mere defense of ownership of the land involved in a detainer case does not divest a Justice of the Peace Court of jurisdiction.  Consequently, the  order denying the motion to  dismiss was  properly  issued.   On the question of ownership  of the  land said to be detained  by defendant, as  already  stated, the same  is registered  land  covered by Torrens title in the name of plaintiff Rufina and Company.  On the  other hand, the claim  of  ownership by defendant Cruz is based merely on a Miscellaneous Sales Application filed by him with  the Bureau of Lands which upon the opposition of Rufina and Company, was rejected by the Bureau.  It is true that the effect of said rejection of his said  sales application was  later suspended by the Director of Lands, subject to further investigation,  but thereafter, the Director of Lands in his order of November 15, 1954, found  that  the sales application of Cruz  encroached upon the land of Rufina and  Company already covered by  the torrens title;  that  excluding that portion overlapping the  registered land,  there remains only  a small portion but this portion covers a canal or  creek which Cruz seems to have filled up; and  under the circumstances the Bureau withheld  action  on the Cruz' sales application to see whether the remaining portion was open and available for disposition  because it may affect  the rights of the public.  From all this, it would appear that Cruz' claim of ownership  of the land subject of the detainer case  on  the strength of which he sought to divest the Peace Court of jurisdiction is unfounded.  Moreover, the order of the Court of First Instance in the prohibition case No. 2819 dismissing his  petition  and which case directly involved the jurisdiction of the Peace Court to hear and decide the pending detainer case, became final because Cruz failed to appeal from it, thereby making it conclusive as against him; and said Peace Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine said  detainer 'case, as in fact it decided it against him.

With respect to the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against Cruz in  Civil Case No. 3110, of the Court of First Instance, we gather from the pleadings filed in the said Court marked as Annexes  by both parties that petitioner Cruz  claims that the petition for the issuance  of  the writ was filed beyond the  ten day period fixetf by Art. 1674 of the New Civil Code for the reason that the appeal was perfected on November 2, 1954, and the motion for the  issuance of the writ was filed on November 23, 1954.  Plaintiff Rufina and Company, however, explained that the said ten days should be counted not from the actual date of  the perfection of  the  appeal but from the time  that  it was notified of said perfected appeal which was  on November 19, 1954.

We agree with plaintiff-respondent.  An appellee in  a case  appealed from the  Justice of the Peace Court to  the Court of First Instance is not  called upon to be  always on guard in  the Justice of the  Peace Court to ascertain the exact  date  and hour the  appeal  is  perfected.  All that an  appellee is expected to  do is to wait for  the official notice to him of said perfected appeal from  the Court of First Instance  where the appeal is taken.   Otherwise,  said  appellee may be prematurely  filing a petition for the  issuance  of a  writ of preliminary  mandatory injunction  in the  Court  of First  Instance  before  the appeal is actually  received by  the said  court; and said appellee  would not  know  how  to  entitle  or number his petition, and the  Clerk of Court may not  admit said petition because there  is as  yet no  case or record of a case to which it may be attached  and  incorporated.  We, therefore, rule that  the period of ten days mentioned in Article  1674 within which to  file  a petition for  a writ of preliminary  mandatory  injunction should be  counted from the date when the  petitioning party is notified of the perfection  of the appeal.

Defendant-petitioner Cruz also contends that Article 1674 of the Civil Code is not available to  Rufina and Company for the reason that it had' no  previous  possession of the property  in  litigation.

Prior physical possession in the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer case is not an indispensable requisite where said plaintiff  is a vendee.^[1] Cruz also claims that there being no relation  of lessor and  lessee  between plaintiff Rufina and  Company and himself, the provision of Article 1674 of the Civil Code is not applicable.  From what we gather from the records, before Rufina and  Company bought the land, the vendor had permitted Cruz to occupy a part of it and to build his house thereon, on what conditions and whether or  not he was to  pay rent, is not known.  These conditions and the relation between the owner of the land and  Cruz as  a temporary occupant continued after the sale  of the land. Thereafter, the vendee Rufina and Company made a demand upon  De la Cruz to vacate the portion occupied by him but he refused.  It  is not necessary that there be a formal agreement or contract »of lease  between the  vendor  or  vendee  and  Cruz.  For the  purposes of Article 1674 of the Civil Code, it is enough that the plaintiff is the owner of the land and the defendant is in temporary occupancy thereof whether under a  lease contract or on mere tolerance or under a temporary permit.   Where after the  termination of  the lease contract  or the  revocation of the permit  the lessee or occupant unlawfully prolongs his occupation  of the premises, there is unlawful detainer. It is therefore clear that Article  1674 of the Civil Code is applicable to  the present  case.

In view  of the  foregoing,  finding the  orders of the Court of First Instance issued by the respondents Judges to be  in accordance with law,  the petition for  certiorari  is hereby denied, with costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon,  Padilla,  Reyes A., Bautista Angelo,  Concepcion,  Reyes, J.  B.  L.,  and  Endencia,  JJ., concur.

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^[1] Aguilair vs. Cabrera, 74 Phil., 658.