This  is a petition for certiorari to annul certain orders issued by  the  respondent judge  in Civil  Case  No. 1407 of  the  Court  of First Instance  of  Occidental  Misamis denying relief  from the judgment rendered therein and authorizing the execution of said judgment.

It appears that the civil  case  mentioned  was initiated by  the  herein  petitioner Gelacio  Bodiongan with  a complaint filed on  September 4,  1951  for  the recovery  of possession of a truck, which,  so it was alleged, had been mortgaged  and delivered  to  him  by Antonio  Barrientos, one of  the defendants therein, but  which,  through force and intimidation and  without the mortgage debt having been  paid off,  was  later "snatched" by the said Antonio Barrientos  and,  without plaintiff's knowledge, sold,  first to  Roman Mabanag  and  later  to the  other defendant Prudencio  Revelo.  Mabanag intervened   and   claimed ownership of the truck through  purchase from Antonio Barrientos.   Plaintiff impugned the purchase as made in bad faith and in  violation of the  chattel mortgage  law, and  then  amended  his  complaint  to  include  Policarpio Barrientos as party defendant, alleging that the latter had also  mortgaged a  truck to him but had failed to pay the mortgage within the time  stipulated.  The  amended com- plaint, therefore, prayed for the return of the truck taken from  plaintiff by  the  defendant  Antonio Barrientos and for the  foreclosure  of the  chattel  mortgage  constituted on the other truck by the other defendant Policarpio Barrientos.  The defendants filed their answer to the*'amended complaint, and plaintiff, on his part, filed a reply to  the said  answer.  And with the issues thus joined and with most  of the  evidence  already presented,  the parties  to the action submitted an agreement signed  by themselves and their respective attorneys with the request that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith.  In view thereof, the court rendered its decision, dated September 25, 1953, quoting and approving the agreement aforementioned and ordering the  parties to comply with its terms.

The  agreement  reads:

"BETWEEN  PLAINTIFF BODIONGAN AND  INTERVENOR ROMAN  MABANAG

1. That  the  truck  claimed by the  Intervenor Roman  Mabanag in the above  entitled case shall remain with and belong  to  the herein  plaintiff, Gelacio Bodiongan, whose ownership thereof  Intervenor and defendant hereby recognize and respect;
   
2. That  plaintiff  Gelaejo Bodiongan  shall pay  the intervenor Roman Mabanag the sum of SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED PESOS  (P6,900.00)  Philippine  currency,  the  sum  of P2,500.00 is hereby  paid,  and  the Intervenor Roman  Mabanag acknowledges to have received the  same;
   
3. That the  balance of P4,400.00 with 8 per cent interest shall be paid by the said plaintiff  Bodiongan within a period of one  (1) year in twelve (12)  monthly  installments, to wit;  the sum of P366.66 within the first  5  days after  the end of  each and every month effective October 1,  1953;
   
4. That  should plaintiff  fail  to pay  the  first four  (4)  or  any four (4)  installments as  above specified, the whole sum  shall thereby become due and payable, and execution  shall issue on the Judgment  rendered based on this agreement.

BETWEEN  PLAINTIFF  BODIONGAN  AND   DEFENDANT ANTONIO BARRIENTOS:

1.   That  plaintiff Gelaejo Bodiongan shall return  and deliver to "defendant Antonio Barrientos in good working condition and properly  equipped and fit for TPU operation  his passenger truck subject  of  the controversy between them in  this case;
   
2.   That  the work  in  putting the said  truck in  good  working condition  shall  be  done  by  the  DERONG REPAIR  SHOP  at Ozamis City  and  that all the  expanses incurred therein including labor, costs  of spare parts and other services,  shall be form exclusively by the plaintiff;
   
3.   That  the  delivery  of the  said truck  in the conditions above stated  shall be made to  the  defendant at  Ozamis  City within  a period of two (2)  months from the date  of this agreement;
   
4.   That  in satisfaction of the claim  of  the plaintiff, defendant Antonio Barrientos shall pay to him the sum of FIVE  HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) within the period of two (2) months from the date the passenger truck above referred to is delivered to and received by the defendant;
   
5.   That  in  case  of failure  of the plaintiff to comply with  the obligation  above stated, the  Court shall order  the  repair of  the said  truck at the  expense of  the said  plaintiff;
   
6.   That  in  ease  of failure of the said  defendant Antonio  Barrientos to  pay the sum  herein above stated, the said truck shall answer for the said amount in the form o£ security."

On  December 10,  1953, the  defendant  Antonio  Barrientos filed a motion  alleging that plaintiff  had failed to return  the truck to the said defendant  within the  two months stipulated  in  the agreement and  praying,  among' other things, that the court order the truck  repaired at plaintiff's expense and that the sum of P7,717, the estimated cost of repairs be deposited  with the city treasurer from whom the  repair shop was to draw such amounts as might  be needed from  time to time.   The motion contains a notice  to  plaintiff himself that  it  was  to  be  submitted for the resolution of the court at 8 o'clock a.m.  on December 15, 1953 and also a statement that copy thereof had been sent  by registered mail to plaintiff  on the  10th of that month.   No  objection having  been made to the motion, the respondent judge, on December 15, rendered an order in open court directing  the clerk of court to  execute the decision  in accordance with what was prayed for in said motion.  But it  would  appear that,  at the  instance of plaintiff, the effectivity of the  order  was  suspended so as to give him time to comply  with the agreement  and that,  before  the period  of  grace had  expired,  plaintiff delivered the truck to the  clerk  of  court.

On March  9, 1954 and then again on the 22nd of that month,  Antonio Barrientos filed a second motion. for execution, alleging that the truck delivered by Bodiongan to the clerk of  court was not in good working  condition and was  disapproved  for registration  by the  office of the  district engineer, for  which reason the movant prayed that the order suspending execution be lifted.  On March 26 plaintiff filed his  opposition  to  the second  motion for execution, but on the following  day, March 27, the date set for  the hearing of the motion,  the court,  finding the motion  well  founded,  handed  down an order  (similar to the one rendered on  December 15)  requiring plaintiff to deposit with the city treasurer the sum of P7,717, the estimated costs of repairs, and  directing  a levy  on his property to  cover  that  amount  should  he fail  to  do so within 15 days.  On April 14,  plaintiff asked for a reconsideration of this last order, but  the motion having been found  to be groundless and  without  merit,  the  court handed  down an  order, dated July 3, 1954, directing that its order of  March 27, 1954 be immediately executed.

Five  days  thereafter,  that is, on July  8, 1954, plaintiff served notice on  the court that he was changing counsel and that thereafter Cayetano P.  Paderanga was to be his attorney "of record"  in place  of the attorneys-of-record, Attys. Crispin C.  Labaria and Ceferino  E.  Paredes"  and on that same day plaintiff also filed  a verified petition to have the aforementioned agreement of September 5, 1953 and the decision rendered in accordance there with, as well as the orders thereafter handed  down, sot aside, on  the grounds  (1) that  plaintiff had affixed his signature  to said agreement  after  the respondent judge  had  exerted pressure and undue influence upon him to the  extent  of making the judge's action in  that  regard amount to  a fraud;  (2)  that fraud was also  committed  when notice of hearing of the motions for  execution, and  the motion for reconsideration was not served on his attorney; (3) that the order for  execution dated March 27 was "manifestly unconscionable,  highly oppressive,  evidently unreasonab!e, and contrary  to law;"  and (4)  that plaintiff had sufficient,  valid  and sound  causes of action against the other party litigants.   In an  ex parte motion  separately filed on that same day, plaintiff, through his new attorney, asked the respondent judge to " disqualify or inhibit himself from  further  acting  in the instant case on grounds of propriety and delicacy."

Opposing the petition for relief, the defendant Antonio Barrientos  denied  the  imputations of fraud and judicial pressure and undue influence therein contained and called attention to the fact  that the  said petition was too late, the  same having been  filed more than 9  months  after the decision sought  to  be  set aside.  Finding the opposition "to  be well-founded, in that  the  petition for relief has been filed out of time  as  provided for in Section 3, Rule 38,"  the court under  date of August 28, 1954  rendered an order denying the  said petition, and  on September 11 issued another order directing the, clerk of court "to  issue a writ of execution  as prayed for."

On  September 18, plaintiff filed  a  motion asking for a reconsideration  of the  order of August  28,  denying his petition for relief; and the  motion for  reconsideration having  been  denied,   he  filed  the  present petition for certiorari in this Court on October 2, 1954, alleging that the  respondent  judge,  gravely  abused his discretion  in ignoring his  motion for  disqualification and  also acted arbitrarily and with bias in  passing upon and denying the petition for relief in which the said judge's " own actuations have been  questioned and put in  issue,"  declaring the said petition out of  time  and not applying the ruling of his Court in the case of Jose Samaniada vs. Epifanio Mata, et al., 92 Phil., 426.

After  going over  the record, we agree with  the  respondent trial  judge that  the  petition  for  relief was  out of time, it appearing that it was filed more than nine months after   the  decision sought to  be  set  aside  was rendered.

Arguing that  the  petition  was  filed on  time, petition cites in the case of Samaniada vs.  Mata, supra.  We find the  citation not  in  point.  Though the judgment  in that case was also based on a  compromise agreement, that judgment was  not  considered final  because a  commissioner designated by the parties was  still to segregate from a disputed parcel of land the portion to be awarded to one of the parties and this Court said that "for all practical purposes the proceedings  after the compromise  agreement was a partition of real estate" which, according  to the  Rules, needed court approval.   It was, therefore, there held that the decision based on the agreement did not become final until after the submission of the report by the commissioner en segregation  and its  approval by the parties  and  the court, so that the period to file the petition for relief  did not commence to run from the date  of the decision but only after the court had acted on the  commissioner's report. In the present  case, however, the agreement of the parties contained nothing which would  require  subsequent court approval.  All that remained  for the court to do was to enforce its  judgment.  The fact that  the court could, at that stage  of  the proceeding,  still  act  in the ease in  the proceeding for execution, does not  make the judgment to be executed any the less final.

Petitioner makes capital of  the fact that  the respondent judge issued  his order  denying  the  petition  for relief without first deciding the  motion  for  his  disqualification for  reasons of  "propriety and delicacy".  These, however, are  no legal grounds for disqualifying  a  judge,  and while it is  true that the  respondent  judge did not expressly declare himself qualified, still in  denying the petition for relief instead of withdrawing from the  case, he must be deemed to have in effect decided in favor of his compentency.  At any rate, the question  of whether or not the respondent judge should have disqualified himself  from taking cognizance of the petition for relief is really of no importance, considering that the  said  petition was, as. the  record does show,  filed more than nine  months  after the  decision sought  to be set aside and,  therefore, beyond the  period allowed by section 3  of Rule 88.

Wherefore,  the  petition  is  denied  with  cost  against the  petitioner.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista  Angela, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.