Appeal by certiorari from a decision of Judge Baltazar M.  Villanueva, Court  of Industrial Relations, dated April 22, 1957, ,in case No. 33, for unfair labor practice in Cebu. In  August, 1955,  petitioners were charged with unfair labor practice for having  interfered with,  restrained or coerced their workers or laborers who are affiliated to, or are  members of  the respondent  union.  After hearing Judge Villanueva  found that the  complaint is sustained by  the  evidence submitted  at the hearing;  that in many instances, respondents showed their anti-union activities towards the Democratic Labor Union, complainant; that respondents were ordered to stop working in the hacienda owned  and managed  by the petitioners  herein because they were members of the Democratic Labor Union; that Jimenez, petitioner herein,  had been telling the members of the union that he advised or recommended to the owners of the hacienda not to give cash advances to the members of the union, etc.   The judge, therefore, found the  information well founded.   Against this decision of the judge, a petition for certiorari has  been filed directly with us.

The most important question which we think to be decisive of  the  case, is whether or  not  an appeal from a decision of a judge of the  Court of Industrial Relations, as in this case, may be appealed  directly to this Court, without the previous presentation of a motion for reconsideration of the  decision before the Court of Industrial Relations en banc.  Respondents  claim that a motion for reconsideration  to the court en  banc is  necessary before an  appeal can be made  in this  Court,  while petitioners claim that such  step is not necessary in unfair labor practice cases, such  as the case at bar.  The reason for petitioners' contention is the fact that section 5(e) of Republic Act No.  875 confers  power  to  the court or any judge thereof; that appeals  in unfair  labor practice cases are governed exclusively by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 875, which requires  no motion for reconsideration to be presented,  prior to the appeal to this Court, to the court en  banc.

It is  to be noted that Republic Act No. 875 does not propose to amend or modify the  constitution  of the Court of Industrial Relations or the procedure established in the Act of its creation (C.A. No. 103), or appeals therefrom. Section 1 of Said Commonwealth Act No. 103 expressly provides that if any of the parties aggrieved by a decision or ruling of any of the judges, requests for a reconsideration of said  decision, it  must be  presented to the judges who shall sit together, and that the concurrence of at least three of the five  judges shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a  decision, order, or award.  This provision has always been followed in cases of appeals to this Court by certiorari.  To such effect are the rulings of this Court in the cases of Manila  Terminal Relief and  Mutual Aid Association vs. Manila Terminal Co., 88 Phil.,  395; and Rizal Cement Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, G. R. No. L-10312,  July 26, 1957.  There is  no provision in the Industrial Peace Act which modifies the constitution of the court or the procedure  therein as expressed  in Section 1  of Commonwealth Act No.  103.  And the  very language of  said  Industrial Peace Act  provides  that in unfair labor practice cases the person aggrieved by any order of the court may  appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines  (Sec. 6,  Rep. Act No. 875).  The provision does  not authorize  an appeal  from any decision made by a judge but  only  from decisions of the court. The court  is constituted by a presiding judge and  four associate judges  (Sec.  1, C.A. No. 103).   When, therefore, the Industrial  Peace  Act  authorizes an appeal from a decision of the court to the Supreme  Court, the decision that can be appealed is that rendered by the court en banc and not that rendered by any judge thereof.

The provision in Commonwealth Act No. 103 authorizing presentation of a motion for reconsideration of a decision or order of the judge to the  court en banc, and not direct appeal  therefrom to  this Court, is also in accord with the principle or exhaustion  of administrative remedies before resort can be made to this Court.  If the court en banc can give the relief that a party may desire, there would be no need of coming to  us for such relief.  This procedural requirement that a reconsideration must first be sought from the court en banc is therefore  based on principle  and administrative efficiency,  aside from the fact  that  it  is expressly provided for by law.

We find no reason for deviating from this express  provision of law which  is based on a practical policy,  and we are, therefore,  constrained to dismiss the petition for certiorari, with costs against petitioners.

Paras,  C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Endencia, Barrera,  and Gutierrez  David,  JJ., concur.