Appellant, while not directly questioning the legality of the ordinance as it is, nor his conviction under the facts of the case, nor the penalty imposed upon him, has, however, appealed  and now assails the  constitutionality  of what  he  calls  the operation or implementation of  the ordinance.   Thus,  his assignment of errors:

2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT REVISED ORDINANCE NO.  1600,  SECTION 1158  IS  LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL  ON ITS  FACE, INSTEAD ON THE WAY IT IS  OPERATED.
   
   
3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED  IN HOLDING  THAT REVISED ORDINANCE NO. 1600, SECTION 1168, AS OPERATED, IS NOT  UNDULY  OPPRESSIVE  UPON  THE  INDIVIDUAL.
   

He complains that the members of the Manila Police Department, in enforcing the ordinance, immediately arrest and detain for one hour and not exceeding six hours, as was due in his particular case,  all violators of the  ordinance,  instead  of  merely serving them with a summons or  ticket for their appearance  in  court, as provided in Section 43  of Republic Act No.  409 (Charter of Manila) for violation  of any ordinance.  As thus  enforced, appellant submits  that  the ordinance, although reasonable  on its face, becomes unreasonable and  oppressive and, therefore, illegal and unconstitutional.

The  flaw in  this argument is that appellant confuses the application or  operation of the ordinance as it is, and the act of the police  officers in  the performance of  their functions  as  such  in connection with the apprehension and prosecution of  its  violators.   This misapprehension on  the part  of the appellant is made evident when  he states in his brief:

The issue boils down to that part of  Section 37, Republic  Act No. 409, Charter, of Manila, which provides that  peace officers have the power 'to arrest or cause to be  arrested, without warrant of arrest,  any offender  when the offense  is committed in  their presence or  within their view' ".  (Appellant's brief, page 4).

The arrest was not a part of the offense or violation for which the  accused  was tried and convicted.   Section  1158 of the Revised Ordinances does not provide for or indicate the manner by which the infractors  or violators thereof would be arrested and prosecuted.   It merely specifies the acts that  would constitute "littering", which acts  shall be punishable  as misdemeanors pursuant  to  Section  1262 of the Revised  Ordinances.  How the violators  are to  be dealt with and brought  to court are procedural matters entirely foreign to  the ordinance  itself, and the legality or illegality of the procedure followed by the law enforcement agencies in cases of violations of said ordinance can not affect  its validity  or  legality.

The legal situation where, while a municipal  ordinance or regulation is reasonable on its face, it may  be unreasonable or oppressive  in its operation in a particular instance and, therefore, unenforceable therein, is illustrated in the case of City  of Acworth vs. Western & A. R. Co. (159 Ga. 610; 126 SE 454).  There, the city, in pursuance to the general welfare clause  of its charter,  enacted an ordinance  requiring  all  railroad  companies operating through the city to keep and maintain a human watchman at all crossings where said railroads cross the public highways  or streets of the city, for the purpose  of warning travelers of the approach of trains.  The railroad company filed suit  against the city seeking to enjoin the enforcement  of the ordinance as to the petitioner  on  the  ground that it  (the railroad company)  had  erected and  was already maintaining  a system of signals at  such street crossings, known as wig-wags, which were as efficient,  if not more,  as human watchmen, in safeguarding persons and property  passing over such  crossings; and, further, because the employment  of  human  watchmen involved much heavier  expenditures than the installation and maintenance of  such system of signals.  The State Supreme Court of Georgia, in finding for the railroad company and in affirming an  interlocutory injunction,  declared that although  the ordinance on  its  face  was reasonable  and within the general welfare clause its effect and operation in the case of this particular  railroad company was unreasonable and unconstitutional.

The situation  of herein appellant is different.  He does not claim  that  the  anti-littering ordinance does  not or should not apply as to him or  as  to the facts of the case. He does not pretend  that the penalty provided for  this misdemeanor,  or that  imposed  on him, is unreasonable or oppressive.  What he complains of specifically is that he was arrested,  as allegedly all  violators, instead of being merely served with a summons or ticket.  It is this arrest that he assails  as abusive and arbitrary.  As it  is, appellant should have directed his efforts against the particular acts  or procedure which he  believes to be illegal or unconstitutional and  not  against the instant ordinance the validity of which, at least on  its face, he tacitly acknowledges and admits.

The judgment appealed from  is  hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.   It is  so  ordered.

Paras, C.  J., Bengzon,  Padilla,  Montemayor,  Bautista Angelo,  Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, and  Gutierrez David,  JJ.,  concur.